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ABSTRACT 
 Federal disaster declarations are authorized by the president under the provisions of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. Prior studies have 
found varying levels of political influence associated with the declaration process. Factors 
including electoral votes, reelection years, congressional committee appointments, geographic 
location, and party favoritism have been implicated in claims of inequity associated with the 
distribution of federal disaster assistance. Compounding these concerns is evidence of recurring 
problems associated with disparities in the long-term recovery from disasters based on social and 
economic factors. This dissertation is a response to the call for further research into the political 
dynamics of disaster declarations. Multivariate hierarchical analytical techniques and key 
stakeholder interviews were utilized to systematically investigate perceived inequities in the 
implementation of federal disaster policy and the consequences of those inequities with respect 
to health-related recovery in communities that had differential access to federal resources. The 
research findings counter broad claims of political motive in the distribution of federal resources 
after disasters. However, the observation of a disproportionate post disaster stress-related disease 
burden in portions of the study area is indicative of a procedural inequity that must be addressed. 
The recently enacted Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 calls for a review of eligibility 
criteria for disaster declarations. The findings of this research are intended to contribute to the 
review process and assist in the reformulation of public policy in order to address the unique 
needs of previously unconsidered at-risk populations.
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CHAPTER 1: 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Spatial equity refers to the consideration of need, justice, and fairness in the distribution 
of resources and services across different places as well as different socioeconomic and political 
groups (Hay 1995, Talen and Anselin 1998; Omer 2006). Disasters provide fertile ground for the 
investigation of spatial equity as the severity of these events is defined by the destruction and 
reconstruction of our physical and social attachments and the manner in which they are "woven 
together through space by ….. ties that produce places as changing constellations of human 
commitments, capacities, and strategies" (Agnew 2009, 37). Fritz (1961) informs us that 
disasters are events in which a community “incurs such losses to its members and physical 
appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the 
essential functions of the society is prevented.”   In this context, it is clearly evident that disasters 
represent much more than a quantifiable compromise to the economic value of the natural and 
built environment. The post-disaster fragmentation of a community’s social structure is 
represented by the “loss of our places of work and worship; the places of safety, sanctuary, and 
solace; and ultimately, the places of contentment and emotional well-being that are the markers 
of a healthy society” (Salkowe 2012).  
These are the “humanized spaces” (Tuan 1978) that differentiate hope from despair in the 
aftermath of disasters.  We frame our sense of place around the “decay and renewal of social 
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relations” (Massey 1994) that define our existence in the midst of catastrophe. We mark our 
sense of recovery from disaster by the salvation and restoration of our material and emotional 
resources. Yi-Fu Tuan (1980) reminds us that, "our fragile sense of self needs support, and this 
we get by having and possessing things because, to a large degree, we are what we have and 
possess.” Hobfoll, in developing a “conservation of resources” integrative stress theory (1989, 
513) suggests that, “people strive to retain, protect, and build resources and that what is 
threatening to them is the potential or actual loss of these valued resources.”  When these 
resources are lacking or lost in the aftermath of a natural or technological disaster, “people 
become vulnerable to psychological and physical disorder and debilitated functioning” (Hobfoll 
and Jackson 1991, 111).   
Disaster policy in the U.S. has been formulated with the intent to equitably address the 
“overwhelming” needs of people and places with indifference to political acts of favoritism, bias, 
and preference. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 
(P.L. 100-707) (the Stafford Act), was specifically enacted by the U.S. Congress to ameliorate 
the negative consequences of individual and community resource loss by means of direct and 
indirect assistance; ranging from psychological and medical services to temporary housing and 
property repair. Flint (2000, 145) tells us that “There is a recursive and mutually constituting 
relationship between political acts and the social construction of space that has become 
axiomatic in geography.”  The relationship between the equitable implementation of the 
provisions of the Stafford Act, designed to preserve and restore our material and social resources 
in the midst of disaster, and the potential post-disaster incidence of psychological and physical 
disorders in communities that had differential access to federal government support becomes 
apparent when the, aforementioned, “conservation of resources” theory is considered. 
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1.2 Purpose of the Investigation and Summary of Methodology 
 This dissertation systematically investigates perceived inequities in the implementation 
and effectiveness of federal disaster policy in the U.S. under the provisions of the Stafford Act, 
and the consequences of these inequities with respect to health-related recovery in communities 
that had differential access to the array of federal resources that are available after a disaster. The 
resultant in-depth study of every disaster declaration and denial issued by the President of the 
U.S., since the approval of the Stafford Act in 1988 through 2012, provides additional clarity 
with respect to the local, state, and federal decision-making processes that surround these 
unfortunate events. Supplementing these findings is a quantitative hierarchical retrospective 
analysis of stress-related disease recovery outcomes with respect to individual and community 
physiological, psychological, and social health and well-being in presidential disaster declared 
and denied counties of the U.S., based on a case analysis conducted in the state of Illinois. This 
state provided a pertinent study area for the examination of long-term recovery outcomes in 
disaster affected areas of the U.S. due to the extent of flood exposure that occurred in 2008, the 
combination of related disaster declarations, denials, and appeals and the political dynamics of 
presidential discretion in an election year when an Illinois U.S. Senator, from an opposing party, 
ran as a presidential candidate. The use of triangulated key stakeholder interviews and 
longitudinal (2007-2009) pre- and post-event encrypted identifier level empirical data from 
12,000 Medicare eligible patients, obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, provided a unique insight into the post-disaster health status of the rural elderly in the 
study area. The rural elderly were selected for the case study due to documented evidence of 
disproportionate levels of stress-related illness in certain subsets of this population, a relative 
lack of access to health services, and less satisfactory outcomes associated with psychological 
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disorders and comorbid chronic illnesses. (Lawrence and McCulloch 2001; Letvak 2002; Rost et 
al. 2002; Inder, Lewin and Kelly 2012; Mechakra-Tahiri et al. 2013).  
 The National Research Council’s Committee on Population Panel (2009) has concluded 
that an  “emphasis on the elderly in disaster research is needed precisely so that the special 
circumstances of older adults are not overlooked, appropriate strategies of mitigation and 
response can be introduced, and the epidemiologic consequences of disaster for older 
populations can be better characterized.”  The panel participants “underscored the importance of 
surveillance data predisaster (sic) and longitudinal data post-disaster to make sense of events and 
their sequelae.” The following retrospective longitudinal analysis is consistent with this 
directive. The findings of this dissertation provide further perspective into individual and 
community vulnerabilities and capacities and the tactics that are utilized in the attempt to protect 
and restore the resources that are essential to health and well-being in the aftermath of disasters. 
 
1.3 Background 
 Federal disaster declarations and denials (turndowns) are authorized by the president 
under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 
1988 (P.L. 100-707) (the Stafford Act). This act created a mechanism for the distribution of 
various forms of relief aid after disasters including debris removal, temporary housing, 
individual and family financial assistance, infrastructure repair, emergency communications, and 
military support for the preservation of life and property (Bea 2006). Disaster declaration 
requests are considered when a state or local government indicates that it has been 
“overwhelmed” by the effects of a disaster event and the governor of the affected state has 
executed the state’s emergency plan and requested consideration for federal disaster relief from 
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the President of the United States (Sylves and Waugh 1996; Bazan 2005). The Stafford Act 
grants the president permanent and final authority to direct federal aid to affected states (Bea 
2005).  
The President of the U.S. is not bound to follow the disaster declaration criteria utilized 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and is not obligated to abide by FEMA’s 
recommendation for a declaration or denial of Stafford Act assistance (Sylves 2008). The 
decision-making processes surrounding a federal disaster relief declaration or denial (turndown) 
are protected by executive privilege and unavailable for public scrutiny (FEMA 2008; FEMA 
2011; McCarthy 2011). This has contributed to the skepticism and confusion associated with 
perceived inequities in the distribution of federal relief under the provisions of the Stafford Act. 
This is pervasive in rural communities that have been denied requests for federal disaster relief 
and was recently highlighted by the mayor of 2012 tornado-stricken Ridgway, Illinois who 
stated, “I feel like we are the little one at the end and we aren't getting our piece of the cookie” 
(DeNeal 2012). This sentiment was reinforced by Illinois Governor Pat Quinn, after a 2013 
denial for tornado damages in rural central Illinois;  “I really feel the federal law that FEMA 
follows is fundamentally unfair and needs reform…It’s not a fair formula for large states that 
have a big city and rural areas. Those rural areas can get ignored” (Berg 2014). Often plagued by 
disproportionately higher levels of unemployment, poverty, chronic illness, and unmet medical 
service needs in an increasingly elder demographic, some rural communities have developed a 
sense of deprivation and disenfranchisement that they attribute to “political elites” in urban areas 
and in Washington (Walsh 2012; National Rural Health Association 2013). 
 Disaster relief to individuals and households under the provisions of the Stafford Act 
extends well beyond temporary housing provisions. Disaster declarations for Individual 
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Assistance (IA) may include benefits for immediate and long-term psychological crisis 
counseling, medical and dental services, consumer aid, legal needs, funeral expenses, tax relief, 
unemployment compensation, food coupons, relocation assistance, child care cost 
reimbursement, and loans or grants for repairs or replacement of personal property (FEMA 
2008a). Additionally, presidential disaster declarations (PDD) provide an opportunity for 
affected states and counties to access a variety of supplementary prioritized disaster-related 
recovery services including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s post-
disaster Community Development Block Grants, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural 
Development Disaster Assistance loans and grants, and the Department of Health and Human 
Services – Disaster Assistance for Older Americans program (FEMA 2005; Brown 2012, USDA 
2014a). 
 Attention has been drawn to political motives such as partisanship and vote-seeking 
behaviors that may influence the decision-making process due to the sole discretion granted to 
the president with respect to disaster declarations and denials (turndowns) and the observation of 
a significant increase in both the frequency of disaster declarations and the financial allotment 
associated with federal aid since the approval of the Stafford Act (Sylves 1998; Downton and 
Pielke 2001; Garrett and Sobel 2003). In reference to the significant increase in post-Stafford 
Act requests for disaster declarations, Rubin (2007, 121) indicates that “Seeking presidential 
disaster and emergency declarations has become a ‘growth industry’ for the U.S.” Sylves  (2008, 
101) informs us that, “The broader authority to judge what is or is not a disaster under the 
Stafford Act has provided presidents since 1988 with more latitude to approve unusual or 
‘marginal’ events as disasters or emergencies.” The success rate in acquiring a presidential 
emergency or major disaster declaration increased from 62.5 percent during the pre-Stafford Act 
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time period of 1953-1988 to 82.7 percent in the 1989-2012 post-Stafford Act time frame (FEMA 
2013a). Requests for disaster declarations are 20.2 percent more likely to be granted since the 
Stafford Act was legislated in November of 1988. Claims of “disaster gerrymandering” (Platt 
1999), inefficiency, and inconsistency in the determination and aid distribution process for 
disaster declarations have been highlighted in prior research and media reports (Sylves and 
Waugh 1996; Gaul, Morgan, and Cohen 2006). The lack of  established specific fixed criteria for 
the determination of a state’s capacity to be “overwhelmed” by a disaster event has led to 
scrutiny regarding evidence of the designation of presidential disaster declarations (PDD) that 
are not associated with major hazard events (Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). The ability 
for the president to modify cost share requirements for major disaster declarations (Bea 2006) 
and exceed monetary relief thresholds for emergency disaster declarations (Bea 2005) 
compounds the concern pertaining to subjectivity in decision making protocols. Additionally, 
federal intervention after disasters has become an expected role of government and the failure to 
offer assistance could create a loss of confidence during a time of crisis (Sugerman, 2007). 
These considerations extend the debate pertaining to the presidential disaster declaration 
process. Political influences including electoral votes, reelection year, “battleground” state 
status, affiliations between affected states and key congressional committee appointees, and 
party favoritism have all been implicated in criticism of the selective approval capacity that is 
solely designated to the president under the congressional legislative mandate of the Stafford Act 
(May 1985; Downton and Pielke 2001; Garrett and Sobel 2003; Cutter and Emrich 2005; 
Krueger 2005; Reeves 2006; Sylves and Buzas 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch and Cutter 2008; 
Reeves 2011, Gasper 2013). The conclusions of these researchers suggest that inequities exist in 
the implementation of the provisions of the Stafford Act and that relief aid is preferentially 
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distributed to politically important actors, states, and regions to the disadvantage of areas without 
equivalent political power and voice.  
A burgeoning national budget deficit has led to a renewed focus on the debate regarding 
the role of the federal government in the response to natural disasters (Hulse 2011; Korte 2011; 
CNBC 2013). The President of the U.S. has issued 1,199 major disaster declarations and 252 
emergency declarations from the initiation of Stafford Act legislation in 1988 through 2012 
(FEMA 2013) resulting in a federal outlay of approximately $344.5 billion for federal disaster 
assistance from 1989-2009 (adjusted to 2012 dollars) (Lindsay and Murray 2011; FEMA 2013a). 
The recently enacted Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L.113-2), authorized an 
additional $50.7 billion in disaster assistance in response to the damages from Hurricane Sandy 
in 2012 (Painter and Brown 2013). Compounding these fiscal concerns is evidence of recurring 
problems associated with inequities in the long-term recovery from disasters based on a variety 
of social and economic factors (Elliott and Pais 2006; Cutter 2006; Brown, Rothman and Norris 
2007;  Moss, Schellhamer and Berman 2009; Rubin 2009; Adams et al. 2011; Weber and 
Hilfinger Messias 2012).  
The adverse consequences of disasters take an insidious toll on the most vulnerable 
members of our society. Behind the tragic visage of damaged homes and lost possessions is the 
realization that subsets of individuals who are disenfranchised by poverty, age, infirmity, race, 
lower education levels, and lack of social support are at the greatest risk of suffering from the 
burden of stress-related diseases that may surface in the wake of disasters and these same 
members of our community may be the least able and least likely to accept help from 
government (Klinenberg 2002, 47; Barr 2008). Although prior research has established that most 
people are able to withstand exposure to disasters without long-term adverse health 
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consequences (Marks and Fritz 1954; Bonanno 2004), the persistence of stress-related behaviors 
and physiological disorders after disaster events has been well-documented in vulnerable 
population subsets (Boman 1979; Norris, Friedman, and Watson 2002; Burton et al. 2009; 
Holman and Silver 2011). The consideration of post-disaster physiological, psychological, and 
social well-being is critical to the development of effective federal disaster policy with respect to 
individual and community recovery.  
The need to recognize mental and physical health as essential components of individual 
and community well-being after disasters has been recognized by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in the National 
Preparedness Goal, the National Response Framework, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-21, the National Health Security Strategy, the National Disaster Recovery Framework, 
and in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) long-term community recovery 
initiatives (Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21 2007; Department of Homeland 
Security 2008; 2011a; 2011b; FEMA 2009a; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
2009). The Disaster Mental Health Subcommittee of the National Biodefense Science Board, 
established to provide expert advice and guidance to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS), concluded that “…..the most pressing and significant 
problem that hinders integration of disaster mental and behavioral health is the lack of 
appropriate policy at the highest Federal level. Compounding that problem is the lack of any 
clear statement as to where the authority to devise, formulate, and implement such policy should 
reside” (Disaster Mental Health Subcommittee 2010). The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has placed a “new focus on the societal determinants of health” in its 
“Healthy People 2020” initiative (2010 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). The 
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HHS Secretary’s Advisory Committee recognizes that “at a societal level, policies made in 
governmental, corporate, and non-governmental sectors can impact health and health behaviors 
in whole populations both positively and negatively” and that the elimination of health 
disparities will “occur by changing our thinking about health, examining root causes and societal 
determinants.”  The broader impacts of the following dissertation are designed to assist in 
addressing these issues by the systematic investigation of potential inequities in extant federal 
disaster policy under the provisions of the Stafford Act and the outcomes associated with policy 
implementation pertaining to the mental and physical health and well-being of disaster-affected 
individuals and communities. 
 The concerns pertaining to federal intervention in the response to and recovery from 
disasters have been heightened over the past several years. Since 1980, the frequency and 
severity of hydro-meteorological events has been increasing with a concurrent rise in financial 
losses from these events (Steinberg 2006, 202; Munich Reinsurance Company 2013). The 
ubiquitous sense of public angst associated with the increased risk of exposure to disasters has 
been augmented in the past decade by the well-documented limitations in the federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina and the perceived lack of effective federal oversight associated with the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (U.S. House 2006; Birkland and Waterman 
2008, Hagerty and Ramseur 2010; Salkowe 2010). In the midst of these unsettling occurrences, 
there is a growing sense of collective despair regarding the inability of our elected officials to 
reach consensus on a myriad of public policy concerns. Pulitzer Prize winner, David Rohde 
(2012), summarized the growing lack of congressional open-mindedness, tolerance, and empathy 
in categorizing 2012 as “the year that government failed us.”  
11 
 
 Former Cabinet Secretary John Gardner addressed the growing concerns associated with 
political partisanship and public cynicism by stating “We must not despair of the Republic” 
(Gardner 1998). However, public perception of failures in federal policy and practice have 
contributed to a growing sense of despair with a “Republic” that in the wake of disasters has, too 
often, become suspect of abandoning the “social contract” that defines the “spatial distribution of 
rights and responsibilities between citizens and the state” (Pelling and Dill 2010) and “the duties 
of care that public officials owe to the people of a democratic society” (Ignatieff  2005). 
Gardner’s (1998) prescient warning, “We must not despair of the Republic”, has found an early 
roost in the 21st century American political dynamic. “By many accounts, the Congress has been 
more partisan since the turn of the new century than it had been for a hundred years” (Smith, 
Roberts, and Vander Wielen 2006). The percentage of Americans indicating confidence in 
Congress as an institution is at a 40 year nadir, in 2013, with only 10% of those surveyed 
supporting the actions of our federal legislature (Mendes and Wilke 2013).  Wolf, Strachan, and 
Shea (2012) suggest that congressional incivility has contributed ‘to conditions that make future 
consensus even less possible, as the emphasis on partisan divisions, political incivility, and 
unwillingness to compromise demobilizes those voters who prefer civil deliberative politics and 
mobilizes those who favor the balkanized party positions.” Senators including Evan Bayh (D-
IN), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) have decided to not seek re-election 
due to the systemic intransigence that permeates Congress; Bayh in 2010, Snowe in 2012, and 
Chambliss in 2014 (Smith 2012, Chambliss 2014). Senator Bayh explained his rationale for 
retirement by stating, “I want to be engaged in an honorable line of work” (Klein 2011). Senator 
Snowe (2012), in a more hopeful tone, indicates that “Government can work again, but only 
when Americans support and vote for individuals who will follow the principles of consensus-
12 
 
building.”  Senator Chambliss stated, “This is about frustration, both at a lack of leadership from 
the White House and at the dearth of meaningful action from Congress” (Chambliss 2013). 
Faced with a growing awareness of dysfunctional governance and a stratified electorate, 
polarized by partisan redistricting and disparate political ideologies (Perlstein 2001; Forgette 
2005), there is a substantive concern regarding the effectiveness of our experiment in 
deliberative democracy (Apperson 2006). 
 Embedded in the realization of Gardner’s despair (1998) and emblematic of its cause are 
the aforementioned reports of  inequities associated with preferential and partisan politics in the 
federal response to natural and technological disasters in the U.S., as evidenced in internet blogs, 
media reports, and the academic literature (Downton and Pielke 2001; Garrett and Sobel 2003; 
Cutter and Emrich 2005; Krueger 2005; Klein 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch and Cutter 2008; Sylves 
and Buzas 2007; Reeves 2011; ABC News 2012, Vogel 2012). The recent politicization of 
disaster relief after Hurricane Sandy in 2012 highlights the dismay related to the perception of 
partisanship and ineffective leadership from our elected representatives with respect to disaster 
response and recovery. Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey, in a plea for assistance on behalf 
of his storm-ravaged constituency stated, “National disasters happen in red states and blue states. 
We respond to innocent victims of natural disasters, not as Republicans or Democrats but as 
Americans – or at least we did until last night" (CNBC 2013).  Congressman Mick Mulvaney 
(R-SC5) in reference to the contentious deliberations over Sandy aid commented, “Indeed, if we 
cannot come together under these tragic circumstances to find a way to pay for this relief, do we 
seriously believe we will have the political will to ever balance the budget”(Faile 2013)?  
 We have reached a collective “tipping point” (Pelling and Dill 2010); a critical juncture 
where opportunities for positive change in policy must be manifested and supported by a willing 
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government. There is no other recourse. Systemic intransigence is not a remedy for political ill-
will. In contrast to the well-publicized rancor that is evident amongst our elected officials, 
bipartisan congressional legislation has been enacted to address concerns pertaining to inequities 
and inadequacies in the response to disasters in the U.S.  The recently authorized Sandy 
Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 exemplifies the attempts of a functional and deliberative 
Congress to implement positive change in response to disasters by legislating supplements and 
revisions to the Stafford Act that are intended to improve local and federal response and 
recovery initiatives (Brown, McCarthy and Liu 2013).  
 The subsequent multivariate analysis of every disaster declaration and denial since the 
Stafford Act was signed into law, through 2012, counters several of the prior claims of academic 
researchers pertaining to political partisanship and preference in the distribution of disaster relief 
under the provisions of this policy. The in-depth findings of this dissertation respond to the call 
for further research into the political dynamics of disaster declarations (Sylves and Buzas 2007; 
Sobel, Coyne, and Leeson 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). The consideration of 
confounding variables that were absent in prior studies reveals that the mandate of presidential 
privilege in disaster-decision making is not synonymous with presidential impropriety in the 
implementation of the provisions of the Stafford Act. Political patronage and the spoils of 
financial aid are not “the remorseless working of things” (Whitehead 1948, 17) in the federal 
response to natural disasters. These important observations allow us to move past an assumed 
notion of immutable political bias in presidential disaster declaration decision-making and focus 
on the recovery outcomes of disaster affected communities with the intent to support effective 
Stafford Act policy reformulation.  
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1.4 Broader Impacts and Significance of the Investigation 
 Robert Sack (1997) has challenged human geographers with a task, as Homo 
Geographici, to pursue investigations that increase our moral awareness of the differences that 
exist between and within our socially created spaces. Consistent with this mission, Sack (1997, 
248) tells us that, “The local can be understood and accorded respect only if people attain a more 
objective perspective, enabling them to see beyond their own partiality and to be held 
responsible for this larger domain.”  This is a critical observation at a time when the partiality of 
political sentiment has called to question the ability of elected officials to govern effectively 
(Muirhead 2010). Faced with a growing frustration in the seemingly irreconcilable differences 
that are the antithesis of a deliberative democracy, we have collectively lapsed into a state of 
bitter and weary discontent. The resultant sense of ennui permeates the electorate (Walsh 2012) 
and challenges our ability to enable effective change in disaster practices on a local, state, and 
federal level. David Rothkopf (2013), alarmed by the lack of public protest and outcry in the 
face of the 2013 partial federal government shutdown, suggests that, most disturbingly, what the 
citizenry is saying is, "We don't believe you any more and we are starting not to care." 
 Joe Scanlon (2013), in referencing Scott Knowles (2012, 306), informs us that, 
“Research into disasters matters, it has real human and economic repercussions and when the 
research is productive but cannot influence disaster policy, cannot help shape the risks, then we 
have failed to live up to our obligations as social scientists, ….. as those privileged enough to 
understand what’s at stake.” McGuirk (2011, 236) builds upon this sentiment in calling for “an 
orientation to policy research with (as opposed to for) the state in critical praxis: an engaged and 
politicized process of collaborative, situated knowledge production aimed at advancing critical 
ethical and normative agenda. This relies on a recognition of states, first, as complex social 
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terrains with intense institutional capacities and, second, as porous to intersections with critical 
researchers aiming to advance progressive policy interventions.” 
This dissertation attempts to adhere to the challenge of the aforementioned scholars by 
advancing the knowledge and understanding of the factors that are associated with effective 
governance in times of disaster and the consequences of those actions with respect to the 
resources and recovery of individuals and communities affected by these untoward events. The 
first deliverable from this investigation, Federal Disaster Relief in the U.S.: The Role of Political 
Partisanship and Preference in Presidential Disaster Declarations and Turndowns (Salkowe 
and Chakraborty 2009), has been quoted and cited by the Library of Congress-Congressional 
Research Service in 2 independent reports to the U.S. Congress (McCarthy 2010; Lindsay and 
McCarthy 2012). In this regard, it is hoped that the initial and subsequent findings of this 
research will contribute to the critical examination and reformulation of disaster policy in the 
U.S.  The previously referenced Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-2) 
(Brown, McCarthy and Liu 2013) specifically mandates that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) review the subjective components of the Individual Assistance 
provisions of the Stafford Act in order to provide a better understanding of eligibility criteria for 
disaster affected communities. The following analysis is intended to respond to the call for 
public input and contribute to the federal review process by providing empirical evidence of 
stress-related disease recovery outcomes in disaster declared and denied counties of the U.S.  
 
1.4.1 Consilience 
 Anthony Oliver-Smith  (1999, 29-30) informs us that, "a political ecology perspective on 
disasters focuses on the dynamic relationships between a human population, its socially 
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generated and politically enforced productive and allocatable patterns, and its physical 
environment, all in the formation of patterns of vulnerability and response to disaster.” This 
dissertation undertakes a syncretic approach to an investigation of the dynamic relationships that 
exist between federal policy, community practice, and individual outcomes in disaster affected 
areas of the U.S. It embraces Oliver-Smith’s political ecological perspective (1999, 29-30) by 
contextualizing patterns of health vulnerability within a framework of political response to the 
extreme environmental disturbances that result in requests for Stafford Act disaster declarations 
from the President of the U.S. It expands upon the role of geographic inquiry with respect to 
human-environment interactions by systematically examining the political ecology of stress-
related disease (Mayer and Meade 1994; Mayer 1996) in flood damaged areas of Illinois. 
 Specifically, this study investigates the implementation of federal disaster policy based 
on political decision-making and how differential access to federal disaster related resources 
may be associated with the development and persistence of stress-related illness in the aftermath 
of natural and environmental disasters. This integrative pursuit provides transformational 
evidence-based outcome methodologies that are applicable to a variety of geographic 
investigations of the human condition and the myriad of social, cultural, and political factors that 
influence health and well-being. The resultant multiscalar inquiry connects the universal to the 
particular (Agnew 1996) by considering  macro-level federal policies that provide support to 
disaster affected communities and the micro-level biological effects of those policies as 
exhibited by the incidence of stress-related disease in individuals who had differential access to 
post-disaster resources. 
 At its core, the following dissertation is an effort at consilience (Whewell 1840; Wilson 
1998); an attempt to unify the knowledge that encompasses policy and practice; implementation 
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and outcome; action and consequence, in the arena of U.S. disaster policy and disaster recovery. 
This necessitates a rigorous analysis of, both, the factors that are associated with disaster 
declarations and denials under the provisions of the Stafford Act and the resultant recovery 
outcomes in communities that had differential access to Stafford Act related resources. A 
fragmented investigation of policy implementation will not suffice, nor will a stand-alone 
inquiry of health-related disaster recovery. As geographers, committed to the study of human-
environment relations, we are well-served by adhering to the Kantian concept that “the revival of 
the science of geography . . . should create that unity of knowledge without which all learning 
remains only piece-work” (Harvey 2000). Nearly a century ago, Harlan Barrows called for a 
geographic emphasis on the relationships that exist between the natural environment and the 
distribution and activities of man in his 1922 presidential address before the Association of 
American Geographers. Barrows (1922, 10) informed us that the “solution of the geographic 
problem requires the use of psychological, economic, and political facts”. Consistent with these 
observations, Mayer and Meade (1994, 103) reveal that the study of disease ecology: 
…..considers the numerous social, economic, behavioral, cultural, environmental, 
and biological factors which create disease in specific places at specific times 
(Meade 1977). As such, disease ecology is inherently concerned with integrating 
the social and physical aspects of human existence. This is one of the claims that 
geographers frequently make in defending and defining their discipline, and 
disease ecology is the embodiment of this claim. 
 
 
The Stafford Act is not an arcane mandate situated on the periphery of the human 
condition. It is the “centerpiece” of federal disaster policy in the U.S. (Moss, Schellhamer and 
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Berman 2009). This legislation enables multiple scales of horizontal and vertical governance to 
be simultaneously operationalized in response to the ravages of flood, fire, wind, and earthquake. 
It authorizes the distribution of a vast array of direct and indirect disaster support services that 
are designed to protect and restore the material and emotional resources that are the hallmarks of 
our sense of well-being. We must retain a framework of understanding, throughout the following 
discourse, which defines disasters as events that disrupt the social structure of a society (Fritz 
1961).  In this regard, it is evident that disasters represent the most severe moments of our 
individual existence and the capricious manner of these events often exposes the least capable 
and most vulnerable members of our society to disproportionately devastating outcomes (Cutter, 
Boruff, and Shirley 2003; Fothergill and Peek 2004; Cutter and Finch 2007).  
While John Gardner justifiably forewarned of the dangers of “despair of the republic”, it 
is evident that within our private, parochial, and public spheres there are individuals who, on a 
daily basis, despair of their own existence. The higher incidence of hopelessness, sadness, and a 
sense of worthlessness amongst the rural poor, elderly, and culturally marginalized is empirically 
established (Hauenstein 2003; Pleis, Lucas and Ward 2009; Plonczynski et al 2012). These 
individuals are inordinately burdened with a molecular despondency that is manifested by the 
biochemical markers of stress and pain that are associated with anxiety, depression, and the 
myriad of comorbid physiological maladies that may be prevalent after disaster exposure. There 
is an essential cogent connection that exists between an examination of the politics of federal 
disaster policy and the potential persistence of post-disaster stress-related disease amongst the 
disadvantaged rural elderly. A meticulous dissection of the sinew of spatial relations that connect 
disaster policy to disaster recovery is critical to an understanding of the situational pathology 
that afflicts these individuals. A toxic level of concurrent psychological and physiological stress 
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often exists amongst those who are disproportionately burdened by chronic levels of poverty, 
poor health, and lack of social support (Kristenson et al. 2004; Barr 2008; Shonkoff, Boyce and 
McEwen 2009; McEwen and Gianaros 2011).  
Exposure to disasters and the resultant loss of material and emotional resources may 
serve as a tipping point towards a downward spiral of progressive illness in people who are 
already compromised by advancing age and lower socioeconomic status.  The following 
dissertation rests the question of spatial equity and federal disaster policy in the weathered hands 
of these individuals. If we count upon their fingers, the noted concerns of political partisanship; 
patronage; privilege; and preference and the concerns of post-disaster health outcomes related to 
age; access; gender; culture; and poverty, we will garner a greater appreciation for the insidious 
nature of previously unrealized inequities and for the unity of knowledge that embodies a 
geographic approach to disaster research. 
 
1.5 Research Questions/Hypotheses 
Although prior research has used various methodologies to examine inequities associated 
with responses to presidential disaster declaration requests, there is a substantive need to address 
remaining gaps in the literature that pertain to a more thorough consideration of variables 
associated with political favoritism, “overwhelming” need, geographic preference, and disaster 
recovery. Ultimately, it is necessary to ascertain if the implementation of federal disaster policy 
adheres to a public choice model that focuses on the individual political needs of legislators or a 
redistributive process that is based on the “overwhelming” needs of disaster stricken 
communities. A multi-level and multi-method research approach was employed to investigate 
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the equitable implementation of the provisions of the Stafford Act based on the questions that are 
summarized below. 
 
1.5.1 Political Partisanship/Biased Vote Seeking 
Is there significant evidence of political partisanship or biased vote-seeking behavior in 
the distribution of presidential disaster declarations and denials under the provisions of the 
Stafford Act? Do the findings support prior claims of political favoritism in the decision making 
process? These questions will be addressed by empirical analysis of all presidential disaster 
declarations and denials in the U.S. from 1989-2012.  
 Hypothesis: Presidential Stafford Act disaster declarations and denials in the U.S. are not 
influenced by political partisanship or biased vote seeking behavior. 
 
1.5.2 Overwhelming Need 
Is there significant evidence that the distribution of presidential disaster declarations in 
the U.S. is based on the "overwhelming" need of states/counties since the initiation of the 
Stafford Act in 1989? Do the findings support prior claims of inequity in the distribution of 
disaster declarations in the U.S. for marginal, small-scale disaster events that are not associated 
with "overwhelming” need? These questions will be addressed by empirical investigation of all 
presidential disaster declarations in the U.S. from 1989-2012. 
Hypothesis: Presidential Stafford Act disaster declarations and denials in the U.S. are 
influenced by the "overwhelming" need of a state/county. 
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1.5.3 Geographic Inequity 
Is there significant evidence of geographic inequities in the distribution of presidential 
disaster declarations and denials under the provisions of the Stafford Act, after controlling for 
economic losses and the severity of major disaster events?  Do the findings support prior claims 
that geographic inequalities in the receipt of presidential disaster declarations are not solely 
based on the pattern of major hazard events? These questions will be addressed by empirical 
investigation of all presidential disaster declarations and denials in the United States from 1989-
2012. 
 Hypothesis: There is no evidence of geographic inequities in the distribution of 
presidential disaster declarations and denials under the provisions of the Stafford Act in the U.S. 
Geographic disparities in the distribution of presidential disaster declarations and denials under 
the provisions of the Stafford Act are based on the differential prevalence of natural hazards in 
certain regions of the U.S. 
1.5.4 Disaster Recovery and Individual/Community Health and Well-Being 
 Is there a significant difference between presidential disaster declared and presidential 
disaster denied places that experienced similar types of natural disasters, with respect to post 
event disaster recovery, as measured by changes in indicators of individual and community 
health well-being? This question will be addressed by a longitudinal comparison of indicators of 
stress-related psychological and physiological disorders in presidential disaster declared and 
denied counties of a single state (Illinois) that were recipients of gubernatorial declared 
storm/flood disasters in 2008. 
22 
 
 Hypothesis: The recovery from similar types and scales of disaster events is the same in 
presidential declared and presidential denied counties of Illinois in 2008 under the provisions of 
the Stafford Act. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Note to Reader 
 Portions of this chapter have been previously published in the Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management (2009) and have been reproduced with the permission of 
Walter de Gruyter Inc. for institutional repositories from: Salkowe, R. and J. Chakraborty, 
Federal Disaster Relief in the U.S.: The Role of Political Partisanship and Preference in 
Presidential Disaster Declarations and Turndowns, DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1562 (See 
Appendix 3). The final publication is available at www.degruyter.com  
<http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ 
jhsem.2009.6.1/ jhsem.2009.6.1.1562/jhsem.2009.6.1.1562.xml> 
 Additional portions of this chapter have been previously published in Behavioral Health 
Response to Disasters. 2012. Teasley, M. and J. Framingham, eds. and have been reproduced 
with the permission of CRC Press-Taylor and Francis Group from: Salkowe, R., Past Disaster 
Experiences and Behavioral Health Outcomes, DOI: 10.1201/b11954-3 and Salkowe, R. and J. 
L. Framingham, Government Roles and Responsibilities in Disaster Behavioral Health Response 
and Recovery, DOI: 10.1201/b11954-6 (See Appendix 3). The final publication is available at 
www.crcnetbase.com. http://www.crcnetbase.com/doi/book/10.1201/b11954.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 The following literature review provides a purposive historical analysis of the 
psychological consequences of disasters. It is introduced to establish the importance of a 
culturally sensitive behavioral health perspective as a component of disaster recovery. This 
portion of the chapter provides the reader with contextual background vis-à-vis the documented 
narratives of disaster survivors since the 79 A.D. eruption of Mt Vesuvius in Pompeii and, in so 
doing, provides a foundation for the consideration of persistent stress-related psychological and 
co-morbid physiological disorders as a measure of disaster recovery.  
 A detailed summary of disaster policies and practices in the U.S. that are pertinent to the 
dissertation is provided in conjunction with a review of prior research findings associated with 
perceived inequities in the distribution of federal disaster declarations under the provisions of the 
Stafford Act. This portion of the chapter is relevant to the research questions addressing political 
partisanship/biased vote seeking, overwhelming need, and geographic inequity and it provides a 
mechanism for understanding the “patchwork quilt” (Thomas and Bowen 2008) of  various 
governmental programs, policies, and resources that are available to address the needs of disaster 
affected individuals and communities in the U.S. Portions of the policy review that are pertinent 
to the 2008 Illinois case study are highlighted where specific provisions and requirements of the 
Stafford Act interfaced with community practices in a manner that influenced the presidential 
decision making process and/or contributed to perceptions of inequitable access to federal 
assistance. This will provide critical insight into the mechanisms that may have contributed to 
the disaster declarations and denial that were issued in Illinois after the flood events of 2008. 
 An overview of post-disaster stress-related disease and the biological, psychological, and 
social mechanisms associated with psychological stress in disaster survivors is included to serve 
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as a basis for addressing the research question pertaining to individual and community health 
and well-being.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework  
 Stevan Hobfoll (1989), in a “Conservation of Resources” (COR) theoretical framework, 
describes “psychological stress” as a major factor affecting people’s health and well-being and 
the avoidance of stress as an essential motivating influence in human behavior. Hobfoll defines 
psychological stress as a reaction to the environment in which there is the threat of a net loss of 
resources, the net loss of resources, or a lack of resource gain following the investment of 
resources (Hobfoll 1989, 516).  COR theory places primacy on our desire to avoid material and 
social resource loss and considers the attainment and retainment of four classes of resources as 
predictors of stress or eustress (i.e. well-being):  “Object resources” such as cars, houses, and 
material goods which represent shelter and socioeconomic status; “Conditions” which serve as 
resources that are often valued and sought after such as power, prestige, tenure and seniority;  
“Personal Characteristics” which act as resources to resist stress such as self-efficacy and self-
esteem; and “Energies” which represent resources such as time, money, knowledge, and social 
networks.  
 The following analysis of the political and health geographies of disasters in the U.S. 
utilizes a pluralistic theoretical construct (Bohman 1997) that is framed by Hobfoll’s COR 
perspective regarding the primacy of resource preservation amongst the respective agents in, 
both, the disaster declaration decision-making process and in the disaster recovery process.  In 
regard to the preservation of resources associated with prior claims of inequities in the 
distribution of Stafford Act disaster declarations, the reference is to the resources of power, 
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prestige, influence, and the retainment of status for the president, governors, congressional 
representatives, and FEMA operatives involved in the disaster declaration decision-making 
process.  In regard to the loss of resources associated with the individuals and communities who 
have been exposed to the consequences of disaster declarations and denials, the reference is to 
the full extent of social and material “Object” resources that are at risk of loss in the midst of 
devastation from disasters. As disparate as these perspectives may appear, they are 
concomitantly adherent to the fundamental premise of COR theory. The central tenet of 
Hobfoll’s COR model is that individuals maximize the obtainment, retainment, and protection of 
those things that they value in order to avoid psychological stress and establish a sense of well-
being. (Hobfoll 1988; Hobfoll, 2001, 341). It is Hobfoll’s assertion (1989, 517), that individuals 
maximally “strive to develop resource surpluses in order to offset the possibility of future loss” 
and that the primacy of avoiding the loss of resources supersedes the desire to acquire gains. 
This theoretical construct has been applied in a variety of contexts from “political messaging” 
(Farinella 2012) to “burnout and stress in organizational settings” (Lee and Ashforth 1996) and 
has been utilized in prior research as a framework for understanding the vulnerabilities and 
resiliencies that are associated with psychological distress and resource loss in disaster scenarios 
(Freedy et al. 1992; Benight et al. 1999; Arata et al. 2001). This dissertation employs the COR 
theoretical framework to examine the “Condition” and “Energy” resource considerations  of 
disaster declaration decision makers, which may lead to the inequitable distribution of federal 
relief , and the “Object” and “Personal Characteristic” resources of disaster affected individuals 
who have differential access to post-disaster federal resources.  
 If we acknowledge Hobfoll’s assertion that our resource preservation tactics are 
undertaken with the prime intent of avoiding psychological stress and preserving a sense of well-
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being (eustress),  it becomes evident that in some cases, “rational choice” agents may choose an 
inequitable partisan path to assure the self-preservation of the acquired resources of power, 
prestige, and elected office. This is the conclusion of the previously cited researchers who have 
determined that there are improprieties in the actions of the president, congressional 
representatives, and administrative appointees with respect to the selective appropriation of 
disaster declarations and denials under the provisions of the Stafford Act. Barnes (1987, 84) 
informs us that, in a world of scarce means but unlimited desires, individuals must make choices 
and he refers to a rational actor, known as Homo economicus, who makes choices that maximize 
his/her personal gain (resources) given the limited means that are available. Homo economicus is 
the offspring of “rational choice” theory, a concept that has historical roots in the invisible hand 
of Adam Smith‘s free market ideology (Barnes and Sheppard 1992) and Bentham‘s 
Utilitarianism; a belief in the individual maximization of the resource of happiness (Hurtado 
2008). Alexander Hamilton (1775) appears to have been an early adherent to the principles of 
rational choice theory in stating that "every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no 
other end in all his actions but private interest". Homo economicus is a person who will settle for 
nothing less than the best (Simon 1978). In the most radical form, he/she plays the role of a self-
serving egoistic unfettered capitalistic decision maker. This is a creature who acts upon an 
assumed essentialist instinct of personal gain and accumulation without complete awareness of 
the long term societal consequences of his/her actions.  
 Homo economicus exists as a stakeholder in the field of political science under the 
constructs of “public choice” theory which proposes that politicians react to issues they face 
based on personal gain, as manifested through the attainment and preservation of power and 
prestige, and independent of motivation that is focused on public benefit and need (Buchanan 
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and Tullock 1962; Garrett and Sobel 2003). Garrett and Sobel (2003) utilize the “public choice 
model” to explain presidential motive in disaster declaration decision making. Similarly, Frisch 
(2006, 18) references the “distributive model” of congressional organization in stating that 
members of Congress seek membership in committees that will best serve their interest in 
reelection. Peterson‘s (1995) “legislative theory” suggests that the president is primarily 
motivated by political incentive and that congressional influence will prevail in bargaining 
between the president and Congress. Individual political gain supplants altruistic motive under 
the premise of a public choice model, a distributive model, or legislative theory. This concept is 
readily applied to political motivations regarding disaster request declarations and turndowns 
and the intergovernmental relationships that exist amongst a variety of bureaucratic, legislative, 
and executive stakeholders.  
 However, the complexities of decision making under the premise of public choice, 
distributive, and legislative theory have been criticized by several authors (Barnes 1987; Barnes 
and Sheppard 1992; Miller 1992; Peterson 2005; Frisch 2006). John Rawls (1993) was a strong 
advocate of both rational and reasonable moral powers that coexist and are central to political 
decision making. Favoritism in the form of partisan behavior towards members of congress or 
governors who represent the same political party as the president is indicative of an entrenched 
method of preserving power amongst like-minded elected representatives. Rawls viewed 
partisanship as a manifestation of injustice (Muirhead 2003) and this perspective is exemplified 
in findings that suggest federal disaster relief is disproportionately distributed based on political 
partisanship that is independent of actual community need or by biased vote-seeking via the 
selective distribution of a greater frequency of disaster declarations to areas with a higher 
number of electoral votes and/or during reelection cycles.  
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 The Stafford Act mandates that presidential decision-making in times of disaster will be 
predicated on the "overwhelming" need of a state. The intent of this policy is the antithesis of the 
notion of a self-serving legislative bureaucracy ruled by Homo economici under the pretext of 
rational choice or public choice theory. The redistribution of federal revenues under the 
provisions of the Stafford Act is, in fact, an applied manifestation of the Marxist sentiment, 
"from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" (Marx 1875). Additionally, it 
is worth noting that Adam Smith (1776), whose notions of "laissez faire" capitalism contributed 
to the conceptualization of Homo economicus, was also the author of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1761, 5), in which, he notes that, " humans have a natural tendency to care about the 
well-being of others" particularly when "we see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another 
person". It is evident that conflicting tendencies associated with rational and reasonable 
decision-making processes provide for complexities in the analysis of the equitable 
implementation of presidential disaster declarations under the provisions of the Stafford Act. 
 Rational choice and public choice theories provide the framework for several of the 
previously mentioned studies that address political partisanship in the implementation of the 
Stafford Act. However, rational choice is based on a construct of "methodological 
individualism" which has been critiqued as incompatible with the processes of collective action 
and the norms of trust, justice, and social obligation that are essential to the effective governance 
and functioning of a civilized society (Scott 2000). The influence of various social structures on 
the decision making actions of individuals during disasters suggests that an essentialist notion of 
the unfettered independent capacity of human agents is inherently flawed. Giddens (1986), in the 
development of his theory of structuration, informs us that human agents and social structures 
are not independent entities. The structuring of social actions and social relationships over time 
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and space is dependent on a recursive interactive process that exists between individuals and 
their respective social systems and social places (Thrift 1985; Sack 1997). Homo sapiens are 
evidently capable of making decisions based on the influence of private, public, and parochial 
realms and Giddens offers an alternative to the rigid framework that binds Homo economicus. 
 Although structuration theory provides a valid foundation for understanding the 
reciprocal relationship between social structures and individual behavior, concerns have been 
raised regarding the failure for this theory to adequately address differences that exist between 
individuals with respect to behavior and decision making (Gove 1994; Pickel 2005). Pickel 
(2005, 456) informs us that "the individual actor or individual member of a social system is at 
the same time a complex system itself, i.e. a biopsychosocial system. This implies that in 
addition to social mechanisms, individuals are subject to biological and psychological 
mechanisms shaping personal development and personality change". Engel (1977) emphasizes 
the interdependency between physical and mental health and the social environment in his 
biopsychosocial model. Borrell-Carrio et al. (2004, 576) explain that the biopsychosocial model, 
“is a way of understanding how suffering, disease, and illness are affected by multiple levels of 
organization, from the societal to the molecular”.  These concepts have been further developed 
by McEwen and Gianaros (2011) and Barr (2008) in defining the role of chronic social and 
environmental stressors in the development of illness secondary to maladaptive behavioral and 
physiological processes. 
 The relationship between the social and environmental stressors that are inherent in 
disaster scenarios and varied aspects of physical and emotional well-being has been well 
established (Madakasira and O'Brien 1987; Lutgendorf et al. 1995; Reacher et al. 2004; Bland et 
al. 2005; Burton et al. 2009). The role of biopsychosocial influence is particularly relevant to this 
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investigation as individual random effect biological and psychological determinants of well-
being were utilized in the assessment of disaster recovery associated with the equitable 
distribution of disaster relief under the provisions of the Stafford Act. Hobfoll’s “conservation of 
resources” framework provides a valid link between the theoretical “public choice” actions of 
politicians and FEMA operatives who place primacy on the retention of power and prestige 
resources and the psychological and physiological consequences of uncompensated resource loss 
in individuals who were potentially disavowed from the presidential disaster declaration process 
due to a relative lack of political importance.  
 
2.3 Past Disaster Experiences and Behavioral Health Outcomes 
 In 1954, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago produced a 
seminal report regarding the behavior of individuals in disasters titled, Human Reactions in 
Disaster Situations (Marks and Fritz 1954; Quarantelli 1988). This study revealed that while the 
majority of disaster survivors suffer from negative psychological effects, there is a low incidence 
of “incapacitating or behaviorally dysfunctional consequences” (Quarantelli 1988, 305). The 
report also indicated that widespread looting is an infrequent finding in most disasters in the 
United States, post-disaster community volunteerism is common, and that social capital is a 
major factor in determining individual behavior. This research provided some of the earliest 
insight into post-disaster behavioral outcomes and most of the NORC findings remain consistent 
with more recent disaster analyses. There are multiple aspects of individual and community 
capacity that may affect the recovery from the adversities of disasters. Tierney (2007, 512) 
informs us that, “disasters are occasions that can intensify both social solidarity and social 
conflict” and prior research has emphasized the importance of cultural competency in disaster 
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response to address the varied needs of a diverse group of survivors (SRA International, Inc. 
2008). The risk of adverse behavioral health outcomes after disasters is influenced by the social, 
cultural, economic, and political dynamic of afflicted populations and the concomitant interplay 
between these factors and the type, severity and frequency of the disaster event. The 
psychosocial consequences of disasters may take an insidious toll on individuals and 
communities and the relationship between the social stressors that are inherent to disaster 
scenarios and varied aspects of physical and behavioral well-being have been well established in 
several prior studies of  post-disaster health outcomes (Madakasira and O'Brien 1987; Norris and 
Murrell 1988; Lutgendorf et al. 1995; Norris, Phifer and Kaniasty 2001; Norris, Friedman, and 
Watson  2002; Reacher  et al. 2004; Bland et al. 2005; Burton et al.  2009).  
This portion of the literature review utilizes a purposive sample of historical texts and 
journals to examine narrative accounts of disaster events ranging from the eruption of Mt. 
Vesuvius and the destruction of Pompeii in A.D. 79 to the Buffalo Creek flood of 1972. Many of 
these events precede the time frame of formal structured disaster research and, as such, they are 
not intended to provide a quantitative measure of behavioral well-being after disasters. Instead, 
the perspectives of the survivors of these unfortunate occurrences are considered with the intent 
to provide additional foundation for an understanding of the importance of behavioral health 
intervention with particular attention to the support structures, or lack thereof, that were 
historically available to assist in the psychosocial recovery from disasters. The use of temporal 
context serves an integral role in disaster research as it provides a perspective to frame and 
substantiate the more recent analyses of behavioral health outcomes after disasters. This 
summary review attempts to clarify the similarities and differences in our perceptions of disaster 
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scenarios over varied periods of time and, in so doing, provides us with an opportunity to 
reassess our progress regarding the response to and recovery from disastrous events. 
 
2.3.1 Background: The Eruption of Mt. Vesuvius and the Destruction of Pompeii  
 
Nothing, then, was to be heard but the shrieks of women, the screams of children, 
and the cries of men; some calling for their children, others for their parents, 
others for their husbands, and only distinguishing each other by their voices; one 
lamenting his own fate; another that of his family; some wishing to die, from the 
very fear of dying . ... Among these were some who augmented the real terrors by 
imaginary ones; and made the frighted multitude falsely believe that Misenum 
was actually in flames- Pliny the Younger (Melmoth 1809, 307). 
 
 These words, retrieved from a letter written to Tacitus, the Roman senator and historian, 
several years after the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in A.D. 79, represent Pliny the Younger’s 
recollection of the scene during the Pompeii disaster which resulted in the estimated death of 
more than 10,000 people. Pliny the Younger, who later achieved acclaim as an author, lawyer, 
and magistrate in ancient Rome, was 17 years of age at the time of the eruption of Pompeii and 
he had witnessed the devastation and ensuing chaos, first hand, from the town of Misenum on 
the Bay of Naples. His uncle, Pliny the Elder, the Roman naturalist and philosopher, had 
succumbed to respiratory complications from the inhalation of volcanic ash fall during an 
attempt to provide support to the citizens of Pompeii. Similar vivid accounts of disasters have 
been retold in varied forms throughout history after events ranging from the Antioch earthquake 
34 
 
in A.D. 526 to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. Although there are unique aspects associated 
with each disaster occurrence, there is some degree of consistency with respect to the range of 
human emotions and behaviors that are evident during the response and recovery phases of 
disasters. Pliny the Elder died in a heroic attempt to provide aid to the people of Pompeii. Pliny 
the Younger maintained an extensive set of letters that provided details of Roman life during the 
1st century A.D. and he had sufficiently recovered from the mental duress associated with his 
exposure to the devastation of Mt. Vesuvius to pursue a career as an attorney in A.D. 80, the 
year after the Pompeii disaster. The citizens who had lost family, friends and neighbors exhibited 
an array of stress-related responses and the role of emotional comfort and community support 
after the disaster inevitably played a substantial role in the recovery process. This is represented 
in a correspondence to Pliny the Younger from a friend of his uncle: 
 
At this point, my uncle’s friend from Spain spoke up still more urgently; if your 
brother, if your uncle is still alive, he will want you both to be saved; if he is 
dead, he would want you to survive him- why put off your escape? We replied that 
we would not think of considering our own safety as long as were uncertain of his 
(Sigurdsson and Carey 2002, 40). 
 
 These sentiments are indicative of the mutual concerns that are shared by survivors of 
disasters and the potential to ameliorate the adverse effects of disaster events by support 
mechanisms ranging from individual aid to government intervention. Community support was 
not limited to individual outreach after the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79.  The news of the 
disaster traveled rapidly to Rome and the Emperor Titus Flavius acted rapidly to provide relief to 
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disaster survivors. Titus Flavius had become emperor two months before the eruption of 
Vesuvius and upon learning of the disaster he immediately left Rome for the region of Campania 
where he organized aid and reconstruction efforts (Sigurdsson and Carey 2002; Suetonius 2007). 
The emperor used the funds obtained from the value of estates belonging to deceased disaster 
victims without heirs to assist in the reconstruction efforts and he supplemented the necessary 
disaster relief with his own personal accounts. Suetonius (2007, 326), the Roman historian, 
informs us that, “with regard to the public buildings destroyed by fire in the City, he (the 
Emperor Titus) declared that nobody should be a loser but himself.”  Survivors from the 
devastated areas of Pompeii and surrounding communities fled the area and sought refuge in 
other cities. Titus Flavius provided special privileges to the cities that were willing to 
accommodate the survivors of the disaster (Sigurdsson and Carey 2002). Titus Flavius returned 
the following year to evaluate the reconstruction efforts in Campania and during his travels, 
there was a devastating fire and a resultant plague in Rome. Once again, the emperor provided 
relief to the afflicted citizenry and “for the relief of people during the plague, he employed in the 
way of sacrifice and medicine, all means both human and divine” (Suetonius 2007, 326). These 
extensive measures of government support were undoubtedly integral to the well-being of the 
populace that was affected by the event and the actions undertaken by Titus Flavius in response 
to the Pompeii disaster are consistent, in many aspects, with present day federal disaster policies 
and protocols in the United States. 
 It is worth noting that the Roman Empire in A.D. 79 had a social structure that was based 
on several classes of citizenry with slaves residing at the lowest end of the social ladder. 
Approximately 40 percent of the population of Pompeii was estimated to be slaves. Many of the 
slaves were unable to leave the city during the disaster as they did not own horses or carriages 
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and some were found chained to wheat grinders along with mules in the archaeological 
excavation of the ruins of Pompeii (Dyson 2006).  The benefits of government intervention and 
community support were not as easily accessed by the slave class. Pliny the Younger 
unintentionally attests to the differential status of slaves in describing the death of his uncle, 
Pliny the Elder: 
 
Upon this, an outbreak of flame and smell of sulphur, premonitory of further 
flames, put some to flight and roused him. With the help of two slave-boys he rose 
from the ground, and immediately fell back, owing (as I gather) to the dense 
vapour obstructing his breath and stopping up the access to his gullet, which with 
him was weak and narrow and frequently subject to wind. When day returned.... 
his body was found whole and uninjured, in the dress he wore; its appearance 
was that of one asleep rather than dead   Pliny the Younger (Lewis 1890) 
 
The unanswered question is what became of the slave-boys? While it is understandable that 
Pliny the Younger’s recollection of the tragic events of the day were focused on his uncle’s 
suffering and heroic efforts, the reality of the situation reveals the fact that the slave-boys who 
attended to Pliny the Elder were exposed to the same risk and their story remains untold. These 
selective and abridged recounts of disaster scenarios are common in historical writings with 
respect to the misfortune of the “underclass”, as will be seen in narratives from disasters in the 
United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The concept of culturally competent 
intervention after disasters is antithetical to the plight of those groups that were disenfranchised 
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from the equitable consideration of suffering and, in some cases blamed, for the social unrest 
that ensued after the crisis. 
 Nearly two millennia removed from the Pompeii disaster, we are able to see the 
similarities between this historically tragic event and present day disaster interventions that are 
designed to improve psychosocial well-being. The past can serve as a prologue to the future with 
respect to behavioral health outcomes after disasters. The letters of Pliny the Younger and the 
findings of the excavation of Pompeii reveal a story of emotional comfort, community support, 
and government intervention, albeit selective, to assist in post-disaster recovery. The following 
analysis of historical events provides additional insight into the perceptions and behaviors of 
individual actors, the role of government and community support, and the necessity for cultural 
competence in disaster response and recovery. 
 
2.3.2 Risk Perception and Behavior in Disasters: A Historical Perspective 
 Disasters are inherently full of uncertainty and the processes of decision making under 
the dynamics of uncertainty demand a broad consideration of various factors that influence 
human behavior. Those of us who are not directly exposed to the disaster scene often wonder 
why the victims and survivors of these events did not pursue more purposeful actions to protect 
themselves and their families.  The behaviors that are prevalent in disaster environments are 
often associated with limits on human cognition that constrain the capacity to consider all 
relevant choice options in a given scenario. This concept of limitations in rational thought with 
respect to decision making (Simon 1957) during disasters may be associated with stress-related 
physiological compromise and/or the constraints that exist with respect to insufficient time, 
knowledge, and resources to make optimal decisions (Gigerenzer 1997). Evacuating from a 
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disaster scenario may not be practical if there are limitations in available transportation or if the 
perception of risk to family and personal possessions compromises the willingness to leave the 
area. Additionally, the role of disaster-related emotional arousal has been acknowledged as a 
source of bounded rationality (Kaufman 1999).  
 Historical accounts of disasters provide valuable information regarding the vulnerabilities 
of populations that settle in hazard-prone areas. The tendency for human habitation in areas that 
are associated with a high risk of hazard exposure and subsequent disaster is often a result of the 
land use and transportation amenities that exist in these same places. The dissertation case study 
area of rural Southern Illinois has an extensive history of changing land use and transportation 
demands that have compromised the economic productivity of the region. Places that are prone 
to flooding and volcanic eruption are also associated with fertile plains and hillsides that yield 
bountiful food crops. Regions that are prone to hurricanes, typhoons, and tsunamis are also 
places of commerce, trade, and transportation where population density became centralized 
during historical periods of settlement. The benefits of the land and waterways far exceeded the 
risk of infrequent disaster and we have constructed a world of high risk places, rural and urban, 
seemingly unaware of the inevitable outcome. 
 Smith (1992) describes three forms of risk perception that people exhibit in order to cope 
with the potential danger associated with natural hazards: determinate perception, dissonant 
perception, and probabilistic perception. Determinate perception involves the assumption of pre-
determined regularity or repetition of disaster events and is often utilized by individuals who 
assume that structural mitigation and technological advancements have removed the hazard risk. 
Dissonant perception encompasses the denial of risk and danger associated with hazardous 
events. Probabilistic perception acknowledges the random nature of natural disasters but may be 
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associated with a loss of the sense of responsibility to prepare for disasters as they are 
attributable to the forces of nature. Risk perception in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was 
affected, in part, by limited prior experience with the hazards that existed in particular 
geographic locales and the nascency of valid geophysical and meteorological warning systems. 
Recent settlement and high rates of immigration often resulted in lack of familiarity with 
potential local hazards. This is a problem that persists in regions of the world where migration 
has exposed socially marginalized people to high risk from natural hazards. Violent conflict and 
the demise of rural agrarian lifestyles led to an exodus of immigrants to the coastline of Thailand 
prior to the 2004 tsunami. The individual lack of familiarity with the type of natural hazard risk 
in this area played a significant role in the ultimate death toll (Wisner 2006).  
  The attachment to places ranging from the Mississippi flood plain to Port-au-Prince, 
Haiti is often created out of necessity and the acceptance or denial of risk becomes a valid 
coping mechanism. The industrial mill towns of Pennsylvania and West Virginia, during the 
mid-20th century, were representative of areas where known hazards were considered to be an 
acceptable risk in return for the benefit of stable employment. In 1948, a temperature inversion 
trapped poisonous fumes from the local zinc smelter over Donora, Pennsylvania resulting in the 
death of 25 people and illness in an estimated 43 percent of the 13,600 residents (Townsend 
1950). Quarantelli (1988) notes that personnel from the Army Chemical Center who were 
evaluating the community after the event noticed that some citizens who were not  exposed to 
the poisonous fumes were exhibiting physical symptoms similar to those individuals who 
suffered direct exposure. This was considered to be an early indicator of psychosocial factors 
affecting behavioral health after a disaster. Although there was limited crisis intervention 
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capacity at this point in the response to disasters, the Donora event did lead to the passage of the 
federal Air Pollution Control Act in 1955. 
While some risk related decision-making processes are based on the necessities of 
livelihood, other choices are made out of dissonant disregard for potential danger due to the 
perceived advantage of the particular amenities of land and sea (Salkowe, Tobin and Bird  2006). 
Garesche (1902, 97), describes the prevailing attitude in Martinique prior to the eruption of Mt. 
Pelee in 1902: 
 
That a disaster such as this would at some time occur in this volcanic region had 
frequently been predicted. The group of islands to which Martinique belongs is 
wholly of volcanic origin, and there has never been lacking proof of the thinness 
of the earth’s crust or evidence that nature’s great fires had not been wholly 
extinguished. Geologists who had made a careful study of the region had time 
and again declared that Mt. Pelee was liable to burst forth in eruption at any 
time. ... Men had no fear of it. They even dared to toy with it and on its sides, 
nearly half-way to its dangerous mouth, built a pleasure resort, and there many of 
the wealthy people had erected handsome homes, where they resided nearly all 
the year. 
 
Willis Fletcher Johnson (1889), quotes an inhabitant of Johnstown after the flood of 1889,  
 
We were afraid of that lake seven years ago. …People wondered, and asked why 
the dam was not strengthened, as it certainly had become weak; but nothing was 
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done, and by and by they talked less and less about it, as nothing happened, 
though now and then some would shake their heads as if conscious the fearful 
day would come some time when their worst fears would be transcended by the 
horror of the actual occurrence (p. 34-35).  
 
Lake Pontchartrain’s levees evoked similar concern from citizens, hazard experts, and 
government officials for years prior to their failure during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Many of the inhabitants of St Pierre, Martinique, San Francisco, and Johnstown were obviously 
aware of the dangers associated with their chosen location and ignored the known risk based on 
the infrequency of its occurrence and the preferential aspects of living in these areas. 
 Supernatural and deistic powers were often associated with disaster causality in the 
historical literature (Salkowe, Tobin and Bird  2006). The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 has been 
referred to as the first modern disaster due to the extensive emergency management measures 
that were put into place by the government in response to this event. This earthquake was also 
unique in European disaster history as it was the one of the earliest recorded events where 
“natural” rather than “supernatural”" causality was offered as an explanation for the disaster 
(Dynes 1997; Alexander 2002). After the 1902 Mt. Pelee eruption on Martinique, Reverend G. 
Scholl of Chicago stated, 
 
The scientists of Martinique, on the day before the horrible catastrophe, 
according to official and press reports, met and declared that all was well and 
safe at St. Pierre. The next day the hand of God was upon the place and their lips 
are now silenced as to their explanation. We firmly believe the trembling of the 
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earth, the volcanic eruptions and misfortunes which are still growing, are sure 
signs of the coming end and are just what the Bible sets forth with reference to 
the approaching end of the world and the second coming of Christ. The Galveston 
disaster was likewise considered by us as a punishment meted out by God and as 
a warning (Garesche 1902, 222). 
 
 
The attribution of natural disasters to a higher authority remains present in today’s society and 
the recent 2010 earthquake in Haiti has been associated with a “pact with the devil” (ABC News  
2010). Drinker (1918, intro), in review of the 1913 Dayton flood, makes a salient point that 
transcends the time frame from the secular interpretations of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 to 
the present day by stating,  
 
In the presence of such a fearful disaster there are few persons who will say, but 
there are some who will think, that this is in some manner a visitation decreed 
upon the communities which suffer. The very magnitude and superhuman force of 
it will suggest to many minds the thought of an ordered punishment and warning 
for offenses against a higher power. Such a concept, happily more rarely held 
now than in earlier times, is, of course, revolting to sober judgment and to the 
instincts of religious reverence. For it would imply that multitudes of the innocent 
should suffer indescribable cruelty; it would attempt the impossible feat of 
justifying the smiting of Dayton, where all the inhabitants lived lives of peaceful, 
helpful industry, and the sparing of communities where men serve the gods of 
43 
 
dishonest wealth and vicious idleness. This was no vengeance decreed for human 
shortcomings. It was superhuman, but not supernatural. It was but a 
manifestation of the unchangeable, irresistible forces of nature, governed by 
physical laws which are inexorable. 
 
2.3.3 Individual Behavior 
 Individual behaviors after disasters range from selfless acts of heroism to dysfunctional 
panic. Prior research has noted differences in post-disaster measures of stress, well-being, and 
resiliency based on factors including age, race, marital status, and prior disaster experience 
(Kilijanek and Drabek 1979; Norris and Murrell 1988; Ferraro 2003). The work of the National 
Opinion Research Center (Mark and Fritz 1954) and subsequent studies have revealed that the 
great majority of disaster affected individuals exhibit highly adaptive behavioral characteristics 
and are able to recover from the event without incapacitating consequences. Historical accounts 
of prior disasters address these findings.  
 
For two days after the great catastrophe the people of the city of Galveston were 
stunned. They seemed to be dazed. It is a remarkable thing that there were no 
signs of outward grief in the way of tears and groans to mark the misery that 
raged in the breasts of the people. Only when some person who was thought to 
have been dead appeared to a relative living, who had mourned for him or her, 
were there any tears. There was a callousness about all this that attracted the 
attention of those who had just come to the unfortunate place. There was a 
stoicism in it, but it was unexplainable. It indicated no lack of appreciation of 
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what had occurred. It demonstrated no lack of affection for those who had gone. 
Nature, generous in this instance, came to their relief in a way and made them 
dull to the seriousness of what had occurred to an extent which prevented them 
from becoming maniacs, for if the grief which comes to a mortal when he loses a 
dead one had come to his whole community the island would have been filled with 
raving maniacs. In case of individual losses there is always someone near to give 
consolation. Had the grief come to the whole island there could have been no 
consolation, for every soul on it had lost in some way that which was dear to it 
(Green 1900, 102-103). 
 
Similar descriptions of the emotions of disaster-stricken individuals were described in recounts 
of the aftermath of the 1972 Buffalo Creek dam collapse and flood disaster in West Virginia. 
Persistent traumatic neurotic reactions affected 80 percent of the population, 2 years after the 
event (Tichener and Kapp 1976). Erikson (1976, 157) provides a telling recollection of the 
emotions of a disaster survivor: 
 
I think we will have to leave Buffalo Creek before we can get any peace. I have 
been a resident of this place for forty-five years and now I am unhappy, 
dissatisfied, and disturbed. The disaster has left me very nervous. When 
something like that happens and all the friends you had down the years-some are 
living and some are dead and some you don’t know where they’re at- you don’t 
forget something like that. As we stood in the rain and snow and saw what we 
saw coming down the hollowhouses washing down Buffalo Creek, people crying 
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and getting out of the creek naked and almost frozen to death, people begging for 
help which we could not give, I had about twenty or more of my kin killed in the 
disaster, and if these things won’t crack a person up they sure are strong people. 
 
 The findings of posttraumatic stress in the Buffalo Creek flood survivors highlight the 
need for crisis intervention and behavioral first aid after disaster events. Emotion-focused and 
problem-focused coping mechanisms (Brown, Shiang and Bongar 2003) were exhibited in 
reports of personal reconciliation with the consequences of the Johnstown Flood and in the 
heroic acts of individuals after the San Francisco earthquake. 
 
Just below Johnstown, on the Conemaugh, three women were working on the 
ruins of what had been their home. An old arm-chair was taken from the ruins by 
the men. When one of the women saw the chair, it brought back a wealth of 
memory, probably the first since the flood had occurred, and throwing herself on 
her knees on the wreck she gave way to a flood of tears. ‘Where in the name of 
God,’ she sobbed, ‘did you get that chair? It was mine- no, I don’t want it. Keep 
it and find for me, if you can, my album. In it are the faces of my husband and 
little girl (Johnson 1889, 112). 
 
To stand clear headed and observant while the world seems on the edge of utter 
ruin, one must be either a very great or a very depraved soul. Nero fiddled while 
Rome was burning. It was the crowning act of the world’s supreme pessimist. But 
the San Francisco earthquake discovered men and women actuated by the most 
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sublime motives, who not only looked with cool judgment upon ‘the wreck of 
matter and the crash of worlds’ but went down into the seething furnace and 
remained on duty there in order that the world might know something of what 
was taking place in that ruined and burning city (Banks and Read 1906, 115). 
 
2.3.4 Government and Community Support: A Historical Perspective 
 Lofland (1998) describes three realms of social interaction; private, parochial, and public, 
that are particularly relevant to the consideration of support mechanisms after disasters. The 
private realm is represented by family and kinship networks, the parochial realm is represented 
by neighbors and acquaintances, and the public realm is the “world of strangers” (Kusenbach 
2006). Each of these spheres defines a portion of our social capital. Historically, the recovery 
from disasters was primarily dependent on the support of the private and parochial realms. In the 
United States, there was no well-defined structured intervention from the “world of strangers” 
until the formation of the American Red Cross in 1881. Federal disaster relief was not 
structurally mandated until 1950 in the U.S. and government assistance was distributed on a 
case-by-case basis without any assurance of support on a national level. However, prior accounts 
of governmental and non-governmental intervention after disasters substantiate the importance 
of the public realm in post-disaster behavioral health and community well-being. 
 Several nongovernmental organizations were involved in disaster response during the 
late 19th through early 20th centuries. Communities damaged by the Florida hurricane of 1926 
benefited from the efforts of the American Red Cross, the Masonic Service Association, citizen’s 
committees, and various clubs and fraternities (Sturges, 1931). Medical care was surprisingly 
efficient as numerous references to sanitation protocols and disease spread warnings are 
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referenced in the literature including recommendations for boiling water, malaria prevention, and 
receiving typhoid immunizations (Marshall, 1913, Johnson, 1927, Russell, 1913, Simpich, 
1928). A rapid return to some semblance of normal routine was encouraged. During the New 
England floods of 1927, the public sector intervened to make certain that mail was delivered by 
rowboat and horse when washed out roads prevented delivery by truck or automobile (Pease, 
1928). 
 Clara Barton, president of the American Red Cross, departed for Galveston in 1900 to 
assist in the support of disaster survivors, at the age of 79. She issued the following appeal 
(Green 1900, 186): 
 
The American National Red Cross at Washington, D.C., is appealed to on all side 
for help and for the privilege to help in the terrible disaster which has befallen 
Southern and Central Texas. It remembers the floods of the Ohio and Mississippi, 
of Johnstown and Port Royal, with their thousands of dead, and months of 
suffering and needed relief, and turns confidently to the people of the United 
States, whose sympathy has never failed to help provide the relief that is asked of 
it now. Nineteen years of experience on nearly as many fields render the 
obligations of the Red Cross all the greater. The people have long learned its 
work, and it must again open its accustomed revenues for their charities. It does 
not beseech them to give, for their sympathies are as deep and their humanity as 
great as its own, but it pledges to them faithful old-time Red Cross relief work 
among the stricken victims of these terrible fields of suffering and death. 
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 Although no formal federal disaster relief policy existed during the late 19
th
 through early 
20th centuries, the United States government and nongovernmental organizations were 
responsive to major disasters. Over $1.5 million dollars ($38 million 2009 inflation adjusted) 
(Lerner 1975; U.S. Census Bureau 2009) in relief aid was provided by cities and states 
throughout the U.S. after the Galveston hurricane in 1900. Twenty-five million ($589 million 
2009 inflation adjusted) ( Lerner 1975; U.S. Census Bureau 2009) was raised by relief agencies 
within seven days of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake (Tyler, 1906) and temporary shelter was 
provided for 300,000 homeless people (Banks and Read 2006). The United States Congress 
authorized $200,000 ($4.9 million 2009 inflation adjusted)   (Lerner 1975; U.S. Census Bureau 
2009) for the relief of the citizens of Martinique within four days of the Mt. Pelee eruption in 
1902 and adopted the following resolution (Garesche, 1902, 119): 
 
To enable the President of the United States to procure and distribute among the 
suffering people of the islands of the French West Indies such provisions, 
clothing, medicines, and other necessary articles and to take such other steps as 
he shall deem advisable for the purpose of rescuing and succoring the people 
who are in peril and threatened with starvation... 
 
Federal government intervention after the San Francisco earthquake has been critiqued due to the 
inordinate authority that was granted to the military. However, the presence of federal troops 
provided the mayor with the power to order the disbandment of self-constituted citizen vigilante 
committees. Mayor Schmitz of San Francisco stated, “Causes of friction thus being removed and 
49 
 
tangles straightened out, the mighty task of bringing order out of chaos went forward smoothly 
and rapidly” (Banks and Read 1906, 88).  
 
2.3.5 Cultural Competence: A Historical Perspective 
 The differential implementation of governmental policy regarding the distribution of 
relief aid to groups based on race, ethnicity, disability, and socioeconomic status was pervasive 
during the late 19
th
 through early 20th centuries in the United States. The concept of the 
importance of cultural competence in disaster behavioral health has a foundation that is built on 
the observations of centuries of inequitable outcomes and compromise to the well-being of 
marginalized populations. Banks and Read (1906, 84) inform us that, “The care of the Chinese 
colony received special attention. President Roosevelt asked that the Chinese be given relief, as 
well as other nationalities, and a separate camp was established for the Orientals, where their 
peculiar needs were given attention, under the direction of their leading representatives.” 
At the time of the disaster event, this action was interpreted as culturally enlightened 
intervention. Decades later, research has revealed that the treatment of the Chinese after the San 
Francisco earthquake was associated with a derisive policy of culturally insensitive segregation 
that undermined the representation of an egalitarian approach to governmental support after 
disasters (Bancroft Library 2006). The Chinese evacuees settled at a compound near the 
Presidio, but local residents complained that “they did not want to live downwind of the odors of 
the encampment” and the Chinese were forced to move at least four additional times by city and 
military officials (Bancroft Library 2006). Approximately 45,000 Chinese lived in the Chinese 
quarter in 1906 (Banks and Read, 1906, 157). After the evacuation of Chinatown, there were 
reports of National Guard troops looting the area (National Park Service 2007) and city officials 
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recommended against resettling the local population in the Chinatown area due to the presumed 
commercial development value of the real estate. Tyler (1906, 311-312) indicated that during the 
1906 San Francisco earthquake and subsequent fire, “Chinamen of the lower class… sat behind 
barred windows and guarded their poultry and smoked fish until they themselves were smoked 
to death,” Morris (1906, Ch V), in referencing the same disaster, notes the slums of Chinatown, 
the ruin of the Italian tenements, and the flight and panic that ensued during the earthquake and 
subsequent fires; “Here on one side dwelt 10,000 Chinese, and on the other thousands of Italians, 
Spaniards and Mexicans, while close at hand lived the riff-raff of the ‘Barbary Coast.’ 
Seemingly the whole of these rushed for that one square of open ground, the two streams 
meeting at the centre of the square and heaping up on its edges. There they squabbled and 
fought.”  
 These conceptualizations of “foreigners” as more prone to violence and less capable of 
rational action provided false justification for aggressive action and supported further 
misrepresentations of blame with respect to looting and social unrest. Criminal acts were 
disproportionately attributed to “foreigners” and “negroes” in review of the historical disaster 
literature (Salkowe, Tobin, and Bird 2006). There was evidence of looting, but it was sparse and 
the media coverage aggrandized the events based on race and ethnicity. Green (1900, 164-165), 
reporting on the 1900 Galveston hurricane quotes from the Galveston News,  
 
One soldier at guard reported that he had been forced to shoot five negroes. They 
were in the act of taking jewelry from a dead woman’s body. The soldier ordered 
them to desist and placed them under arrest. One of the number whipped out a 
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revolver and the soldier shot him. The others made for the soldier and he laid 
them out with four shots.  
 
Halstead (1900, 176-177) quotes observers of criminal activity during the aftermath of the 
Galveston hurricane of 1900; “I saw a negro woman carrying a large basket of silver that was not 
hers. ... Upon all hands this horrible work is going on. The offenders are usually negroes. As 
soon as the storm subsided the negroes stole all the liquor they could get, and, beastly drunk, 
proceeded with their campaign of vandalism.” Marshall (1913, 90) reveals that after the 1913 
Dayton flood, “Nine colored men and one white man were added to the seven suspected looters 
shot and killed since martial law was proclaimed.” Garesche (1902, 414) reports on the 
Galveston hurricane of 1900, “Tuesday night ninety negro looters were shot in their tracks by 
citizen guards. One of them was searched and $700 found, together with four diamond rings and 
two water soaked gold watches. The finger of a white woman with a gold band around it was 
clutched in his hands.” Johnson (1889, 239), in review of the Johnstown flood of 1889, quotes a 
correspondent who said, “Last night a party of thirteen Hungarians were noticed stealthily 
picking their way along the banks of the Conemaugh toward Sang Hollow. Suspicious of their 
purpose, several farmers armed themselves and started in pursuit. Soon their most horrible fears 
were realized. The Hungarians were out for plunder.”  
 The vulnerability of the poor, the ethnically disenfranchised, and racial minorities was 
evident in late 19th – early 20th century disaster reports. Everett (1913, 85) informs the reader 
that, “Governor Cox stated, ‘The crowded north side of the river, where there may be thousands 
of foreigners dead and dying, lay far beyond reach. No one speaks of it, the immediate needs of 
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the known survivors calling for every attention.’” Regarding the Mississippi flood of 1927, 
Sturges (1931, 180) informs us that,  
 
Thousands of refugees, white and colored together, crowded the levee tops.... At 
first there were no shelters and but little food; the levee tops were concentration 
camps of misery and disease. ...Relief was hampered, in spite of money and 
willingness, by lack of sufficient motor boats, difficulties of navigation, and the 
constantly spreading flood waters which turned the safe ground of today into the 
flooded area of tomorrow.  
 
However, Barry (1998, 320) writes that a letter from a black Republican activist at the time of 
the flood stated,  
 
It is said that many relief boats have hauled whites only, have gone to imperilled 
[sic] districts and taken all whites out and left the Negroes; it is also said that 
planters in some instances hold their labor at the point of a gun for fear they 
would get away and not return. In other instances, it is said that mules have been 
given preference on boats to Negroes.  
 
Du Bois (1928, 5) revealed that, “In the white camps transportation on the river boats was issued 
to individual refugees at their request.” Evidently, blacks were only allowed to leave the camps 
when the owners of the land on which they share-cropped requested their return. Although 
Mississippi state law cancelled all tenant indebtedness for sharecroppers during time of flood 
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disaster, the black sharecroppers were effectively bound to the plantation by the inability to 
obtain equitable access to evacuation from the flood ravaged area. (Du Bois 1928).  
Simpich, (1927, 265) writes, “On the levees, fighting now to save their homes and their lives, 
white men and negroes work side by side.” However, Du Bois (1928, 7) states, “The work on the 
Vicksburg levee was entirely the enforced labor of Negro refugees, superintended by armed 
guardsmen. This was done by order of General Green, the labor to be brought from the colored 
refugee camps.” Similar historical representations of racial harmony in the response to disaster 
events are countered by accounts of forced labor and selective punishment. Green (1900, 177) 
reports that, 
Galveston shall be rebuilt. Galveston shall be the greatest of towns. Hurrah for 
Galveston!  Thus they talked and went about the work of throwing up 
breastworks against disease by cleaning the town. Thousands of people, negroes 
as well as whites, went about the work of burning the dead and cleaning away the 
debris. They asked nothing about wages, even those who had no property. They 
had begun the fight. It was evident that they intended to keep it up. 
 
In contrast, Everett (1913, 302) describes the following scene in Cairo, Illinois after the 1913 
flood: 
A strange parade was held Tuesday when 100 militiamen marched through the 
thoroughfares in charge of nearly 600 colored men, whom they had dragged from 
their homes to act as laborers. The negroes had not responded to the call for help 
and had to be “gone for.” Although their wives, in some instances, falsified 
blithely and earnestly from the front door steps, the searches usually were 
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rewarded by discovering the recalcitrants in bed- if not in fact under the bed- 
endeavoring to avoid service at the levee.  
 
After the 1928 Florida hurricane it was reported that, “Negroes ordered to load bodies at 
Pahokee and other Everglade towns were forced to do so at the point of a gun. One negro in 
town was shot for disobeying. They were better then” (Kleinberg 2003, 187). The mass burial of 
deceased black hurricane victims in the pauper's cemetery at West Palm Beach stood out as a 
marker of racial injustice after this hurricane disaster. These opposing representations of equity 
in the treatment of marginalized individuals after disasters are indicative of the overt cultural 
insensitivity that existed during this period in history. The fact that the residents of rural counties 
in the dissertation study area of Southern Illinois have retained a suspicion of differential access 
to disaster relief resources has, in part, a foundation in the perception of culturally insensitive 
interactions with some federal emergency management officials (personal communication, 
anonymous Illinois Emergency Management Agency representative). 
 The problems associated with the institutionalization of the mentally ill were exacerbated 
by disaster events and cultural insensitivity to the plight of the disabled was exemplified in the 
recount of Morris (1906), 
 
Outside this town, … was Agnew’s State Hospital for the Insane, which was 
reduced to an utter ruin, a large number of the inmates being killed or injured, 
while those unhurt escaped and roamed about the country, to the terror of the 
people. ... The main building of the hospital collapsed, pinioning many of the 
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insane under the debris. The padded cells had to be broken open and the more 
dangerous patients tied to trees out on the lawn, in lieu of a safer place.  
 
Clara Barton, founder of the Red Cross, was a strong advocate of culturally competent disaster 
support and behavioral intervention. Turner (2000, 2) indicates that, “In her dealings with city 
officials, she carefully crafted a socially progressive role for middle-class white women, 
attempted to set a more positive example for race relations, and, after her vast experience with 
disaster survivors, introduced concepts of permanent individual housing for the homeless.” 
Given the option of providing supplementary goods or money to the African American citizens 
of Galveston, Barton elected to distribute money directly to the African American Red Cross, so 
that this organization could appropriately determine the needs of its own community and utilize 
the funds accordingly. Most of the money was saved to build a “Home for Indigent Colored 
People” and for Bibles and books for schoolchildren. Barton’s role in providing relief to the Sea 
Island, South Carolina African American community after the 1893 hurricane was instrumental 
at a time when the federal government showed little interest in the community. Barton was 
warned by “locals and by other philanthropists that the Red Cross relief efforts would create a 
class of dependents because everyone knew that blacks would not work where there were rations 
given out” (Turner  2000, 10). The African American community on Sea Island rebuilt their 
homes and replanted their fields; recovering sufficiently by 1900 to provide a donation to the 
Red Cross for the relief effort in Galveston (Pryor 1988). 
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2.3.6 Conclusion: Past Disaster Experiences and Behavioral Health Outcomes 
 Historical recounts of disasters from the destruction of Pompeii in A.D. 79 to the Buffalo 
Creek flood of 1972 reveal consistencies and variations in post-event behavioral health outcomes 
based on factors ranging from the severity of the event to individual response capacities and 
community support. The need for crisis intervention and behavioral first aid has been highlighted 
in this review by considering the narratives of individuals who experienced these historical 
events and who suffered the personal consequences of a disaster. The importance of culturally 
competent disaster support is evident in the retrospective consideration of outcomes that are 
associated with inequities in access to community resources and behavioral health intervention. 
Historical perspectives provide an opportunity to reflect upon our progress and to proceed with 
the investigation of the root causes of differential access to federal disaster support and the 
reformulation of policy directed towards improving post-disaster health outcomes.  
 
2.4 Disaster Policy in the United States: A Historical Perspective 
2.4.1 U.S. Disaster Policy Pre-1950 
 Federal disaster relief for individuals and communities to assist in the restoration of 
material and social resource losses dates back to the formative years of the American Republic. 
Dauber (2013) indicates that congressional appropriations were authorized in 1794 to aid 
communities and “classes of persons” who suffered from property losses during the 
Revolutionary War and in 1796 for agricultural losses due to drought. The authority to distribute 
federal funds and investigate the requests of those petitioning for federal support was assigned to 
an administrative commissioner during these early efforts at managing the response to the needs 
of disaster affected communities. This process was reinforced by the Congressional Act of 1803 
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which authorized federal assistance for the fire-damaged community of Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire (Clary 1985).  
  By 1816, due to requests for federal assistance associated with community resource 
losses from the War of 1812, the U.S. Congress established an administrative process for disaster 
relief that included a salaried relief commissioner who was sworn to an oath of office and 
directed to “promulgate rules, regulations, and procedures to govern applications, evidence, 
authentication, and distribution of funds, and to publish those regulations for eight weeks in 
every newspaper in the country” (Dauber 2013). During the 19th century and early 20th centuries 
100’s of grants were authorized by congress for events including plague, fire, flood, earthquake, 
and hurricane, both in the U.S. and abroad. A precedent for disaster relief had been established 
based on the willingness of the Congress to provide assistance to those in need and a broad 
interpretation of the General Welfare Clause of the Constitution. In 1822, President James 
Monroe, in defining the General Welfare Clause as a constitutional basis for federal disaster 
relief, stated that, “Congress has an unlimited power to raise money and that in its appropriation 
they have a discretionary power, restricted only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes of 
common defense and of general, not local, national not state benefit” (Richardson, 1897, 742). 
Congressional considerations of the equitable distribution of federal relief for those who were 
suffering from the adversities of disasters were common during the formative years of disaster 
policy in the U.S. Dauber (2013) reveals that, between 1789 and 1836, 19 requests for disaster 
relief from the Congress were denied due to the fear of establishing too liberal a threshold for 
federal assistance and due to concerns regarding the equitable application of federal standards 
that were utilized in rejecting prior requests for federal assistance.  
58 
 
 It is evident that the precedent for Congress to provide federal disaster relief vis-a-vis a 
de facto declaration process and issue denials of requests for federal assistance has a long-
standing basis in the American political dynamic. Additionally, the consideration of “equity” in 
the disaster decision-making process has served as a foundation for deliberation by elected 
congressional representatives since the early days of the democracy. The recognition of a “social 
contract” that defines “the duties of care that public officials owe to the people of a democratic 
society” (Ignatieff  2005) in providing aid to those who are  burdened by losses due to  “sudden 
unforeseeable events over which they have no control and for which they are morally blameless” 
(Landis 1998) has been recognized by the federal legislature in the U.S. since the early 19
th
 
century. However, there is also a long history of fervent debate amongst members of Congress 
regarding the merit of disaster relief. While there was little legislative protest to a federal relief 
response in large scale events such as the Johnstown flood in 1889 or the Galveston hurricane in 
1900, smaller scale events such as the 1886 Portland fire or the Rio Grande flood in 1897 were 
met with contentious deliberations pertaining to the appropriateness of federal support.  
 However, the Great Depression of the late 1920’s-1930’s served as a focusing event due 
to the heightened economic hardships affecting states and localities throughout the U.S. and the 
post-depression, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was commissioned by President Herbert 
Hoover in 1932 to lend funds for the repair and reconstruction of disaster-damaged public 
facilities.  This was followed in 1934 by the delegation of authority to the federal Bureau of 
Public Roads to provide funding for the repair of disaster damaged highways and bridges 
(FEMA 2013c).  
 The roots of federal government involvement and responsibility in disaster behavioral 
health were established in foundational legislation that created a framework for the present day 
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organizational flow of federal disaster physical and mental health support and oversight. In 1944, 
President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Public Health Service Act of July 1, 1944 (42 U.S.C. 
201). This policy consolidated and revised a significant amount of existing legislation relating to 
the Public Health Service and represented the framework for the provision of “resources and 
expertise to the States and other public and private institutions in the planning, direction, and 
delivery of physical and mental health care services” (Salkowe and Framingham 2012). 
Presently, the U.S. Public Health Service via its component agency, the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), “supports the delivery of services to build 
resilience and facilitate recovery in communities across the United States” (National Institute of 
Mental Health 2010). SAMHSA is the primary agency providing technical support and 
administrative monitoring for the federally authorized post-disaster Crisis Counseling Assistance 
and Training Program (CCP) under the provisions of an interagency agreement with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. This program will be discussed in detail in subsequent 
sections of the literature review. 
 In 1946, President Harry Truman signed into law, the National Mental Health Act of 
1946, which was legislated in response to the realization of the high incidence of stress-related 
illness associated with the trauma of combat exposure in soldiers returning from World War II 
(Herman 1995). This act led to the formation of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
in 1949 which replaced the Public Health Service Division of Mental Hygiene. The NIMH 
remains an agency of the U.S. Public Health Service and maintains an essential mission to 
“transform the understanding and treatment of mental illnesses through basic and clinical 
research, paving the way for prevention, recovery, and cure” (National Institute of Mental Health 
2010). The NIMH has supported a broad agenda of research initiatives and grant-funded projects 
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pertaining to the consequences of stress and trauma after disasters and activated the ongoing 
Rapid Assessment Post Impact of Disaster (RAPID) research program which was designed to 
“fund new research grant applications for assessing needs, planning of services, and improving 
preparedness and response to disasters” (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response 2008). These measures established the framework for creating an action agenda that 
led to existing federal policy and for the further definition of government roles and 
responsibilities in disaster behavioral health response and recovery. 
 
2.4.2 U.S. Disaster Policy 1950 - 2013 
 The fractious nature of debate pertaining to congressional support for/against each 
request for disaster relief eventually led to the passage of the federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 
(P.L. 81-875). This legislation delegated permanent authority for ongoing disaster relief without 
case-by-case deliberations by congressional representatives and placed sole decision-making 
authority for disaster declarations in the hands of the President of the U.S. (Platt 1999, Rubin 
2007).  Although federal disaster relief was defined as secondary to state and local resources, the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 formed the basis for federal and state cost-sharing relationships that 
were later established (FEMA 2007a).  The determination of a disaster declaration by the 
president was established as contingent upon a gubernatorial request and required substantiation 
of state resources committed to the relief effort. Coordination with non-governmental relief 
agencies and local/state response efforts was also a requirement. This important disaster relief 
legislation was intended to provide relief for public assistance projects involving infrastructure 
repair (Sylves and Waugh 1996) and did not obligate the federal government to the complete 
reconstruction of damaged facilities.  
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The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) was established in 1953 and authorized, 
under the provisions of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163), to distribute loans to 
businesses and individuals for the repair of  home and business losses associated with disasters. 
The role of the SBA remains essential in the consideration of the equitable distribution of federal 
disaster relief.  “SBA disaster recovery loans are the primary source of money for the long-term 
rebuilding of disaster-damaged private property. SBA helps homeowners, renters, businesses of 
all sizes, and private, non-profit organizations fund repairs or rebuilding efforts, and cover the 
cost of replacing lost or disaster-damaged personal property” (FEMA 2010). As of March 2013, 
the SBA had approved approximately 2.0 million disaster loans for over $52 billion (Small 
Business Administration 2013). Disaster grants to individuals in Stafford Act presidential 
disaster declared states will not be considered unless an application has been submitted to the 
SBA for a disaster loan. “SBA may refer applicants who do not qualify for a loan to FEMA for 
grants to replace essential household items, replace or repair a damaged vehicle, or cover storage 
expenses, among other serious disaster-related needs” (FEMA 2014). SBA disaster loans are 
available for personal and business property losses, repayable over a 30 year term at interest 
rates of 4% for individuals and businesses that are unable to obtain credit form another source 
and up to 8% for credit worthy applicants. SBA economic injury loans are available for 
businesses that need assistance meeting financial obligations and ongoing business expenses due 
to a declared disaster. These loans are subject to a 4% interest rate. SBA disaster loans for losses 
that exceed $14,000 are conditioned upon adequate collateral, including flood insurance where 
required, and SBA does not offer loan forgiveness for disaster loans without intervention by 
Congress (Lindsay 2010). The maximum loan for individuals for repair and replacement of a 
disaster damaged “primary residence” is $200,000. Loans are not granted for secondary 
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residences (i.e., vacation homes). Up to $40,000 in SBA disaster loans are available to 
homeowners and renters for disaster losses associated with furniture, clothing, appliances, and 
automobiles (SBA 2014).  Business are eligible for up to $2,000,000 in disaster loans for the 
repair or replacement of disaster damaged real property, fixtures, equipment,  machinery, 
inventory, and/or leasehold improvements or for economic injury (Small Business 
Administration 2014).  
It is critical to our understanding of the disaster relief process to recognize that there are 
several mechanisms available for individuals to access SBA disaster loans that are independent 
of a presidential disaster declaration under the provisions of the Stafford Act. The primary means 
of financial assistance after disasters in the U.S. does not require a presidential disaster 
declaration. The majority of  counties (11 out of 15) that were denied a presidential disaster 
declaration in the dissertation study area of Southern Illinois were deemed eligible for SBA 
disaster loans based on the presence of a gubernatorial disaster declaration and the substantiation 
of sufficient damages to meet SBA disaster declaration loan eligibility criteria (See Appendix 1). 
This will be discussed, further, in the critique of prior research that concludes political 
partisanship and favoritism is a determinant of federal disaster relief without considering the 
availability of SBA loans. The Stafford Act mandates that a disaster declaration will be issued 
when a state indicates that its resources and capacities have been overwhelmed and federal 
disaster relief is required. A component of federal disaster relief under the provisions of the 
Stafford Act is SBA disaster recovery loans, but, to reiterate, these loans are also available 
through several mechanisms that are independent of a Stafford Act presidential disaster 
declaration (See Appendix 1). The SBA has identified six types of disaster declarations, 
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including Stafford Act presidential declarations, which enable the distribution of SBA disaster 
loans (See Table 1). 
 The 1950 Federal Disaster Relief Act was amended during the following 2 decades to 
address needs for temporary shelter and to distribute surplus goods from the Korean War to 
disaster affected communities. Presidential discretion in the determination of disaster assistance, 
which was authorized in the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, was utilized to provide support for 
temporary housing after a 1952 flood event in Kansas (Bea 2007). The Disaster Relief Act of 
1966 (P.L. 89-769) expanded federal relief to rural communities, unincorporated towns, and 
villages and provided funding for damages to higher-education facilities. This policy 
affirmed the authority of an Office of Emergency Preparedness to coordinate disaster relief 
programs (Moss 1999). In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act (P.L. 90-448) was legislated 
to provide federally subsidized insurance in communities that followed established floodplain 
management standards under the guidelines of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
This was augmented by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 which established mandatory 
insurance requirements for property in Special Flood Hazard Areas. The failure to comply with 
NFIP management standards resulted in the lack of insurance for damages in the dissertation 
study area of Saline County, Illinois after the 2008 flood event. 
 Although Medicare is not a disaster specific initiative, it is the source of data for the case 
study area in this dissertation and, as such, a brief review of this federal program is provided for 
those who are not familiar with health insurance. Medicare and Medicaid were established as the 
first public insurance programs in the U.S. under the mandate of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965 (P.L. 89–97). This program serves as the primary health insurance 
mechanism for the aged (65 or >), the eligible disabled, and individuals with end-stage renal 
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disease. It operates under the direction of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. In 2008, 
there were 34,311,500 aged (65 or >) Part A and Part B enrolled Medicare beneficiaries in the 
U.S. and 1,388,317 aged (65 or >) Part A and Part B enrolled Medicare beneficiaries in the case 
study area of Illinois (CMS 2014). Medicare has multiple components providing hospital 
insurance (Part A), medical insurance (Part B), prescription coverage (Part D) as of 2003, and 
privately operated coverage options (Part C), also known as Medicare Advantage Plans, as of 
1997. Various cost-share obligations apply to each component of the Medicare program but low 
income individuals who are also eligible for Medicaid (dual eligible) are provided with federal 
benefits that lessen or remove the financial burden. 
Table 1: Mechanisms for Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loan eligibility  
Stafford Act Presidential Disaster Declarations President of the U.S. declares a Major Disaster  
Agency Physical Disaster Declarations  
SBA declares disaster in response to gubernatorial 
request based on physical damage to buildings, 
machinery, equipment, inventory, homes and other 
property. Governor must provide evidence that 25 
homes and or businesses, in any county or political 
subdivision, have uninsured losses exceeding 40 percent 
of the estimated fair replacement value or pre-disaster 
fair market value, whichever is lower.  
Governor Certification Declarations  
SBA makes an economic injury declaration following a 
governor’s certification that at least five small business 
concerns in a disaster area have suffered substantial 
economic injury as a result of the disaster and are in 
need of financial assistance not otherwise available on 
reasonable terms. 
Secretary of Agriculture Declarations  
SBA makes an economic injury disaster declaration in 
response to a determination of a natural disaster by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. 
Military Reservist Economic Injury Loan 
SBA may make a Military Reservist Economic Injury 
Disaster declaration as authorized by the Veterans 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act 
of 1999 
Additional Disaster Assistance  
SBA may declare eligibility for additional disaster 
assistance in the event of a presidentially declared 
disaster if a significant number of businesses outside the 
disaster area have suffered substantial economic injury. 
(Adapted from Small Business Administration 2013, 21-22) 
65 
 
The Disaster Relief Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-606) was created to address unmet needs in 
prior legislation. This law allowed for the separate category of emergency declaration which was 
deemed necessary when immediate federal intervention was required for the preservation of life 
and property and to lessen the threat of catastrophe. The Disaster Relief Act of 1970 legislation 
established that “Emergency” declarations would require a federal cost share of not less than 75 
percent of funds distributed and the financial aid would be limited to $5 million dollars although 
the president may exceed this amount with congressional notification if there was a continuing 
threat to public safety and property. Federal aid in emergency declarations is limited to debris 
clearance and emergency protective measures including, in part, technical assistance to local 
governments, co-ordination of disaster relief between government agencies, and individual and 
household assistance consisting of temporary housing grants and distribution of food, medicine, 
and consumables. 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) was authorized by the Disaster Relief Act of 
1970 to provide support for disaster affected individuals who are unemployed and not eligible for 
state benefits (Whitaker 2012). Eligible unemployed workers are defined as: 
• the self-employed; 
• workers who experience a “week of disaster-related unemployment” ; 
• workers unable to reach the place of employment as a result of the disaster; 
• workers who were to begin employment and do not have a job or are unable to 
    reach the job as a result of the disaster; 
• individuals who have become major support for a household  because the head  
  of the household has died as a result of the disaster;  
• workers who cannot work because of injuries caused as a result of the 
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   disaster. (Whitaker 2012) 
Unemployment benefits are not duplicative and those individuals receiving unemployment 
assistance from other sources are not eligible for federal benefits. Presently, DUA benefits 
require a Stafford Act presidential disaster declaration and the loss of unemployment must be 
directly related to the disaster. Illegal aliens are not eligible for DUA. 
 Extensions of the Disaster Relief Act in 1970 and 1974 provided for individual assistance 
via temporary housing and grant programs for furniture, clothing, and essential needs in a cost 
share arrangement between states and the federal government (Sylves and Waugh 1996). The 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 broadened the role of federal involvement in disaster response. This 
legislation emphasized an all-hazards approach in an attempt to coordinate the historically 
fragmented response to specific types of disasters and institutionalized the concept of mitigation 
in disaster management (Sylves 1998). This federal disaster policy authorized a variety of 
measures that were available to assist individuals and families after disasters and marked the 
initial mandate for the Crisis Counseling Program (CCP). The establishment of the CCP and the 
extension of federal benefits under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 were legislated in response to 
an understanding of the role and responsibilities of the federal government in protecting the 
physical and emotional well-being of disaster afflicted individuals and communities. The role of 
psychological intervention after disasters was a contested topic as mental health experts cited a 
documented history of adverse behavioral consequences from disasters including the 1942 
Cocoanut Grove fire in Boston  (Smith 2006) and the 1948 Donora, Pennsylvania “Death Fog” 
event (Townsend 1950). However, noted social scientists, including E. L. Quarantelli, while 
supporting the inclusion of crisis counseling in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, believed that 
crisis intervention should serve a minor role in disaster relief (Morris 2011). Quarantelli felt that 
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federal resources would be better served in improving the disorganized structure of disaster relief 
agencies and social services and posited that an emphasis on individual based mental health 
services was based on “mythological assumptions” (Quarantelli 1984). The findings of the 
National Institute of Mental Health after the devastation associated with Hurricane Agnes led to 
an increased understanding of the adverse psychological and physiological manifestations of 
exposure to emotional stressors associated with catastrophic events. In 1972, Hurricane Agnes 
was considered to be “the greatest natural disaster in American history” (Okura 1975, 136; U.S 
Department of the Army 1972) and a subsequent series of tornado events affecting 10 states and 
resulting in 6 federal major disaster declarations in 1974 encouraged the federal government to 
pass the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Department of Homeland Security 2003) which included 
the following extended provisions for individual assistance after disasters (Oregon State 
University 2004): 
• Temporary housing 
• Disaster loans 
• Tax preparation assistance 
• Legal services 
• Consumer aid 
• Disaster unemployment benefits 
• Crisis counseling 
• Individual and family grants 
• Emergency shelter 
• Emergency food 
• Emergency medical assistance 
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• Essential repairs to homes so occupants can return 
• Temporary assistance with mortgage or rental payment 
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976  
(P.L. 94-265) allowed the U.S. Secretary of Commerce to consider an independent “fishery” 
disaster declaration for natural or man-made events that result in a loss of greater than 35 percent 
of commercial fishery revenue in a specified area. This program provides benefits to fisherman 
with annual revenue of less than $2,000,000 for buyback of equipment and vessels and/or 
assistance in creating a “sustainable” fishery in disaster affected areas. Disaster declaration 
requests are, normally,  initiated by the governor of an affected state or the local fishing 
community (Department of Commerce 2011). 
  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was established in 1979, through 
an executive order by President Jimmy Carter, to “consolidate and coordinate disaster response 
efforts” (Downton and Pielke 2001, 158) as federal disaster relief efforts had previously been 
distributed across a vast array of bureaucratic agencies. Sylves and Cumming (2004) indicate 
that since its inception, FEMA’s jurisdictional priorities have varied from civil defense against 
nuclear attacks and continuity of government to natural disaster management, depending on 
presidential administrations and perceived dangers. 
 Due to burgeoning costs associated with disaster relief, FEMA suggested instituting 
“economic capability factors” to determine eligibility for assistance in 1986, but this 
recommendation was not supported by Congress. In fact, in an attempt to preserve the 
discretionary authority of the president, the Robert T Stafford Act Amendments of 1988 were 
promulgated in a manner that specifically prohibited the use of any sole formula to determine 
eligibility for relief aid, leaving the power of final determination under the complete discretion 
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of the President of the United States (McCarthy 2011). Section 320 (42 U.S.C. 5163) of the 
Stafford Act states “No geographic area shall be precluded from receiving assistance under this 
Act solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding scale based on income or population” 
(Bazan 2005, FEMA 2007). Although several well-defined thresholds and precedents are utilized 
in the determination of individual and public assistance declarations by the president, the 
language of the Stafford Act regarding the prohibition of the use of any “sole” arithmetic 
formula has augmented the discretionary authority of the president and, in doing so, has served 
as the basis for claims of political impropriety in the presidential disaster declaration decision 
making process.  Daniels (2010) indicates that the Stafford Act expanded the role of the federal 
government in disaster response by authorizing amendments to previous disaster legislation 
allowing for: grants to fund full cost for the reconstruction of eligible private nonprofit facilities 
and owner-occupied private residential structures, local government overhead expense loans, 
free temporary housing benefit extensions, the installation of essential utilities, mortgage or 
rental payments to individuals for up to one year, food stamps, legal services, additional 
counseling services for low-income citizens, and  community economic recovery programs.  
 Pre-disaster mitigation became an area of increased emphasis in 1997 with the initiation 
of Project Impact which was designed to foster community partnerships that identified hazards 
and vulnerability and prioritized risk reduction (Wachtendorf, Connell, and Tierney 2002). This 
program was discontinued in 2001 and replaced with a competitive based pre-disaster mitigation 
grant protocol. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 further amended the Stafford Act by 
establishing additional mitigation plan requirements that called for coordination of disaster 
planning and implementation activities on a state and local levels (Disaster Mitigation Act 
2000). Additionally in 2000, the U.S. Congress recognized the increasing role of the Department 
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of Health and Human Services in responding to the behavioral health needs that arise as the 
result of both natural and human-caused emergencies and disasters by establishing Section 3102 
of the Children’s Health Act of 2000. This legislation amended the Public Health Services Act to 
allow for “emergency response” and establish mental health and substance abuse emergency 
response criteria. This expanded the grant assistance authority of the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration beyond the established crisis counseling services 
authorized by the Stafford Act for individual and household assistance in federally declared 
major disasters. The U.S. Congress “recognized the need to expand emergency services to 
include both mental health and substance abuse needs, whether or not a Presidential disaster is 
declared under the above authority. To help address these needs the Secretary (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services), through SAMHSA, was given the mandate to develop a new 
emergency grant program subsection, entitled “Emergency Response” (Federal Register 2001). 
This “Emergency Response” provision is included in section 3102 of the Children’s Health Act 
of 2000 and authorizes the Secretary to use up to 2.5% of the funds appropriated for 
discretionary grants for responding to emergencies. 
 FEMA was abolished as an independent agency in 2003 and became part of the cabinet 
level Department of Homeland Security. The General Accounting Office (GAO) acknowledged 
the management challenges that faced FEMA in 2003 as it merged with the Department of 
Homeland Security. The 2003 GAO report emphasized that FEMA must “ensure effective 
coordination of preparedness and response efforts, enhance the provision and management of 
disaster assistance for efficient and effective response, reduce the impact of natural hazards by 
improving the efficiency of mitigation and flood  programs, and resolve financial weaknesses to 
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ensure fiscal accountability” (GAO 2003). The goal was to provide a more comprehensive 
approach, including mitigation, while providing control over costs.  
 The Stafford Act was amended by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006 (PKEMRA) which was formulated in an attempt to improve the organization and 
coordination of intergovernmental and non-governmental operations in order to provide a focus 
on long term recovery in disaster scenarios. Prior to PKEMRA, the emphasis on recovery under 
the Stafford Act was on the repair of damaged buildings and infrastructure, debris removal, 
temporary housing and limited home repairs, and revenue loss loans (Bea 2005). The enactment 
of PKEMRA authorized the lead federal official in presidential disaster declared areas " to 
activate a team of federal long-term recovery experts to offer technical assistance to States to 
support particularly challenged communities organize and plan for long-term recovery, as well 
as access coordinated Federal, State, non-governmental and private sector recovery resources" 
(FEMA 2009a). Section 219 of PKEMRA amends the Stafford Act to address behavioral health 
concerns by increasing the legislated provisions to: 
 
...  expand the authorization for professional counseling services to victims of 
major disasters to include substance abuse and mental health counseling. 
Requires federal agencies providing mental health or substance abuse services, in 
coordination with state and local officials, to: (1) survey mental health or 
substance abuse services available to individuals affected by, and emergency 
responders to, major disasters; and (2) develop a strategy for the adequate 
provision of such services (The Library of Congress 2006). 
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PKEMRA also created a new position at FEMA: the Small State and Rural Advocate. The 
designated advocate was assigned to assure that “the needs of smaller states and rural 
communities were ‘met in the declaration process’ and to assist small states in the preparation of 
declaration requests” (McCarthy 2011, 6; McCarthy 2011a, 6). 
 In 2006, the President signed into law, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
which amended the Public Health Service Act by creating an Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) in the Department of Health and Human Services to focus 
on preparedness, planning and response and to strengthen the capabilities of health systems in 
disasters. This act also established the National Health Security Strategy. The purpose of the 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act is “... to improve the Nation’s public health and 
medical preparedness and response capabilities for emergencies, whether deliberate, accidental, 
or natural” (Public Health Emergency 2010). This law has been integral in the distribution of 
hospital preparedness grants that are utilized to improve local capacity to handle hospital surge 
and the resultant psychological trauma associated with mass casualty events. 
 The Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act (PETS) (P.L. 109-308) amended 
the Stafford Act to ensure that states and localities had established plans to provide for the care 
of household pets and service animals following a disaster. This legislation was a result of the 
observation of a large number of individuals who failed to evacuate high risk areas prior to 
Hurricane Katrina landfall due to the fear of abandoning their pets and service animals.  
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, which was authorized as a portion of the 
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L.113-2) amended the Stafford Act by streamlining 
the approval process for small project Public Assistance grants, providing for family child care 
expenses, mandating a review of eligibility requirements for Individual Assistance grants, and 
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authorizing advanced payment for certain Hazard Mitigation Program expenses (Brown, 
McCarthy, and Liu 2013). This legislation directs federal disaster resources to individuals in 
presidential disaster declared areas by emphasizing” Disaster Survivor Assistance” This 
initiative is designed to provide a timely presence in disaster areas to address immediate needs of 
disaster survivors by, “providing in-person, tailored information and services; providing referrals 
to whole community partners as needed; collecting targeted information to support decision-
making; and identifying public information needs so critical messaging can be developed and 
disseminated (FEMA 2013e). Table 2 provides a summary of significant federal disaster 
legislation since 1950 and includes key policy initiatives that have been instrumental in 
contributing to the extensive network of resources that are available to individuals and 
communities after disasters. 
 
Table 2: Federal disaster legislation overview: 1950-2013 
1950, PL 81-875    Disaster Relief Act: Created permanent relief fund; authorized federal funding for repair of local 
government facilities, Transferred authority for disaster relief decision making from Congress to the 
president, established precedent for cost-sharing between federal & state govt. 
1951, PL82-107 Amendment to 1950 law: Authorized federal emergency housing 
1953, PL 83-134   Amendment to 1950 law: Permitted donation of federal surplus property to state and local governments  
1962, PL 87-502 Amendment to 1950 law: Extended federal assistance to state facilities & U.S. Territories.  
1966, PL 89-769 Disaster Relief Act: Extended federal assistance to rural communities, towns, and villages.  
1968, PL 90-448 National Flood Insurance Act: Provided for federally subsidized insurance and reinsurance  
1969, PL 91-79 Disaster Relief Act (Limited to 15 months): Funding for debris removal from private property. 
Distribution of food coupons, Unemployment benefits for disaster victims. Temporary housing for 
disaster victims.SBA, FHA, VA loan revisions 
1970, PL 91-606 Disaster Assistance Act: Codified existing disaster legislation and added the following: Grants to 
individuals for temporary housing/relocation. Funding for legal services.  
1974, PL 93-288 Disaster Relief Amendment: Distinguished emergencies from major disasters. Emphasized disaster-
mitigation programs. Crisis Counseling 
1980, PL 96-365 Federal Crop Insurance Act: Made all commercial crops part of the program. Introduced premium 
subsidy. Permitted private-insurance companies to sell federal crop insurance 
1988, PL 100-707 Stafford Act: Present day centerpiece legislation for providing disaster relief  
1994, PL 103-325 NFIP Reform Act: Tightened flood-insurance purchase requirements. Expanded mitigation  
1994, PL 103-354 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act: Offered catastrophic coverage at subsidized rates  
2000, PL 106-390 Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000-Small State and Rural Advocate 
2006, PL 109-295 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
2006, PL 109-308 Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act 
2013, PL 113-2 Sandy Recovery Improvement Act- Disaster Survivor Assistance Program,Child Care  Assistance 
Source: Partially adapted from (Office of Emergency Preparedness 1972; May 1985; Moss 1999) 
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2.5 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988  
 Federal disaster declarations in the U.S. are authorized by the president under the 
provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (P.L. 
100-707) (the Stafford Act). As summarized in Chapter 1: Introduction, this act codified, 
clarified, and augmented the previously established mechanisms for the distribution of various 
forms of federal assistance after disasters including debris removal, temporary housing, 
individual and family assistance, infrastructure repair, emergency communications, and military 
support for the preservation of life and property (Bea 2006). This legislation provides the 
statutory framework for the federal support of state and local resources after disasters (Bazan 
2005).  The Stafford Act grants the president permanent authority to direct federal aid to affected 
states by means of a “declaration” of federal assistance (Bea 2005). This policy represents the 
culmination of two centuries of federal disaster intervention and congressional action designed 
to respond to the needs of disaster stricken individuals and communities. It has been modified on 
several occasions and a detailed review of Stafford Act policy predecessors and modifications 
will be provided in Section 2.3.  
 The Stafford Act defines two categories of disaster declarations that are under the sole 
discretionary authority of the President of the U.S.: “Emergency” and “Major” disaster 
declarations. The Stafford Act also provides for a disaster declaration category of “Fire 
Management Assistance”, but this declaration classification does not require presidential 
authorization and is issued, independently, by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Fire 
Management Assistance declarations have clearly defined cost thresholds for federal support and 
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have not been subject to substantive claims of political impropriety with respect to declarations 
by FEMA. This dissertation focuses on the equitable implementation of Stafford Act disaster 
declarations that are subject to autonomous presidential authority and, as such, Fire Management 
Assistance declarations are not included in the analysis.  
 The Stafford Act defines “Emergency” as “any occasion or instance for which, in the 
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts 
and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to 
lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States” (FEMA 2007). 
Federal aid in “emergency” declarations (EM) is limited to “debris clearance” and “emergency 
protective measures” including, in part, technical assistance to local governments, co-ordination 
of disaster relief between government agencies, and individual and household assistance 
consisting of temporary housing grants and distribution of food, medicine, and consumables. 
“Debris Clearance” and “Emergency Protective Measures” are defined as Category A and 
Category B grants in the Stafford Act classification scheme. Emergency disaster declarations 
require a federal cost share of not less than 75 percent of funds distributed and the financial aid 
is limited to $5 million dollars, although the president may exceed this amount with 
congressional notification if there is a continuing threat to public safety and property. 
Presidential declarations for “Snow” and “Winter Storm” disaster events have been historically 
classified as Emergency (EM) declarations and distribution amounts for federal assistance in 
these events has often exceeded the $5 million dollar limit (FEMA 2013a).   
A “Major disaster” is defined by FEMA as: 
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 any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, 
winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or 
explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the 
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major 
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available 
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in 
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby (FEMA 
2007).  
 
“Major” disaster declarations (DR) entitle eligible states and counties to federal benefits that 
provide for significant extensions of the measures that exist under emergency declarations and 
include a broad array of individual and household assistance benefits (IA) and public assistance 
benefits (PA) for the repair, restoration and replacement of infrastructure. Major disaster 
declarations qualify requesting states to receive the legislated Stafford Act components of 
Individual Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA), and/or Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) assistance depending on the federal approval of assessed needs. The Freedom of 
Information Act acquired FEMA Disaster Financial Status Report from 1989-2012 (FEMA 
2013a) indicates  approximately 42 percent of major disaster declarations were for Public 
Assistance, 7 percent were for Individual Assistance, and 50 percent were for, both, Public 
Assistance and Individual Assistance declarations. Requests for presidential major disaster 
declarations are initiated by the governor of an affected state, although the president can issue an 
emergency declaration for a state without the governor’s request in extraordinary situations that 
77 
 
involve primarily federal interests, such as the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster declaration 
(FEMA 2003; Bazan 2005). The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response 
Framework also provides for the deployment of federal resources, including mental health 
services, in times of significant disaster without requiring a gubernatorial request for assistance 
(Salkowe and Framingham 2012). Major disaster declarations are also subject to cost-share 
requirements between the federal government and the declared state or territory. The federal 
government is obligated to pay not less than 75 percent of eligible and approved costs with the 
exception of 100 percent federal payments for approved temporary housing awards (FEMA 
2007).   
 Emergency declaration requests can be declared or denied (turndown). Major disaster 
declaration requests can be declared, denied, or designated as emergency declarations. Approval 
or denial of emergency disaster declarations and major disaster declarations is under the sole 
final authority of the President of the U.S. The U.S. Congress appropriates funds for disaster 
relief on an annual basis to guarantee that federal assistance is available to those communities 
that have received disaster declarations. These appropriations are considered “no year “funds and 
are rolled over to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for the following year if not used in the 
appropriated year. The annual allowance for the DRF appropriation is presently based “on the 
ten year rolling average of what has been spent by the federal government on relief efforts for 
major disasters” (Painter 2012).  The distribution of these funds is under the auspices of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency for distribution in presidentially declared disasters that 
occur in the U.S. and its territories. Bea (2005, 4) indicates that, “appropriations to the DRF 
generally evoke little controversy” in Congress. However, as previously noted, the significant 
fiscal demands associated with recent disaster events, such as Hurricane Sandy in 2012, have 
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altered the political dynamic with respect to supplemental appropriations (CNBC 2013, Faile 
2013). Congressional legislation is required to meet the urgent needs associated with large scale 
catastrophic events and recent debates have focused on the creation of “budgetary offsets” for 
approved damages that exceed the available DRF resources (Painter 2012). 
 The Stafford Act also formally established the federal Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) which provided funding to lessen the risk of future disasters by means of structural 
modifications to buildings and landscape. Eligibility for HMGP funding requires requesting 
states and counties to have disaster preparedness and hazard mitigation plans in place. Hazard 
Mitigation Grant funds are available in all areas that have received a major disaster declarations, 
if requested by the governor. HMGP funds are distributed based on a “sliding scale” formula 
which is applied as a percentage of the funds spent on a specified prior Public and/or Individual 
Assistance disaster declaration for the requesting state. The sliding-scale formula provides grant 
funding for up to “15% of the first $2 billion of estimated aggregate amounts of disaster 
assistance, up to 10% for amounts between $2 billion and $10 billion, and 7.5% for amounts 
between $10 billion and $35.333 billion. For States with a FEMA-approved Enhanced 
Mitigation Plan, up to 20% of the total of Public and Individual Assistance funds authorized for 
the disaster (up to $35.333 billion of such assistance) are available” (FEMA 2009). Hazard 
Mitigation funds may be utilized to pay up to 75% of the eligible project costs. Floodplain 
improvement projects ranging from acquisition and relocation of flood-prone homes and 
infrastructure to road improvements are eligible for mitigation grants under the provisions of this 
program. HMGP funding was utilized to buy-out the homes of the residents of the Village of 
Valmeyer, Illinois after the 1993 Midwest floods. The townspeople adopted a village relocation 
strategy and the majority of residents chose to move to a higher elevation location in the “new” 
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Valmeyer (Friend 1994; Knobloch 2003; State of Illinois 2012). Counties that have been turned 
down for presidential disaster declarations requests are eligible for Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program consideration if there has been a major disaster declaration issued by the president for 
another event in their state and the requesting county has an approved Local Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. It is important to note that Saline County, Illinois; a 2008 flood damaged and presidential 
disaster declaration denied county in the dissertation case study area of Southern Illinois did not 
have an approved local Hazard Mitigation Plan in place until 2012 and was not eligible for 
mitigation funding under the provisions of this program until that time. West Frankfort, Illinois 
in 2008 disaster declaration denied Franklin County. received $6,415,688 in HMGP funding in 
2014 to relocate the sewer treatment plant to a location that was 3 feet above base flood 
elevation. The plant was closed for 200 days after the 2008 flood event (FEMA 2014E). 
 The HMGP is one component of mitigation planning that is administered by FEMA. The 
Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program, the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program, and 
the Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) program are additional federally legislated initiatives designed 
to reduce risk to people and structures in the event of a disaster (Thomas et al. 2011). Eligibility 
for each of these programs requires an approved local hazard mitigation plan. In 2012, Jackson 
County, Illinois received a Flood Mitigation Assistance grant to acquire all residences in the 
Reed Lake Mobile Home Park and transfer the property into a public county green space. Each 
homeowner was provided $25,000 for their residence and $15,000 for moving expenses. The 
owner of the mobile home park was awarded $1.25 million for the land and his personal property 
(Norris 2012). The Reed Lake Mobile Home Park was previously damaged by flooding in the 
presidential disaster declaration (PDD) denied area of Southern Illinois in 2008 and again in 
2011. The 2011 event received a Major PDD (DR-1991) for Individual and Public Assistance. 
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The repetitive losses that this community suffered over a time span of 3 years (2008-2011) 
served as the basis for FEMA’s funding of the acquisition costs. 
 The establishment of clearly defined cost-share requirements was codified in the Stafford 
Act in conjunction with language that provides the president with the authority to adjust cost-
shares for Public Assistance declarations (McCarthy 2010). The federal share of relief aid was 
not to be less than 75 percent and could be up to 100 percent, including 100 percent of temporary 
housing costs for disaster declarations that received individual and household assistance. It was 
also required that states show the nature and amount of their commitment in terms of local 
resources. In the following years there have been significant waivers to the 25 percent 
requirement with the federal contribution paying up to 90 percent of assessed damages for 
several disaster events. The 2013 threshold for seeking waivers to the 25 percent local 
contribution is $133 statewide loss per person and waiver consideration is also given if there is 
more than one disaster in a twelve month period in a specific disaster request area.  (Federal 
Register 2013; Bea 2006). Factors such as previous or recent disaster exposure, local impact, and 
the percentage of population that is low income, elderly or unemployed (Bazan 2005) are 
considered when waivers for Stafford Act state requirements are applied to gubernatorial 
requests. Disaster declared counties in the Illinois dissertation study area were the recipients of a 
cost share waiver in 2008 for a Public Assistance declaration (FEMA-1771-DR) (Federal 
Register 2008). 
 
2.5.1 Disaster Declaration Process 
 Requests for relief under the Stafford act are initiated by the governor of an affected state 
or territory when a disaster event theoretically surpasses the ability of the state to provide 
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adequate services to its affected locales. The governor is required to declare a state of 
emergency, activate the state emergency response plan, and furnish information to FEMA 
regarding the availability of state resources that are committed to the disaster including the 
ability to participate in all cost sharing requirements contained in the Stafford Act (Sylves and 
Waugh 1996; Bazan 2005). Gubernatorial requests for Stafford Act disaster declarations must 
explicitly indicate that “federal assistance is necessary to supplement the efforts and available 
resources of the state and local governments, disaster relief organizations, and compensation by 
insurance for disaster related losses” (FEMA 2014a).  
 It is important to consider the factors that may influence a gubernatorial decision to 
request federal relief. Governors must balance the varied needs of their constituents against the 
loss of public confidence that may result if a turndown of a gubernatorial request for disaster 
assistance is received from the president (McCarthy 2011). Additionally, governors must 
consider the potential loss of trust from the president and FEMA operatives if unjust and 
imprudent requests are made for Stafford Act assistance. The fiduciary obligations of elected 
office dictate that governors use fiscally sound assessments in requests for disaster declarations 
due to the mandated state/county cost-share obligation of 25% of federal expenditures for 
disaster relief. This cost-share is usually divided equally between the state and the disaster 
declared county and it represents a financial burden that must be considered by elected officials, 
particularly for Individual Assistance grants in rural counties with limited or non-existent 
disaster escrow funds and in states with restrictive balanced budget obligations. The “moral 
hazard” associated with injudicious state and federal support for individuals and communities 
that have failed to adequately mitigate and prepare for disasters has become part of the equation 
in determining the basis for a presidential disaster declaration request and the assumption of 
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associated cost share responsibilities that are mandated in a federal disaster declaration (Kousky 
and Shabman 2012; Kousky,Michel-Kerjan, and Raschky 2013) 
 FEMA’s recommendation for a presidential disaster declaration is issued when it has 
been determined that all other resources and authorities to manage the crisis are inadequate. The 
recommendation is then forwarded to the president from the FEMA director. The capacity for 
selective application of the objective requirements of the Stafford Act and the broad latitude 
given to the president in the use of subjective criteria for disaster declaration determinations has 
created an environment of suspicion regarding underlying motives for marginal disaster 
declarations and the equitable distribution of federal relief.  
 
2.5.1.1 Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) 
 FEMA’s recommendation for a disaster declaration or denial is based on a Preliminary 
Damage Assessment (PDA) of the disaster affected area by a team of representatives from 
county, state, and federal emergency management agencies, American Red Cross 
representatives, and Small Business Administration operatives (McCarthy 2011; FEMA 2012). 
The Preliminary Damage Assessment team plays a critical role in the disaster declaration 
decision making process as the documentation of disaster specific damages forms the basis for a 
determination of a disaster declaration or denial (turndown) (McCarthy 2011). The fact that PDA 
teams may consist of volunteers, temporary employees and local representatives with varied 
levels of experience in assessing disaster related damages is critical to our understanding of the 
potential for a turndown of a presidential request. McCarthy (2011) informs us that, “… the PDA 
helps to identify a specific, potential need for certain programs, such as crisis counseling or 
disaster unemployment assistance during the disaster recovery period. It is this identification of 
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discrete need that helps the governor decide on which assistance programs will be requested.” 
Rubin and Colle (2012) indicated their concern regarding the qualifications of personnel 
involved in the emergency management process in stating, “A large part of FEMA’s workforce 
is what’s called reservists or Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs)—full-time but temporary 
staff who are not regular FEMA personnel. Many of the DAEs do not have an education or a 
background in emergency management.” In marginal cases, these factors may contribute to 
inconsistencies in the determination of a substantive need for a presidential disaster declaration. 
“Insufficient damages and the failure to accurately document damages are the main reasons for a 
denial of a governor’s request for a federal disaster declaration” (anonymous FEMA 
representative, Natural Hazards Conference, 2011).  
 The Preliminary Damage Assessment team has three standard approaches that are 
utilized in evaluating damages in areas that are requesting a disaster declaration (FEMA 2005a): 
1. Windshield Survey- This approach involves assessments of damages by car while driving 
thru disaster affected communities in conjunction with occasional interviews which serve 
as benchmarks to determine socioeconomic profile and insurance coverage. This is 
reported to be a common approach to conducting a PDA (FEMA 2005a) but has been 
soundly criticized as an inadequate approach (Anonymous FEMA Public Assistance 
Operative 2013), particularly in flood-damaged communities that are often inaccessible 
by automobile until the waters have receded and the damages are no longer visible from a 
“windshield” perspective. 
2. Door-to-Door- This is a labor intensive approach to damage assessments but provides a 
accurate and specific information regarding socioeconomic status, insurance coverage, 
and degree of damage (FEMA 2005a).   
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3.  Fly-Over- This technique is used in remote areas and or for large scale events to provide 
a fast assessment of damages but is the least accurate mode of damage assessment.  
 
 The turndown of the 2008 gubernatorial request for an Individual Assistance declaration 
in the dissertation study area of flood damaged Southern Illinois was attributed, in part, to a 
Preliminary Damage Assessment that involved “drive-by window estimates of flood damages 
instead of door-to-door assessments. “This may have been part of the reason we got denied” 
(anonymous county level Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) county level official  
2011). Patti Thompson, IEMA Communications Director, in referencing a 2011 disaster 
declaration request for flooding in Southern Illinois, stated, “IEMA rushed to request a 
declaration after flooding in 2008 and got denied…..  That's why we really tried to balance being 
quick as possible and being efficient as possible" (Hevern 2011). 
 The PDA team assesses the affected disaster area and submits its findings to the 
requesting governor for his/her consideration. The findings of the PDA form the objective basis 
for a governor’s decision to request a disaster declaration based on the determination that 
damages have exceeded the response capacity of state personnel, equipment, and fiscal 
resources. The gubernatorial request is forwarded to the FEMA Regional Director’s office where 
the damage assessment is used to compile a Regional Summary and Regional Analysis and 
Recommendation. Neither the Regional Summary or Regional Analysis and Recommendation 
are public documents; they are only recommendations (FEMA 2004, 6). This is another factor 
that contributes to suspicion in cases where gubernatorial requests for a presidential disaster 
declaration are turned down. Without access to the Regional Summary and/or Regional Analysis 
and Recommendation, it is impossible to ascertain at which jurisdictional level the declaration or 
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turndown decision was initially rendered.   This summary is forwarded to the federal FEMA 
Administrator’s office for further evaluation and final recommendation to the president (See 
Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of disaster declaration process (Adapted from FEMA 2010a; FEMA 2012a) 
The final recommendation to the president and the decision for a disaster declaration or denial is 
based, in part, on the following guidance criteria. (adapted from Code of Federal Regulations 44, 
2002, 431-433):  
 
2.5.1.2 Criteria Utilized for Public Assistance Disaster Declarations 
 1. Estimated cost of the assistance- Prior to 1999, there were no objective criteria applied 
to the disaster declaration determination process under the provisions of the Stafford Act with 
the exception of the requirement for an affected state to show evidence of the fiscal capacity to 
provide 25 percent of the cost-share associated with the disaster. Since 1999, FEMA’s 
recommendation for a Public Assistance disaster declaration or turndown has been based, in part, 
on several objective and subjective factors including a minimum threshold of $1 million in total 
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state damages. This fiscal requirement for disaster aid was established as it was assumed that 
even low population states can manage the obligation for this amount of public assistance. No 
provision for inflation was made for this threshold upon legislation in 1999 (GAO 2001). In 
addition, a $1.00 statewide per capita critical financial threshold was established in 1999 for 
consideration of public assistance (GAO 2001). This is adjusted annually by an increase in the 
Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers by 1.5% from the prior year and is $1.39 per 
capita statewide as of October 1, 2013 (Federal Register 2013b). There is no per capita fiscal 
damage criteria applied to requests for Individual Assistance disaster declaration requests and, as 
stated previously, the Stafford Act precludes the use of any arithmetic formula as a sole 
determinant of eligibility for a disaster declaration. 
 2. Localized impacts- Extraordinary concentrations of damages that might warrant 
federal assistance are considered even if the statewide per capita is not met. This is a specified 
consideration when critical facilities are involved or where localized per capita impacts might be 
extremely high. The per capita critical financial threshold for localized impacts is $3.50 per 
capita countywide (Federal Register 2013a).  
 3. Insurance coverage in force- Counties that have received prior disaster declarations are 
required to have insurance coverage in place in order to be eligible for future public assistance 
benefits. Section 311 of the Stafford Act stipulates that federal assistance is “ unavailable in any 
type of major disaster if the applicant has not complied with all insurance requirements imposed 
as conditions of previous disaster assistance” (Liu 2008). States may self-insure to meet this 
requirement but counties/localities that have previously received Public Assistance grant funding 
must obtain and maintain external insurance and may not self-insure (FEMA 2013b). The 
Stafford Act stipulates that self-insured states will not be eligible for grants to repair, replace or 
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restore damaged facilities “to the extent that insurance for such property or part thereof would 
have been reasonably available” (FEMA 2007). This portion of the Stafford Act was intended to 
encourage states to take the appropriate actions that were necessary to avoid future unprotected 
losses from disaster events. However, states can petition the federal government for waivers of 
insurance obligations if external insurance costs are found to be prohibitively expensive. The 
determination of insurance availability and prohibitive cost for insurance obligations is delegated 
to the insurance commissioner of the state requesting the waiver. “The President shall not require 
greater types and extent of insurance than are certified to him as reasonable by the appropriate 
State insurance commissioner responsible for regulation of such insurance” (Louisiana 
Department of Insurance 2010). This provision had led some insurance industry operatives to 
conclude that, “The U.S. Government is an insurance company with a military” (anonymous 
Swiss Re Representative, 2012). 
Noteworthy exceptions have been made with respect to the obligation to obtain and 
maintain insurance coverage. In 2008, Lawrence County, Illinois, a rural disaster-declared 
county included in the dissertation study area, was awarded a Public Assistance disaster 
declaration, (FEMA-1771-DR), contingent upon its decision to begin participating in the 
National Flood Insurance Program. Subsequently, Lawrence County administrators voted to 
abandon the NFIP obligation and in August, 2009 the county discontinued participation in the 
program due to concerns pertaining to costs of compliance with respect to insurance premiums 
and building restrictions (Beavers 2009, Smith 2009). Small Business Administration loans that 
had been distributed to flood affected business after the 2008 flood were subject to federal recall 
but no action was taken (Illinois Emergency Management Agency official 2012). In fact, 
Lawrence County has been the recipient of 2 subsequent major disaster declarations, ( DR-1991) 
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in 2011 for Public and Individual Assistance and (DR-4116) in 2013 for Public Assistance, 
despite the explicit restrictions in disaster assistance that are listed in Section 311 of the Stafford 
Act for counties that fail to maintain insurance coverage. Additionally, as of July 2009, 
Lawrence County residents were the beneficiaries of $505,898.07 in Department of Health and 
Human Services Supplemental Social Services Block Grants, specifically authorized for the 
benefit of states and counties that had received 2008 Major presidential disaster declarations 
(Office of Sustainability 2009). Personal interviews with 2 emergency management employees 
in in the dissertation case study area of Southern Illinois revealed an awareness of the disparities 
that existed in federal assistance initiatives between the disaster declared and denied counties in 
2008 and a repeated refrain was that, “They don’t care as much about Southern Illinois” 
(personal communication  anonymous Illinois emergency management officials 2011).  
 4. Hazard Mitigation- States that have actively implemented hazard mitigation measures 
to reduce damage costs from disasters are considered eligible for public assistance in certain 
cases even if the per capita critical threshold indicators have not been reached. 
 5. Recent Multiple Disasters-  States that have experienced more than one disaster event 
in any 12 month period are given consideration due to the cumulative costs associated with 
multiple events. Prior Stafford Act declarations and gubernatorial disaster declarations are 
evaluated with regard to the amount of state funding associated with recent disaster events.  
 6.  Programs of other Federal assistance- Consideration is given to the availability of 
funds from other federal programs that may be more appropriate or duplicative with respect to a 
Stafford Act declaration for Public Assistance. 
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2.5.1.3 Criteria Utilized for Individual Assistance Declarations  
 1. Concentration of damages- A high concentration of damages in a specific locale is 
considered a greater priority for an Individual Assistance declaration than “widespread and 
scattered damages throughout a State” (Code of Federal Regulation 44 2002, 432). This criterion 
was the rationale for the denial of the request for an Individual Assistance in the dissertation case 
study area of Illinois after flooding in March of 2008 (Illinois Emergency Management Agency 
Official 2012). 
 2. Trauma- The degree of trauma to a state and locality is considered. Some of the listed 
criteria for a trauma designation are large numbers of injuries and deaths, large scale disruption 
of normal community functions and services, and emergency needs such as extended or 
widespread loss of power or water. 
 3. Special populations- Special populations are defined under the Stafford Act criteria as 
low-income, the elderly, and the unemployed and the degree to which these segments of the 
population are affected and have a greater need for assistance.  
 4. Voluntary agency assistance-  The role of voluntary organizations such as the 
American Red Cross and state or local disaster response and relief programs is considered and 
federal relief will be withheld if local resources are adequate to respond to the needs of disaster 
affected individuals and families. 
 5. Insurance- The amount of insurance coverage that exists for individuals who reside in 
the disaster affected area is considered in the declaration decision-making process because 
federal disaster assistance cannot duplicate payments from private insurers. The same 
restrictions that were previously outlined for obtaining and maintaining insurance in previously 
damaged structures for Public Assistance benefits are in place for Individual Assistance with 
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some exceptions that are relevant to the dissertation study area. The restrictions for Individual 
Assistance benefits apply only to maintenance of flood insurance on homes that are located in a 
high risk federally designated Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) and also received prior 
Individual Assistance benefits for repair of flood damages.  Homes that were damaged by non-
flood causes are not under any mandatory insurance obligation and are not excluded from 
receiving Individual Assistance benefits if the same type of event or any other declaration 
eligible type of event were to reoccur (Liu 2008). Homeowners in flood disaster declared areas 
may be entitled to federal subsidies to cover the costs of flood insurance for up to 3 years. 
However, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA) mandates that communities enact 
land use policies to mitigate against flood damage by implementing practices and standards that 
are required for inclusion in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The NFIA “prohibits 
federal officers from authorizing “financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes” 
in an SFHA if the community does not participate in the NFIP. A flood victim in an SFHA is 
only eligible for federal disaster assistance if the community participates in the NFIP” (Liu 
2008). This interpretation of Stafford Act legislation led emergency management officials in the 
2008 disaster denied dissertation study area of Southern Illinois to conclude that, “We were 
turned down because we weren’t participating in the NFIP” (anonymous Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency official 2011). However, another emergency management official, in 
referencing a 2008 Illinois county that was granted a disaster declaration (DR-1771) and was not 
participating in the NFIP , indicated that “FEMA said we’d still be eligible for some types of 
assistance, even after we dropped out of the NFIP” (anonymous Illinois Emergency Management 
Agency official 2011). This confusion in the interpretation of specific portions of the Stafford 
Act will become critical to an understanding of the dynamics of disaster declarations and denials 
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in the following case study analysis. The Stafford Act assistance exclusion for individuals 
residing in SFHA’s is, in fact, limited to “financial assistance for acquisition and construction 
purposes” in connection with a flood and is specifically defined as: 
 
any form of financial assistance which is intended in whole or in part for the 
acquisition, construction, reconstruction, repair, or improvement of any publicly 
or privately owned building or mobile home, and for any machinery, equipment, 
fixtures, and furnishings contained or to be contained therein, and shall include 
the purchase or subsidization of mortgages or mortgage loans…  
 
This exclusion does not prohibit a presidential disaster declaration for Individual Assistance 
grants from being issued for a variety of other needs that will be specified in subsequent sections 
of the literature review. 
 6. Average amount of individual assistance by State- There is no established threshold 
for recommending Individual Assistance grants, but averages for disaster declarations based on 
the number of homes with major damages or total destruction were defined in 1999 based on 
state population (See Table 3). The final determination of a disaster declaration is based on the 
described criteria but the Stafford Act stipulates that “No geographic area shall be precluded 
from receiving assistance under this Act solely by virtue of an arithmetic formula or sliding scale 
based on income or population” (Bazan 2005, FEMA 2007). As previously mentioned, the final 
determination of a disaster declaration or denial is under sole presidential authority. Disaster 
declarations may provide funding for Public Assistance and/or Individual Assistance as defined 
in the following sections. 
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Table 3: Average amount of assistance per disaster: July 1994 to July 1999 
 
 
Small states (< 2 
million pop.)  
Medium states (2-
10 million pop.)  
Large states (over 
10 million pop.)  
Average Population  
(1990 census data) 
1,000,057 4,713,548 15,522,791 
Number of Disaster Housing 
Applications Approved 
1,507 2,747 4,679 
Number of Homes Estimated Major 
Damage/Destroyed 
173 582 801 
Dollar Amount of Housing Assistance $2.8 million $4.6 million $9.5 million 
Number of Individual and Family 
Grant Applications Approved 
495 1,377 2,071 
Dollar Amount of Individual and 
Family Grant Assistance 
1.1 million 2.9 million 4.6 million 
Disaster Housing/IFG Combined 
Assistance 
3.9 million 7.5 million 14.1 million 
(Excerpted from Federal Register 1999)  
 
 
2.5.1.4 Stafford Act Funding Mechanisms: Public Assistance (PA)  
 Major disaster declarations for Public Assistance provide allocations for 7 categories of 
grant awards which are designated based on gubernatorial request and presidential approval of 
FEMA’s recommendation. States, Localities, and certain non-profit organizations that provide 
essential community services, such as hospitals, are eligible for consideration of Public 
Assistance Grants. Specific awards require review and approval by FEMA officials. Small 
Project grants for approved categories in Public Assistance declarations (less than $120,000, 
effective February 26, 2014 (Federal Register 2014)) are payable upon approval by FEMA. 
Large Project grants are paid upon completion, although interim payments can be distributed as 
needed.  
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 All Public Assistance grants are subject to federal oversight and audit. It is important to 
note that rural Henderson County, Illinois; one of the presidentially declared counties (DR-1771) 
in the 2008 dissertation study area, was subject to a 2011 federal audit of approved Public 
Assistance funding for emergency levee repairs associated with the 2008 declaration. The 
Department of Homeland Security- Office of the Inspector General (OIG) determined that 
Henderson County officials failed to follow federal contract procurement protocols and, 
additionally, failed to distribute FEMA funds in a timely manner, due, in part, to inappropriate 
guidance by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) (Department of Homeland 
Security 2011).  This led to an OIG recommendation to disallow over $3,000,000 in previously 
approved funding for projects in rural Henderson County.  County officials appealed the OIG 
recommendation on 2 separate occasions and each time, in 2012 and 2013, the FEMA Deputy 
Regional Administrator concurred with the OIG analysis and removed FEMA’s obligation to 
award a portion of the questioned costs totaling over $1,500,000. The fact that the FEMA 
Deputy Regional Administrator, Andrew Velasquez, who deobligated the FEMA funding, was 
the director in charge of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, in 2008, is an important 
factor to remember as we move forward in the analysis of federal disaster relief and the presence 
or absence of political motives.   
 Public Assistance declarations authorize payment of not less than 75 percent of eligible 
costs for emergency protective measures and/or repair and replacement of eligible public and 
non-profit facilities. Payments are made to the declared state for distribution upon completion of 
the respective project. The respective categories that are eligible for Public Assistance grants are 
(FEMA 2013d): 
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Category A: Debris Removal 
 Debris Removal is designated for the management and removal of disaster related items 
that affect public structures and roadways resulting in an immediate threat to public safety. 
Debris removal is not applicable to private property unless pre-approved by FEMA due to a 
public safety threat. Debris removal is not applicable to “wilderness areas”. This category of 
federal relief is also designated to assist in the economic recovery of the disaster affected 
community. Category A grant awards are also a component of Emergency declarations, as 
previously outlined.  
 Category B: Emergency Protective Measures 
 Grants are awarded, as needed, for essential community services to protect public safety 
including emergency communications, public health services, sandbagging, search and rescue, 
police security, and temporary levees. 
 Category C: Roads and Bridges 
 Disaster related damages to non-federal aid roads and adjacent earthwork affecting the 
structural integrity of roads and bridges is eligible for grant consideration. This includes 
upgrades, if necessary, to meet present codes and standards. Prtivate roads and/or roads under 
the authority of the Federal Highway Administration are not eligible for public assistance. 
 Category D: Water Control Facilities 
 Water control facilities such as public dams, levees, irrigation and pumping facilities are 
eligible if the affected state/locality can establish active maintenance of the structure and 
substantiate losses as disaster-related. It is important to remember that Stafford Act funding is 
not duplicative and flood control structures under the purview of the U.S. Army Corps of 
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Engineers (USACE) or the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) are not eligible for 
permanent repair via Category D grants. 
 Category E: Buildings and Equipment 
 Public and non-profit buildings are eligible for repair and or replacement for disaster 
related damages. This includes building contents and furnishings. The grant is subject to the 
insurance provisions and restrictions previously described and awards are offset by the 
maximum amount of insurance that was available for uninsured buildings in floodplains that are 
awarded flood disaster declarations for an initial occurrence. This provision is designed to 
encourage self-insured jurisdictions to comply with the mitigation protocols that are mandated 
for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). As previously stated, public 
assistance will be “unavailable in any type of major disaster if the applicant has not complied 
with all insurance requirements imposed as conditions of previous disaster assistance” (Liu 
2008). 
 Category F: Utilities 
 Public and private non-profit water treatment and distribution systems, power generation, 
telecommunication, and sewage treatment facilities are eligible for public assistance grants to 
repair and or replace disaster related damages to equipment and structures. Private utilities are 
not eligible for Category F grants but may acquire Small Business Administration loans in 
disaster declared areas, if compliant with SBA protocols. Additionally, Private for profit utilities 
may be eligible for federal mitigation grants to assist in preventing potential future disaster 
related damages. 
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 Category G: Parks, Recreational Facilities, and Other Items 
 Public playgrounds, parks, pools, cemeteries, and beaches are eligible for public 
assistance grants. Unimproved beaches and natural areas are not eligible for permanent repair or 
replacement grants.  
 
2.5.1.5 Stafford Act Funding Mechanisms: Individual Assistance (IA)  
 Disaster declarations for Individual Assistance are awarded by FEMA through the 
following programs: 
 Individual and Households Program (IHP) – This program provides federal relief to 
individuals and/or family units for housing and other needs upon the request of the governor of 
the disaster affected state and the approval of the president. Various components of the IHP 
program are awarded by the president upon review of FEMA’s recommendation based on the 
findings of the Regional Summary and Regional Analysis and Recommendation. The IHP 
program components include Housing Assistance (HA) and Other Needs Assistance (ONA). 
Awards are granted to individuals and households that can establish necessary disaster related 
expenses which they are unable to afford through insurance or other means. The IHP grant does 
not cover business losses, including farm businesses or vehicles and tools used for self-
employment, outbuildings, landscaping, any pre disaster debt, or anything that is considered 
nonessential (Texas Health and Human Services Commission 2013). The Individual and 
Households Program authorizes a maximum grant award allowance which is $32,400 per 
declared disaster per individual or household (Federal Register 2013c). The maximum IHP 
grant award is adjusted annually based on an increase in the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers of 1.5 percent for the prior 12-month period. The average combined grant 
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award for IHP recipients in federal FY 2011 was $4,074 and for FY 12, $2,982 (Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance 2014).  The majority of federal assistance for individuals in 
declared disasters is provided by low interest loans from the Small Business Administration. 
The average grant award in 2012 represents less than 10 percent of the maximum grant award 
available for that year.  
 Housing Assistance (HA) under the IHP program includes benefits for temporary 
housing, repair and replacement of disaster damaged housing, and permanent housing 
construction, on rare occasions in approved insular areas outside the continental U.S or in remote 
areas. This assistance is designated for the owners and inhabitants of a primary residence. 
Vacation homes and secondary residences are not eligible for IHP grants. Temporary housing 
benefits are 100 percent funded by the federal government without a state/local cost share 
obligation. This benefit provides financial assistance for the rental of an alternative residence 
while repairs are being made to a disaster damaged home. Benefits are issued for 1, 2, or 3 
month terms and are renewable for up to 18 months with  substantiated disaster related need. 
FEMA provides a web based resource that identifies rental availability in disaster affected 
regions in collaboration with other federal agencies, including the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and U.S. Veterans 
Administration (VA). During the Midwest Floods of 1993, the dissertation case study state of 
Illinois received 38,000 applications for emergency housing assistance (State of Illinois 2012). 
The magnitude of the federal response to the 1993 event provided state and local emergency 
management operatives in flood damaged areas with valuable experience in the process of 
accessing IHP grant funds to assist in the response to and recovery from disasters. 
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 The IHP program provides grants for the uninsured repair of damaged homes up to the 
maximum grant award amount. Flood insurance is a prerequisite for repair grants in Special 
Flood hazard Areas (SFHA). Deductibles on homeowner’s insurance policies are not covered by 
IHP grants. The grant is designed to the home to a functional capacity. Additional repairs are 
funded through the Small Business Administration loan program, although applying for an SBA 
loan is not a prerequisite for receiving grant assistance. Repair grants cover the following 
disaster damages (FEMA 2014b): 
 •Structural parts of a home (foundation, outside walls, roof); 
 •Windows, doors, floors, walls, ceilings, cabinetry; 
 •Septic or sewage system; 
 •Well or other water system; 
 •Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system; 
 •Utilities (electrical, plumbing, and gas systems); 
 •Entrance and exit ways from the home, including privately owned access roads,   
 •Blocking, leveling and anchoring of a mobile home and reconnecting or resetting its 
 sewer, water, electrical and fuel lines and tanks. 
In remote and insular areas and on rare occasions, FEMA may award the maximum grant by 
means of financial or direct assistance for Semi‐Permanent or Permanent Housing Construction. 
 Other Needs Assistance (ONA) 
 The Other Needs Assistance component of the IHP program provides for uninsured 
disaster related expenses and serious needs. The maximum IHP grant award can be distributed 
for ONA with certain noteworthy exceptions. Medical, dental, and funeral expenses are eligible 
for reimbursement without SBA loan application. However, ONA grants for personal property 
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repair and/or replacement, transportation, moving and storage expenses require applicants to 
apply for an SBA loan and grants are declined if applicants are SBA loan eligible. The average 
combined grant award for ONA recipients in federal FY 2011 was $307 and for FY 12, $346. 
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 2014a).  Specified expenses that are eligible for ONA 
grant awards include (FEMA 2014b): 
•Medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance or charitable entities 
•Funeral costs 
•Repair, cleaning, or replacement of: 
• Clothing 
• Household items (room furnishings, appliances) 
• Specialized tools or protective clothing and equipment  
• Necessary educational materials (computers, school books, supplies) 
• Clean‐up items (wet/dry vacuum, air purifier, dehumidifier) Fuel for primary heat source  
• Repairing or replacing vehicles damaged by the disaster, or providing for public 
transportation or other transportation costs 
• Moving and storage expenses related to the disaster  
 In addition to the IHP program, Individual Assistance declarations provide benefits for 
individuals who are unemployed due to a presidential declared disaster and who are not eligible 
for state unemployment assistance or other forms of income protection. Small Business 
Administration disaster loans are the primary component of individual financial assistance in 
federally declared disasters. It is important to note that similar SBA loan eligibility parameters, 
maximums, and mechanisms for consideration apply to presidential and gubernatorial disaster 
declarations. The SBA does not provide any additional benefits for presidential disaster 
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declarations versus gubernatorial declarations. This is an important consideration in the 2008 
Illinois dissertation study area as 11 of the 15 counties in Southern Illinois that were denied a 
presidential disaster declaration were authorized to receive SBA economic injury and physical 
property loss disaster loans if applicants met the eligibility criteria (See Appendix 1). The 
requirements for Disaster Unemployment Assistance and Small Business Administration loans 
have a precedent that was established prior to the passage of the Stafford Act and the details of 
this component of federal disaster relief legislation will be discussed in Section 2.3 of the 
literature review. Stafford Act Individual Assistance disaster declarations provide for loans up to 
$500,000 for farmers, ranchers and aquaculture operators to cover production and property 
losses, excluding primary residence. This program is managed by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Income tax filing extensions, legal services, and advisory assistance are also 
components of Individual Assistance benefits that may be available to disaster survivors. 
 The Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) is an important 
component of Individual Assistance declarations that may become available to individuals when 
requested by the governor of the disaster affected state and final approval is granted by the 
president. It is a focus of concern in this dissertation as it has been well-established that the 
incidence of stress-related disease in the aftermath of disasters may be mitigated by appropriate 
behavioral health intervention (Ehrenreich and McQuaide 2001; Norris, Friedman, and Watson 
2002; Disaster Mental Health Subcommittee 2010). The CCP is the primary mechanism for the 
federal government to authorize the delivery of immediate behavioral health services to disaster 
affected communities and individuals.  
 The FEMA implements the CCP under the authority of Section 416 of the Stafford Act 
which authorizes the FEMA to “fund mental health assistance and training activities in areas 
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which have been presidentially declared a disaster” (FEMA 2010b). The mission of the CCP is 
“... to assist individuals and communities in recovering from the challenging effects of natural 
and human-caused disasters through the provision of community-based outreach and 
psychoeducational services” (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
2009). The CCP operates under the oversight of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration (SAMHSA), Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), Emergency 
Mental Health and Traumatic Stress Services Branch, and this program provides funding for a 
variety of behavioral health services including (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration 2009): 
•  Individual crisis counseling. 
•  Basic supportive or educational contact. 
•  Group crisis counseling. 
•  Public education. 
•  Community networking and support. 
•  Assessment, referral, and resource linkage. 
•  Development and distribution of educational materials. 
•  Media and public service announcements 
  
 There are two separate programs in the CCP. The Immediate Services Program (ISP) 
provides funding for urgent crisis counseling services immediately after a disaster event and this 
program may be authorized for two months after the date of the disaster declaration date with 
possible extensions for pending Regular Service Program (RSP) requests. The RSP typically 
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funds services up to nine months from the date of award notice (Department of Homeland 
Security 2008a). The Department of Homeland Security (2008a, 5) states that: 
The scope of the Crisis Counseling Program is immediate, short-term, incident-
specific, intervention-style crisis counseling services and support for emotional 
recovery to individuals adversely affected by major disasters. The Crisis 
Counseling Program is intended to supplement state and local mental health 
resources, both public and private, for the specific incident-related need, and is 
not meant to replace or fund existing services. Individuals identified as having 
needs that fall outside the scope and duration of the Crisis Counseling Program 
are referred to other agencies that provide mental health treatment or other 
appropriate types of assistance on a permanent, long-term, and regular basis. 
 
 FEMA’s Disaster Financial Status Report (2013) for the time period from the initiation of 
the Stafford Act in 1989 thru 2012 indicates that the federal government has distributed 
$167,376,280 for the ISP and $465,435,994 for the RSP (FEMA 2013a) (see Table 4). This 
federal funding distribution included 334 presidential declarations for the ISP and 196 
presidential disaster declarations for the RSP. Approximately 45 percent of all presidential 
disaster declarations for the Individual Assistance Program received funding for ISP services and 
approximately 27 percent of all presidential disaster declarations for the Individual Assistance 
Program received funding for RSP services. Data pertaining to denials of requests for CCP 
funding are not available. 
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Table 4: Disaster financial status report-Crisis Counseling Program 1989-2012 
Year Immediate Services Program (Dollars) Regular Services Program (Dollars) 
1989 1,874,578 7,159,814 
1990 2,163,331 3,222,685 
1991 393,551 1,276,819 
1992 10,784,866 28,632,679 
1993 5,956,653 12,393,280 
1994 13,931,603 23,833,582 
1995 2,567,064 5,994,511 
1996 4,397,031 6,496,234 
1997 3,186,775 7,037,365 
1998 5,605,781 8,702,279 
1999 4,190,206 8,340,789 
2000 797,923 1,425,700 
2001 31,945,455 134,338,548 
2002 3,715,789 6,261,645 
2003 3,390,258 5,342,331 
2004 8,702,980 19,037,394 
2005 33,205,194 105,028,219 
2006 3,318,853 10,486,157 
2007 2,105,053 5,275,962 
2008 11,153,028 22,609,402 
2009 2,084,945 4,712,118 
2010 382,997 6,109,742 
2011 8,148,665 24,980,546 
2012 3,373,701 6,738,193 
Totals: 167,376,280 465,435,994 
(FEMA 2013a)   
 
2.5.2 Supplemental Programs  
 Multiple federal agencies, state agencies, and Voluntary Organizations Active in 
Disasters (VOAD) supplement the federal disaster relief efforts that are delegated to FEMA 
under the provisions of the Stafford Act. VOAD’s have provided critical disaster relief services 
in the U.S. for more than a century. Voluntary organizations, such as the Salvation Army, have 
provided support for disaster-afflicted individuals and communities dating back to the Galveston 
hurricane of 1900 when volunteers from across the country served “to help clean, feed and 
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shelter the thousands of survivors, while also providing much needed spiritual and emotional 
support” (Salvation Army 2009). In 1900, the U.S. Congress granted the American Red Cross a 
federal charter to “carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and to 
apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other 
great national calamities” (American Red Cross 2010). These organizations continue to play an 
integral role in providing support to disaster affected individuals and communities. The 
American Red Cross, Operation Blessing, the United Methodist Church, and Southern Baptist 
Disaster Relief have provided essential community based post-disaster response and recovery 
services in the dissertation study area of Southern Illinois for multiple events ranging from the 
2008 floods to the 2012 tornado disaster in Harrisburg, Illinois. In 2008, the Little Egypt Red 
Cross Service Center, representing Southern Illinois, provided 80 shelter registrations, 214 
overnight stays, and $177,161.18 in financial assistance and services to disaster survivors in the 
dissertation case study counties that were denied a presidential disaster declaration (PDD) (See 
Table 5). At Reed Lake Mobile Home Park, displaced residents received a daily stipend from the 
Little Egypt Network of the ARC for the time they were out of their homes to help cover the cost 
of food and other necessities that they had to buy while displaced after the 2008 flood (Gunnin 
2008). 
 In 2011, 3 years after the PDD denial, Southern Illinois experienced severe storms and 
flooding that led to a “Major” PDD for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance (DR-1991). 
In the 2011 Southern Illinois event, the American Red Cross (ARC) provided shelter services for 
1,485 overnight stays and “Red Cross Disaster Mental Health made phone calls & visits 
touching those needing reassurance” to 1,581 individuals (personal communication, Sandra 
Webster, Director ARC Little Egypt Service Center September 2011). Financial assistance 
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figures were not available for the 2011 event but the 7x increase in overnight shelter stays is 
indicative of the difference in community needs for volunteer services between the 2008 and 
2011 storm and flood events in Southern Illinois.  
 The previously discussed Stafford Act eligibility guidelines for disaster declarations 
emphasize the role of voluntary organizations in the declaration decision-making process and 
federal assistance grants may be deemed unnecessary when local volunteer support provides 
adequate resources to support individual and community post-disaster needs (FEMA 2007). 
However, the demand for volunteer services is also representative of the severity of individual 
property loss and personal displacement from home settings. It is important to remember that a 
substantial demand for ARC services is indicative of an “overwhelming” need for disaster relief 
and provides support for the Stafford Act Individual Assistance eligibility criteria associated 
with the consideration of “concentration of damages and “trauma” in the disaster declaration 
determination process. 
Table 5: Little Egypt American Red Cross services 2008 Southern Illinois 
County 
Committed 
Assistance $ Adults Child Seniors 
No 
Individ 
Served 
No 
Families 
Served 
Meals 
Served 
Clean-
up Kits 
Comfort 
Kits 
Alexander 4,730.29 7 0 0 7 3 75 
 
10 
Franklin 14,646.69 19 16 2 37 14 59 105 
 Hardin - 0 0 0 0 0 20 
  Gallatin 18,606.45 21 8 4 33 15 4222 83 31 
Jackson 4,566.05 4 0 2 6 4 
   Johnson 2,963.29 5 4 1 10 3 
  
7 
Massac 3,026.29 4 0 1 5 3 
   Perry 1,494.76 0 0 1 1 1 
   Pope 947.76 0 0 1 1 1 
   Pulaski 55,009.02 42 31 36 109 52 1674 129 54 
Randolph - 0 0 0 0 0 
   Saline 32,795.09 33 20 7 60 25 140 37 4 
Union 5,811.58 5 4 4 13 6 
 
25 
 Williamson 32,563.91 32 29 11 72 30 1273 128 57 
TOTAL 177,161.18 172 112 70 354 157 7463 507 163 
(Provided by Sandra Webster, Director ARC Little Egypt Service Center September 2011) 
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2.5.2.1 Supplemental Programs: Federal 
 Federal disaster policy in the U.S. provides a mechanism for a number of supplemental 
federal grants to be distributed to communities that have received a PDD and/or have been 
burdened by the effects of a disaster event, independent of a Stafford Act presidential disaster 
declaration request.  
 
2.5.2.1.1 Supplemental Disaster Programs Authorized by a PDD  
 Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) – This program is administered by the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the authority of Title XX of the Social Security Act. 
It is designed to allow states to utilize population-based fund allotments to address a broad range 
of social service needs for low and moderate income individuals with an emphasis on children, 
the elderly, and the disabled. The grant guidance emphasizes initiatives that reduce dependency 
and encourage self-sufficiency amongst vulnerable individuals (Lynch 2012). FY 2012 
obligations for the SSBG were $1.7 billion (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 2014m).  
More than 23 million individuals in the U.S. receive supportive social services through this 
program on an annual basis and approximately 27 percent of funding is directed to vulnerable 
and elderly adults (Dutta-Gupta, Pavetti, and Finch 2012). The dissertation case study state of 
Illinois received $111,707,650 in SSBG funding in FY 2009, the year after the 2008 presidential 
disaster declared and denied flood events. This funding was utilized to provide social services to 
1,418,988 individuals in Illinois and 52.6 percent of the recipients were vulnerable or elderly 
adults (Dutta-Gupta, Pavetti, and Finch 2012).   
 Although this program provides benefits ranging from counseling services to adult day 
care for any low or moderate income individual who meets program eligibility criteria, the 
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Department of Health and Human Services has established specific guidelines for disaster-
related supplemental SSBG funding. In 2009, HHS awarded $600 million in supplemental SSBG 
funding to 20 disaster affected states that were granted Major presidential disaster declarations 
for Individual Assistance between January and September of 2008. Illinois received $30,502,439 
for eligible Stafford Act Individual Assistance presidential disaster declarations under this 
supplemental appropriation (Lynch 2012).  In March 2009, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn 
proclaimed, “With this funding, thousands of Illinoisans will get needed help to recover from the 
devastating storms and flooding of last year” (Illinois Government News Network 2009). Funds 
were designated to address the needs of flood affected individuals in all disaster declared 
counties in the dissertation case study area and included mental health and family counseling, 
youth services, employment services, and temporary housing. Funds were also designated for 
individual needs including clothing, furniture, food, medication, household items as well as 
home repairs and renovations. Unfortunately, residents of the 15 rural counties in Southern 
Illinois that were denied a presidential disaster declaration were not eligible for this funding. 
This disparity was not forgotten by emergency management operatives in the region who 
questioned “why the folks we represent aren’t entitled to any of the social service money from 
the feds” (personal communication, anonymous Illinois emergency manager 2011). 
 Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) –These formula grants may be 
distributed to presidential disaster declared counties to assist in long term recovery by expanding 
economic activity and rehabilitating residential and commercial buildings. At least 70 percent of 
grant funding must be utilized for activities that benefit low and moderate income individuals. 
Rural (non-metropolitan) counties are entitled to access CDBG State Program funds for disaster 
related needs in areas that have received an emergency or major presidential disaster declaration 
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(Housing Assistance Council 2006). It is important to note that the CDBG grant program is not, 
solely, activated by a disaster declaration and this program provides funding to states for eligible 
needs on an annual basis. In FY 2012, $ 400,000,000 in CDBG disaster recovery specific 
funding was approved by Congress as a portion of the $3,615,000,000 authorized for the entire 
CDBG program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012; Catalog of Federal 
Assistance 2014b; Catalog of Federal Assistance 2014c).This program is administered by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
 The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2009 (Pub. Law 110-329) appropriated $6.5 billion through the Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG) program for “necessary expenses related to disaster relief, long-term recovery, 
and restoration of infrastructure, housing, and economic revitalization in areas affected by 
hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters occurring during 2008 for which the President 
declared a major disaster” (Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity 2009). 
Presidential disaster declared (PDD) counties in the 2008 Illinois case study area (DR-1747, DR-
1771) were the beneficiaries of CDBG grants, administered by the Illinois Department of 
Commerce and Economic Opportunity (See Table 6). Note: This legislation also included 
funding obligations for an October, 2008 PDD, issued to primarily urban counties in Illinois 
(DR-1800). PDD DR-1800 is not included in the dissertation case study analysis of rural Illinois 
declarations and denials due to the urban designation of the affected counties.  Presidential 
disaster denied counties in the 2008 Illinois case study area were not eligible for this 
supplemental CDBG grant allocation.  
 However, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity (DCEO) 
utilizes a portion of its CDBG allocation to fund the Community Development Assistance 
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Program (CDAP).  The CDAP “assists Illinois communities by providing grants to local 
governments to help them in financing economic development projects, public facilities and 
housing rehabilitation” (Business Information Center 2010). In 2008, Illinois Governor 
Blagojevich awarded nearly $1 million in grants to make necessary improvements to alleviate 
the potential of future flooding in residential areas of PDD denied Alexander and Union 
counties. Governor Blagojevich stated, “These grants … will help alleviate future flooding 
problems in Southern Illinois” (Illinois Government News Network 2008a). In 2013, the CDAP 
allocated $6.6 Million to Southern Illinois counties for public and residential infrastructure 
improvements including water, sewer and home rehabilitation projects. This included a $450,000 
grant for West Frankfort to construct a new sewage treatment plant that was damaged after the 
PDD denied 2008 flood (Fasol 2008a; Illinois Government News Network 2013). 
 
Table 6: Illinois 2008 supplemental CDBG distribution for eligible PDD counties  
State Program Funding ($) Purpose 
Small Business Stimulus 6,500,000 
Max $50,000 forgivable loan for business that commit to 
reopen within 12 months 
Large Business Stimulus 8,500,000 
Improvements to public infrastructure in support of a 
business that would create/ retain jobs in the community. 
Machinery, equipment 
Business Assistance 5,000,000 
Covers SBA loan interest, rental payments, lost rental 
income 
Commercial Property Buyouts 13,838,249 Buyout programs in flood-prone areas 
Affordable Rental Housing 18,950,911 
Supports repairs and reconstruction of the affordable rental 
housing stock Note: $5,000,000 dedicated to rural housing 
Housing Activities Other than 
Affordable Rental Housing 
21,338,250 
Mortgage and down payment assistance  buyouts, repair 
and reconstruction 
Homeownership (Community 
Stabilization) Program 
20,000,000 
Community solutions to address severe hardship to 
communities, including foreclosure impacts and declines in 
economic conditions. 
Short and Long Term Public 
Infrastructure Recovery 
47,993,238 
Support projects that FEMA cannot fund but are critical to 
recovery. i.e. water, sewer, drainage, levee systems 
Planning Activities 16,919,125 
Comprehensive regional planning to guide long term 
recovery and redevelopment. 
 
Technical Assistance/Capacity 
Building 
1,691,913 
Project and construction management services Case 
management assistance to individuals 
  (adapted from Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity 2009) 
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 Community Disaster Loan Program – This program is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is activated by a presidential major or emergency 
disaster declaration. The loans are designated for jurisdictions that can establish a substantive 
disaster related loss of tax revenue and a need for financial assistance to perform normal 
government functions (FEMA 2005). Federal allocations for this program in FY 12 were 
$5,014,387. 
 Disaster Assistance for Older Americans – This program is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the reimbursement of additional 
expenses associated with shelter, in-home assistance, outreach, counseling, and supportive 
services for the elderly in presidential disaster declared counties. These funds are distributed to 
State Units on Aging for determination of local need. The program is a component of the 
services legislated in the Older Americans Act of 1965 which was designed to “maximize the 
informal support provided to older Americans to enable them to remain in their homes and 
communities by providing transportation services, in-home services, and other support services” 
(Catalog of Federal Assistance  2014d). The benefits of this legislation are available to support 
independent living for individuals age 60 and over with an emphasis on those with the greatest 
economic needs, the greatest social needs, and those residing in rural areas. It is important to 
recognize that the vast resources that are provided under the provisions of the Older Americans 
Act are not, solely, dependent on a presidential disaster declaration. Approximately 20 percent of 
all individuals age 60 and over access some component of funding from the OAA ranging from 
vulnerable elder rights protection services, to family-caregiver support and nutritional 
supplements (National Health Policy Forum 2008). Federal nationwide formula grant obligations 
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for the OAA in FY 2012 were $364,663,840. Since 1983, the Shawnee Alliance for Older Adults 
has provided a variety of services, partially subsidized by the Older American’s Act, for the 
benefit of the low-income elderly in the dissertation case study area of Southern Illinois. As of 
2011, this agency had 2,700 community-dwelling individuals over the age of 60 under “active 
care”. These individuals received regular visitation services, including mental health 
assessments, thereby supporting the ability for the recipients to retain independent status in their 
own homes (Becky Pedroza, Shawnee Alliance for Older Adults, personal on-site 
communication, September 15, 2011). 
 Cora C. Brown Fund – This program is FEMA/DHS administered and supports unmet 
disaster needs for individuals in presidential disaster declared areas based on the 
recommendation of volunteer agencies. The FY 2012 allotment for this small grant initiative 
totaled $7,088. 
 Economic Adjustment Assistance Program – Administered by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce/Economic Development Administration, this initiative provides grants to assist 
communities in presidential disaster declared areas by “accelerating economic recovery and 
implementing strategic actions to reduce the risk of economic damage and loss in commercial 
and industrial areas from future disasters” (FEMA 2005). This program is also available, 
independent of a presidential disaster declaration, “to address the needs of distressed 
communities experiencing adverse economic changes that may occur suddenly or over time, and 
generally result from industrial or corporate restructuring, new Federal laws or requirements, 
reduction in defense expenditures, depletion of natural resources, or natural disaster” (FEMA 
2005). The average size of an Economic Adjustment grant in the most recent year of available 
data, FY 2011, was approximately $550,000 (FEMA 2005). In 2012, the Economic 
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Development Administration expanded the Economic Adjustment Assistance Program, through 
the Disaster Relief Opportunity, which provided $200 million in congressionally authorized 
funds for investments in regions experiencing “severe economic distress as a result of natural 
disasters that were declared as major Federal disasters between October 1, 2010 and September 
30, 2011” (Economic Development Administration 2012).  These funds were designated for 
projects that “foster economic growth and resiliency” by “mitigating the potential for future 
losses and adverse economic impacts for communities” (Economic Development Administration 
2012). The City of Harrisburg, Illinois, which was denied a presidential disaster declaration in 
2008 and in 2012, was awarded $1,645,200 in Disaster Relief Opportunity funding to “construct 
improvements to the Harrisburg’s waste water treatment plant, support local industries and 
protect against future floods.  Specifically, it will add to and improve the filtration system and 
install an additional pump in the storm water pumping station while leveraging an expected $2 
million in private investment” (Durbin 2013). Harrisburg was eligible for the grant award as it 
had received a major presidential disaster declaration for Individual and Public Assistance (DR-
1991) as a result of April, 2011 storms and flooding. 
 Workforce Investment Act. Title I, National Emergency Grants- This program is 
administered by the Department of Labor and finances the creation of temporary jobs for disaster 
dislocated workers in presidential disaster declared areas. The Workforce Investment Act also 
provides temporary work grant funding for plant closures and mass layoffs affecting 50 or more 
workers and assistance to trade impacted workers and other individuals eligible under the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) Reform Act (FEMA 2005) The U.S. Congress authorized 
$203,000,000 in FY 2012.  
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 Emergency Loans for Farming Operations- This program is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) to assist farmers in a county that is 
disaster declared by the President or designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as a primary 
disaster area. Loans, up to a $500,000 maximum, may be utilized for the repair or restoration of 
essential property, the payment of disaster-related production costs, essential family living 
expenses, and non-real estate debt refinancing (United States Department of Agriculture Farm 
Services Agency 2012). This funding is administered independent of the Small Business 
Administration disaster loan program. USDA disaster declarations are not under presidential 
authority and are independently issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. All presidential disaster 
declared and denied counties in the 2008 Illinois case study area were eligible for Emergency 
Loans for Farming Operations as they were each declared by the Secretary of Agriculture as 
USDA disaster assistance eligible counties (Illinois Government News Network 2008). The 
program provided a direct loan total of $31,436,000 to eligible applicants in FY 2012 (Catalog of 
Federal Assistance 2014e). 
 HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) – This program is administered by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and may be activated by a presidential major or 
emergency disaster declaration to provide permanent housing for low-income homeowners in 
urban counties. The HOME program is the “largest Federal block grant to state and local 
governments designed exclusively to create affordable housing for low-income households” 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2014). The Illinois Housing Development 
Authority (2014) indicates that HOME funds are targeted towards the housing needs of seniors, 
people with disabilities, and people facing homelessness. Towns, smaller cities, and rural 
counties are eligible for HOME dollars, but they must obtain these funds through state 
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coordination as block grants are not authorized for smaller jurisdictions (Housing Assistance 
Council 2012). The participating jurisdiction may seek a waiver of required cost share 
requirements for HOME grants in areas that have received a presidential disaster declaration 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2014). FY 2012 federal formula grant 
obligations for this program were $1,207,802,000 (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 
2014f). The HOME program is not, solely, activated by a presidential disaster declaration. In 
fact, several counties in Southern Illinois received forgivable non-payment loans thru the HOME 
program after the 2012 turndown of a request for a presidential disaster declaration associated 
with a tornado event (Fitzgerald 2012). 
 USDA Rural Development Disaster Assistance - The Rural Development Disaster 
Assistance program distributes grants and loans to qualified applicants in rural communities to 
provide “housing and shelter, public safety, health care and community facilities and business 
recovery assistance” (USDA 2011). Areas that have received a presidential disaster declaration, 
as authorized under the provisions of the Stafford Act, receive expedited loan approval 
processing. Low income participants in the USDA Single Family Housing Loan Borrowers 
program are eligible for a 180 day moratorium on loan payments and/or loan reamortization due 
to economic hardship in presidential disaster declared areas. Disaster displaced USDA Rental 
Assistance tenants in Rural Development-financed apartment complexes receive transfer of their 
rental subsidy and priority consideration for placement in available units if a presidential disaster 
declaration has been issued (USDA 2011a). The USDA Very Low-Income Housing Repair 
Loans and Grants program for low income elders (> 62 y.o.) and the USDA Rural Business 
Opportunity Grant (RBOG) program are representative of additional opportunities for rural 
communities and individuals to access federal funding with periodization for applicants in 
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presidential disaster declared areas. It is important to note that eligibility for the Very Low-
Income Housing Repair Loans and Grants program is contingent on income, age, and type of 
structure. For example, manufactured homes must be attached to a permanent slab. This limits 
the availability of funding for some individuals in rural areas. The RBOG program is designed to 
assist in the creation of rural businesses and provide support for rural community economic 
development planning ( FY 2012 federal funding obligations for the USDA Very Low-Income 
Housing Repair Loans and Grants program were $9,998,400 (Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance 2014k). FY 2012 funding obligations for the Rural Business Opportunity Grant 
program were $2,500,000 (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 2014l).  
 Mental Health Disaster Assistance and Emergency Mental Health– This program is 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)/Public Health Service 
(PHS), and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 
Project grant funding is distributed to areas that have received Stafford Act presidential disaster 
declarations through state agencies to provide supplemental emergency mental health services 
that have not been addressed by the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program. This 
program also provides necessary training for disaster mental health counselors. FY 2012 federal 
discretionary project grant obligations totaled $15,946,849 (Catalog of Federal Disaster 
Assistance 2014g). Illinois did not receive any funding through this program in FY 2008 and 
$49,500 was distributed in FY 2009 (Hazelwood and Bazan 2010). 
 Food and Nutrition Service – Administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), this program “provides food for shelters and other mass feeding sites, distributes food 
packages directly to households in need in limited situations, and issue Disaster Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP) benefits” (United States Department of Agriculture 
116 
 
2014). Organizations including the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army access this 
program for necessary food resources in compliance with the recommendations of the National 
Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security 2008). Areas that have received 
Individual Assistance presidential disaster declarations are eligible for state coordinated D-
SNAP benefits. Individuals who may not normally be eligible for the USDA Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance program are considered for one month of D-SNAP food assistance 
benefits if disaster-related loss of income, property damages, or relocation expenses has created 
a documented need. 
 
2.5.2.1.2 Supplemental Disaster Programs: Independent of a PDD 
 There are several federal programs that are authorized to provide support for disaster 
response and recovery activities completely independent of a Stafford Act PDD. These programs 
provide various forms of relief after disasters, but they are under the authority of federal 
departments and agencies that determine eligibility for federal support without any requirement 
for a PDD. These initiatives range from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) repair of 
disaster damaged federal roads and bridges to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
specialized services for the repair of USACE Levee Safety Program structures.  
 Some noteworthy examples of federal non-Stafford Act disaster related recovery 
programs include the:    
 Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program (EFSP) - This program is 
administered by the Department of Homeland Security under the authority of the McKinney-
Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 (PL 100-77). The EFSP supports the National 
Preparedness Goal (Department of Homeland Security 2011a) by providing economic assistance 
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to the homeless and those at risk of eviction for food, shelter, and related expenses.  Although 
the program does not require a presidential disaster declaration, the intent of this initiative is to 
lessen the impact of a disaster and mitigate the burden associated with recovery efforts for these 
at-risk populations. FY 2012 federal project grant obligations for eligible jurisdictions totaled 
$120,000,000 (Catalog of Federal Disaster Assistance 2014i). 
 Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) Program – This program is 
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency and is activated by 
an agricultural disaster declaration issued by the Secretary of Agriculture. It provides up to 
$100,000 to offset eligible crop losses due to natural disasters. This program has special 
inclusionary provisions for beginning farmers, limited resource farmers, and “socially 
disadvantaged” farmers who have been subject to hardship due to race or ethnicity. Federal FY 
2012 obligations for SURE totaled $561,492,233 (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 
2014j).  
 The SURE program is one component of an extensive system of federal crop assistance 
that is available for farmers and ranchers affected by natural disasters who meet eligibility 
requirements due to adverse weather and/or a Secretary of Agriculture disaster declaration. 
Congressional legislation provides disaster related financial loss reimbursement through several 
loan and grant sources including the federally subsidized crop insurance program, the noninsured 
crop disaster assistance programs (NAP), the TAP - Tree Assistance Program, the ELAP - 
Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program , the LFP - 
Livestock Forage Disaster Program, the ECP - Emergency Conservation Program, and the 
Economic Injury Loan Program(USDA 2014). These initiatives provide fiscal relief for disaster 
related losses to farmers and ranchers due to crop or livestock loss and for physical losses to real 
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estate, machinery, and equipment. To reiterate, this program is not dependent on a presidential 
disaster declaration under the terms of the Stafford Act. Each of the 15 flood-damaged Southern 
Illinois counties in the dissertation study area that were denied a presidential disaster declaration 
were declared eligible for crop assistance under the provisions of the Secretary of Agriculture’s 
2008 agriculture disaster declaration (FSA 2011). Additionally, small “nursery” growers in each 
of the denied counties were eligible, until September 24, 2008, for a low-interest SBA Economic 
Injury Disaster Loan resulting from a 2007 Secretary of Agriculture drought disaster declaration 
(U.S. Small Business Administration 2007).  
 Emergency Management Performance Grants – This formula grant program is 
administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and distributes funds to states based 
on a fixed percentage per state (0.75% of available funds per state) and a supplement based on 
state population. EMPG grant funds are distributed by states to localities based on county 
population and eligible need as determined by the state. Grant funds are designated to enhance 
and sustain all-hazards emergency management capabilities in the grant recipient state (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 2008). 
 
2.5.2.1.3 Supplemental Programs: Not Disaster Specific 
 Federal funding is also available to states and localities for a variety of initiatives based 
on socioeconomic determinants. Although these grants and/or loans do not have a disaster 
specific authorization mechanism, they are designed to fund services that may benefit the 
recovery of disaster stricken communities. In many cases, these programs provide services for 
home repair and economic stimulus that may preclude access to PDD dependent supplemental if 
it is determined that the PDD affiliated grant would duplicate funding that is already available. 
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Some examples of applicable grant and/or loan programs that are relevant to the Cast Study area 
of Illinois are: 
 Delta Regional Authority (DRA) - In 2000, the U.S. Congress established the DRA as a 
federal-state partnership designated to enhance development in the economically impoverished 
Mississippi River Delta region. This region includes 13 of the 15 Southern Illinois counties in 
the 2008 dissertation case study that were PDD denied. “Predominantly rural, the Mississippi 
River Delta region has the highest concentration of disadvantaged populations in the country. It 
faces profound concerns related to health, out-migration, and persistent poverty. Education and 
income levels are well below the U.S. average, and are lower than other rural areas” (Delta 
Regional Authority 2013). In 2009, the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic 
Activity (2009a) indicated that Illinois DRA counties would receive priority funding 
consideration for eligible state projects including: regional broadband proliferation; tourism 
industry development; energy independence; workforce development and job training; critical 
public infrastructure investments; business development and entrepreneurship; poverty 
reduction; and health care access and affordability. The 2008 Illinois DRA allocation was 
$662,800 and between 2002 and 2008 Illinois received over $5.4 million in DRA funds for 77 
projects which was used to leverage an additional $43,510,551 in federal grants (See Table 7) 
(Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Activity 2009a). This is not a presidential 
disaster declaration affiliated program.  
 Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) – This federal program is state administered 
under the supervision of the U.S.  Department of Health and Human Services. The CSBG 
program provides funds to alleviate the causes and conditions of poverty in communities and to 
empower low-income families to become self-sufficient (National Association for State 
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Community Services Programs 2014). Illinois has established partnerships with 6,808 private, 
nonprofit, and governmental entities, to offer services and programs addressing education, 
employment, housing, health, nutrition, personal finances, energy assistance, and community 
development (Illinois Association of Community Action Associations 2009). The 2008 PDD 
denied region of Southern Illinois received $9,785,944 in private, local, state, and federal 
funding to support CSBG initiatives through community agencies including the: Crosswalk 
Community Action Agency, Shawnee Development Council Inc. , Wabash Area Development 
Inc. , and the Western Egyptian Economic Opportunity Council. 
 
Table 7: 2002-2008 DRA related funding in Illinois 
 
Type of Project 
 
# of Projects 
 
DRA Funds $ 
 
Other Funds $ 
 
Total $ 
Funding  
Basic Public Infrastructure Grants 
 
25 
 
1,499,795 
 
20,814,450 
 
22,314,245 
 
Business Development 
 
15 
 
993,738 
 
15,465,870 
 
16,459,608 
Job 
Training/Employment 
‐related, Education 
 
7 
 
361,521 
 
436,790 
 
798,311 
 
Other 
 
13 
 
869,455 
 
1,648,732 
 
2,518,187 
 
Transportation Infrastructure 
 
17 
 
1,688,870 
 
5,144,709 
 
6,833,579 
 
Totals 
 
77 
 
5,413,379 
 
43,510,551 
 
48,923,93
0 (Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Activity 2009a) 
  
 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) – This legislation was enacted to 
stimulate the post-recession sagging economy and authorized the distribution of block grant 
funding to states based on population. Allocation formulas for state distribution of “stimulus 
funding” to counties in Illinois are based on population, urban/rural status and low-moderate 
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income need based determinants. These funds have been utilized to support previously described 
programs including Very Low to Moderate Income Housing Loans, Emergency Food 
Assistance, and the SURE program. ARRA allocations in Southern Illinois have supported 
infrastructure projects including highway and public land improvements (See Table 8). Disaster 
related projects that were approved in 2009 for the 2008 PDD denied counties include $19 
million for flood damaged Rend Lake campground and reservoir improvements, “$21.8 million 
for Carlyle Lake for operations and maintenance including dam safety, flood repair, increased 
recreational safety measures, dredging, backlog maintenance and to repair damaged roads 
around the lake, and $11.4 million to Lake Shelbyville for maintenance backlog in recreation 
and environmental areas, to complete shoreline erosion repairs, replace flood damaged facilities, 
replace deteriorating administration and visitor center buildings with energy efficient structures 
and combat invasive plant species” (Culli 2009). 
 
Table 8: ARRA stimulus funding in PDD denied Southern Illinois counties 2009-2012 
County Funding total $ 2009-2012 Per Capita Funding $ Illinois County Funding Rank- (102) 
Alexander 14,132,873 1,722 12 
Franklin 75,109,232 1,898 10 
Gallatin 12,218,153 2,191 7 
Jackson 75,040,572 1,243 23 
Jefferson 30,633,133 789 59 
Johnson 12,408,292 985 42 
Marion 50,448,944 1,280 20 
Massac 10,460,499 679 71 
Perry 13,374,368 599 82 
Pulaski 44,066,569 7,157 3 
Randolph 21,150,767 633 77 
Saline 69,312,736 2,780 5 
Union 11,915,518 670 74 
White 27,795,114 1,900 9 
Williamson 65,791,966 991 40 
(ProPublica 2014) 
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2.5.2.2 Supplemental Programs: State  
 As previously mentioned, the Stafford Act and the affiliated federal grant and loan 
programs have established requirements for state and/or local comprehensive emergency plans, 
mitigation plans, insurance maintenance, distribution of obligated funds, and cost-sharing 
arrangements. However, states and localities are not under any federal mandate to provide 
additional disaster assistance to their respective residents. Several states have independent 
legislative mandates that authorize a variety of specific disaster assistance remedies for their 
inhabitants. Illinois programs for disaster relief include: 
 State Disaster Relief Fund - The fund can be used to assist local governments with post-
disaster cleanup. In Illinois, the State Disaster Relief Fund may be accessed when the Governor 
declares the local government to be part of a disaster area and when cleanup is beyond the means 
of the local government. Priority is given to localities suffering the worst damage, particularly if 
the area does not qualify for federal disaster assistance. FY 2008 and FY 2009 distributions for 
this program were $500,000 for each year (McCreight 2009). 
 Opportunity Illinois Disaster Recovery Loan Program – This is a low-interest loan 
program that assists residents and businesses recover from property damages in areas that have 
been declared a natural disaster area by the local, state or federal government. Illinois discounts 
the interest rate on approved loans enabling recipients to obtain below-market loan rates for up 
to 5 years (Illinois State Treasurer 2014). Individuals with insurance are eligible for loans, with 
interest-only payments for one year, pending insurance settlement.  This program was available 
to the residents of all PDD denied counties in Southern Illinois after the 2008 flood (Heartland 
News 2008). 
123 
 
 Illinois Emergency Repair Program – This 2013 program is administered by the Illinois 
Housing Development Authority (IHDA), a self-supporting entity created by the state legislature 
in 1967. The Emergency Repair Program provides low-income recipients with grants for 
emergency repairs to make their homes safe. Qualified homeowners in Southern Illinois were 
eligible for up to $20,000 for home repairs in 2013 (Illinois Housing Development Authority 
2013). This program operates independently from the USDA Rural Development Disaster 
Assistance program. 
 Illinois state agencies including the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Illinois 
Department of Natural Resources, the Illinois State Police, the Illinois Department of 
Transportation, the Illinois Department of Central Management Service, the Illinois Department 
of Public Health, and the Illinois Department of Corrections were activated by each of the 2008 
gubernatorial disaster declarations in the case study (Culli 2008). This multi-agency involvement 
is authorized by the state legislature and is consistent with the eligibility requirements of the 
Stafford Act regarding activation of a state’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. 
County specific disaster relief measures were also evident in Southern Illinois after the 2008 
flood. PDD denied Franklin County approved a resolution to delay the real estate tax due date 
for disaster affected residents (Sandefur 2008). 
 This summary of volunteer, state, and federal disaster preparedness, response and 
recovery program initiatives provides a framework for the analysis of spatial equity in the 
distribution of resources that are designed to support the well-being of individuals and 
communities in the aftermath of disasters. Ed Thomas has aptly described this myriad of disaster 
relief programs and capacities as a “patchwork quilt” (Thomas et al. 2011). As we will see, the 
capacity of the “quilt” to provide adequate and equitable relief from the adverse effects of 
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disaster is ultimately dependent on the ability of individuals and communities to weave the 
fabric into a purposeful garment that can assist in the restoration of lost and damaged resources. 
 
2.6 Prior Research 
2.6.1 The Politics of Disaster Declarations 
 A historical lack of access to information regarding the presidential denial (turndown) of 
requests for disaster declarations led to varied findings and opinions regarding the role of 
political partisanship in federal disaster policy (Downton and Pielke 2001; Garrett and Sobel 
2003; Cutter and Emrich 2005; Reeves 2009). Recent studies that assess both presidential 
disaster declarations and denials have acknowledged the need to consider additional political, 
social, and economic place-based characteristics in the analysis of the equitable distribution of 
relief aid under the Stafford Act (Sylves and Buzas 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008).  
Previous research suggests that the geographic distribution of federal disaster relief under the 
provisions of the Stafford Act has been inequitable with respect to the severity of events and 
consequent economic losses (Cutter and Emrich 2005; Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). 
Such inequities have led to broad claims of political partisanship in the implementation of 
disaster relief policy and concerns regarding the effectiveness of federal intervention in disaster 
recovery. Several studies have investigated the role of political influence in presidential disaster 
declarations. Garrett and Sobel (2003) suggested that nearly half of all disaster relief is 
politically motivated, rather than determined by need, and concluded that states more politically 
important to the president have higher rates of disaster declaration. They utilized public choice 
theory to describe the actions of politicians in the disaster declaration process as dependent on 
personal self-interest and incentives and independent of the sole altruistic motive of serving the 
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public good. Garrett and Sobel (2003, 508) apply this concept to congressional committee 
oversight of FEMA and determine by disaster expenditure models that 44.5 percent of FEMA 
disaster payments are due to representation on FEMA oversight committees and that for each 
House member on an oversight subcommittee (which directly oversees disaster expenditures), 
states receive an average of $31 million in excess disaster expenditures. However, the 
aforementioned study concluded that there was no evidence that states having a governor from 
the same party as the president led to a higher level of disaster relief or that the president used 
disaster declaration authority to harm legislators of an opposing political party. Cutter and 
Emrich (2005) conducted a detailed nationwide analysis and noted limited spatial or statistical 
correlation between disaster losses and disaster declarations along the West Coast, Gulf Coast 
and Florida, the eastern Great Plains, Appalachia and the Northeast. These authors concluded 
that the political nature of the disaster declaration process may contribute to the effectiveness of 
a state and county in securing this designation.  
 Additional research indicates that the level of disaster declaration is higher in reelection 
years than in non-reelection years (Downton and Pielke 2001; Garrett and Sobel 2003; Stehr 
2006; Sylves and Buzas 2007; Husted and Nickerson 2013). Reeves (2009) contends that a 
sitting president can expect a 1.7 percent increase in votes in a statewide contest in return for a 
single presidential disaster declaration. Downton and Pielke (2001) reviewed disaster 
declarations as they relate to Stafford Act requirements pertaining to a state‘s capacity to 
respond adequately to a disaster event by considering per capita damages, total damage as a 
percent of state expenditure, and per capita damages as a percent of household income. The 
Downton and Pielke study indicated that a state‘s ability to pay was not a major consideration in 
presidential disaster declarations.  
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 Cebula (2004) indicated that public dissatisfaction with government can lead to 
emotional responses in voting behavior. The failure of presidential support for a gubernatorial 
disaster declaration request can be reasonably assumed to have a negative emotional effect on 
the respective community. This concept of “negative voting” by a dissatisfied public has been 
presented as an explanation for mid-term congressional decline in a sitting president’s party 
(Kernell 1977). Quattrone and Tversky’s (1988) research revealed that respondents show greater 
sensitivity to losses than to gains and suggests that voter options in political referendums may be 
determined based on negative factors. Similarly, the “negativity effect”, as described by Lau 
(1985), promotes the concept of political behavior based on greater weight being given to 
negative information than positive information. It is evident that public expectations of 
supportive behavior from the president and FEMA, combined with the conflicting tendencies 
associated with rational and reasonable decision making, provide for complexities in the analysis 
of policy implementation under the provisions of the Stafford Act.  
 Four prior studies, including the first publication from this dissertation research (Salkowe 
and Chakraborty 2009), have provided additional insight into the presidential decision making 
process by considering the negative influence associated with a denial (turndowns) of a request 
for a disaster declaration. Sylves (1998) provided an analysis of presidential disaster declarations 
that included declarations and turndowns in coastal versus inland states. The study found that 
between January 1990 and June 1997 coastal states averaged more disaster declarations than 
inland states and received more disaster relief funding when data were controlled for population, 
land area, and population density. Sylves concluded that coastal states do not receive a 
disproportionate percentage of primary flood declarations although they do experience a higher 
turndown rate than inland states. Sylves and Buzas (2007) provided an analysis of disaster 
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declarations and turndowns from 1953-2003 which included a consideration of the type of 
disaster event and found that a state‘s success rate in acquiring disaster declarations was greater 
in presidential reelection years and that the odds of approval for a declaration request were 
greater among Democratic presidents and Republican governors. They determined that 
hurricanes and typhoons were the event most likely to positively impact the rate of approval. The 
authors did not find any significant association between the incidence of acquiring disaster 
declarations and gubernatorial/presidential party similarity. More recently, Schmidtlein, Finch, 
and Cutter (2008) applied geographic weighted regression to determine the spatial similarity 
between major hazard events and presidential disaster declarations/denials and determined that 
spatial inequities exist in the distribution of disaster declarations that are indicative of the 
political nature of the decision making process. 
 Claims of “disaster gerrymandering” (Platt 1999), inefficiency, and inconsistency in the 
determination and aid distribution process for disaster declarations have been highlighted in 
prior research and media reports (Sylves and Waugh 1996; Gaul, Morgan, and Cohen 2006). 
Sylves (2008, 101) informs us that, “the broader authority to judge what is or is not a disaster 
under the Stafford Act has provided presidents since 1988 with more latitude to approve unusual 
or ‘marginal’ events as disasters or emergencies.” Prior research has indicated that presidents 
sometimes approve disaster relief requests when damage in the state is “light” and recovery may 
be possible without federal assistance (Sylves and Waugh 1996; Miskel 2006). Miskel (2006, 
134-135) concludes that “political discretion exercised by the president is likely to be evident 
when the president approves governor requests regarding low damage, marginal incidents that 
often involve relatively low federal payouts.” Tarcey (2004, 1) reports that “in marginal cases, 
small, noncompetitive states receive less help because they are just not that important in terms of 
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an election”. The potential for disparity in the distribution of disaster declarations based on 
differential degrees of political influence across the various FEMA regions has been addressed in 
prior research (Stephens and Wikstrom 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). Schmidtlein, 
Finch, and Cutter (2008, 13) recommended that further research in this arena should incorporate 
measures of state political importance to identify if those political influences help to explain the 
differential spatial pattern of PDDs (presidential disaster declarations).  
 It is evident that prior analyses have provided disparate findings and opinions regarding 
the explanatory role of electoral votes (Downton and Pielke 2001, Reeves 2007, Sylves and 
Buzas 2007, Reeves 2011), gubernatorial and presidential party similarity (May 1985, Garrett 
and Sobel 2003), and congressional influence (Garrett and Sobel 2003; Sylves and Buzas 2007, 
Sobel, Coyne, and Leeson 2007), with respect to presidential disaster declarations. There has 
been consistency in findings regarding a positive relationship between presidential reelection 
years and success in acquiring a disaster declaration by an affected state (Downton and Pielke 
2001; Garrett and Sobel 2003; Stehr 2006, Sylves and Buzas 2007, Gasper 2013) and spatial 
disparities in the distribution of disaster declarations (Sylves 1998; Cutter and Emrich 2005; 
Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). The failure for prior studies to consider all presidential 
disaster declarations requests (declarations/denials) in conjunction with political and geographic 
variables has contributed to an incomplete understanding of the presidential decision-making 
process.  
 There is ample evidence of the problematic characteristics of fragmented research that 
have muddled the interpretation of political influence in disaster declarations. Tarcey (2004, 1) 
informs us that,  
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In 1994, for example, Bill Clinton turned down a request by Illinois governor 
James Edgar for help with floods on Chicago’s South Side that caused $6.7 
million in damage. The 1992 Clinton campaign had declared Illinois Republican 
territory. A year later, Clinton did declare a disaster in response to New Orleans 
floods that caused $10 million in damage; Clinton’s strategists considered 
Louisiana a pivotal state. 
 
Although this observation is correct, Tarcey fails to acknowledge that during President Clinton’s 
first term in office, Illinois was granted 6 major presidential disaster declarations, from 1993 
through 1996, despite the conclusive claim of partisanship based on “Republican territory” and 
Louisiana was denied a gubernatorial request for disaster declaration despite the assumption that 
“Clinton’s strategists considered Louisiana a pivotal state.”  This type of selective reasoning is 
prevalent in prior research. Studies utilizing both declarations and denials have failed to control 
for pertinent political and geographic variables that have been applied in previous analyses 
which were limited, solely, to an examination of presidential disaster declarations. Studies that 
have examined geographic inequities failed to adjust the classification of major hazard/disaster 
events to be concurrent with requests for federal relief under the provisions of the Stafford Act. 
Prior published research that has utilized control variables to assess the relationship between 
presidential disaster declarations and insured losses have inadequately addressed the fact that 
presidential disaster declarations are predicated on a lack of insurance and a turndown will be 
issued if it is determined that federal assistance under the provisions of the Stafford Act would 
duplicate existing insured benefits. Published studies that utilize the SHELDUS database (HVRI 
2014) (Schmidtlein, Finch and Cutter 2008) are problematic as they do not adjust for agriculture 
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crop disasters which are not under presidential authority. Studies employing the Property Claim 
Services (2014) database (Reeves 2011) have not acknowledged that this source does not include 
flood insurance damages or damages incurred by self-insured local and state governments. The 
preliminary published findings from the following dissertation research (Salkowe and 
Chakraborty 2009) have attempted to address these concerns in the analysis of all presidential 
disaster declarations and turndowns form the initiation of the Stafford Act in 1989 -2005. The 
initial findings, as referenced by the Congressional Research Service (McCarthy 2010), indicate 
that: 
There was no statistical evidence to suggest that gubernatorial and presidential 
party similarity, U.S. House of Representatives and presidential party similarity, 
FEMA congressional oversight committee membership, electoral votes, or FEMA 
regional office location influenced success in securing emergency or major 
disaster declarations. 
 
2.6.2 Recovery from Disasters 
 Analyzing the recovery from disasters provides a means for evaluating the consequences 
of potential inequities in the implementation of presidential disaster declarations under the 
Stafford Act. The early focus on disaster recovery in the academic literature dealt primarily with 
reconstruction and restoration of physical structures that were damaged during disaster events 
(Haas, Kates and Bowden 1977; Alexander 1981; Smith and Wenger 2007). A growing 
awareness of the uneven recovery that was evident in disaster stricken communities led to 
assessments of the social, economic, and health related aspects of disasters and a greater 
understanding of the complexities associated with the recovery process (White 1945; Norris, 
131 
 
Friedman, and Watson 2002; Cutter, Boruff and Shirley 2003; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004; 
Steury, Spencer and Parkinson 2004; Wisner et al. 2004; Pais and Elliott 2008). The relationship 
between the social stressors that are inherent in disaster scenarios and varied aspects of physical 
and emotional well-being has been well established as an integral component of disaster 
recovery analyses (Madakasira and O'Brien 1987; Lutgendorf et al. 1995; Smith and Freedy 
2000; Norris, Friedman, and Watson 2002; Reacher et al. 2004; Bland et al. 2005; Burton et al.  
2009). Valuable insight has been gained from the examination of the influences of varied types 
and scales of disasters on the long term psychosocial recovery of individuals and communities 
and the National Disaster Recovery Framework, released by FEMA in September 2011, has 
acknowledged that, “a successful recovery is about the ability of individuals and families to 
rebound from their losses in a manner that sustains their physical, emotional, social and 
economic  well-being (Department of Homeland Security 2011b, 2).  
 The effects of stress on the elderly (>60) and extreme elderly (>80) have led to alternate 
conclusions regarding the well-being of this segment of the population after disasters (Kilijanek 
and Drabek 1979; Krause 1987; Ticehurst et al. 1996; Cook 2001; Creamer and Parslow 2008). 
The negative psychological effects of community destruction and individual loss in the elderly 
population have been highlighted in prior research (Phifer and Norris 1989). Additionally, 
Kristenson (2004) and McEwen (2008) suggest a cycle of negative outcomes, loss of coping 
ability, and chronic stress secondary to psychobiological mechanisms associated with the 
challenges of the socioeconomically impaired.   
 It has also become evident that the effects of disasters extend well beyond the primary 
victims of disaster-related losses as prior studies reveal that the adverse consequences of 
exposure to disastrous events takes a toll on the entire community (Dixon 1991; Duckworth 
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1991; Burkle 1996). Bolin (1985) described two categories of disaster victims: primary victims 
who directly experience physical, material, or personal losses and secondary victims who live in 
the affected area but sustain no personal injuries or damages. Prior research reveals that 
community-level loss of resources is associated with a decreased ability for individual recovery 
in disaster affected areas (Green et al. 1990). This is an important consideration in evaluating the 
indirect effects of the disaster related loss of social, psychological, and material resources on an 
individual and community level. 
 
2.7 Health, Well-being, and the Mechanism for Post Disaster Stress-Related Illness 
 
We all know that life can be difficult, but evolution has provided mechanisms to 
protect the body during crises. Such protection requires many different changes in 
many different parts of the body, and, as usual, hormones coordinate these 
widespread and diverse efforts. When the crisis is past, ebbing hormone levels 
signal the all-clear, and the body resumes other interests such as eating, body 
repair, and reproduction. But if the crisis persists, or if the individual’s 
perception of crisis persists, hormones continue to drive the body to take 
desperate measures, sometimes with disastrous consequences (Sapolsky, 2002). 
   
 There is well-established evidence that a variety of social and environmental “toxic” 
extremes can produce physiological responses that interfere with the capacity for normal 
behavior and contribute to the persistence or aggravation of existing stress-related illness 
(Nelson 2005; Barr 2008; Shonkoff, Boyce, and McEwen 2009).  Anxiety disorders and 
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depression are common stress-related maladies in industrialized countries with a reported 
lifetime prevalence rate of 26.4 percent in the United States (The WHO World Mental Health 
Survey Consortium 2004). Approximately 50 percent of individuals who are diagnosed with 
depression are also diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and the comorbidity of anxiety and 
depression has been well-established in the elderly demographic (Lenze 2003; Anxiety and 
Depression Association of America 2014). The incidence of depression is much higher in 
individuals at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale (McEwen, 2000). The persistence of 
stress-related aberrant behaviors and physiological disorders after disasters has been observed in 
vulnerable population subsets (Boman 1979; Norris, Friedman, and Watson 2002; Burton  et al. 
2009; Holman and Silver 2011).Approximately 8 percent of men and 20 percent of women who 
have experienced a major psychological trauma, such as a natural disaster, will develop post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (National Center for PTSD 2013). A recent study of 2004 
tsunami survivors found that a cohort of community-dwelling elders who remained in the same 
locale after the disaster were significantly more likely to meet criteria for PTSD than their 
younger counterparts (Viswanath  et al. 2012). 
What has become evident in the fields of cognitive neuroscience and behavioral 
endocrinology is that there are biological mechanisms that influence and control certain aspects 
of human behavior and contribute to aberrant responses to stress and result in comorbid 
psychological and physiological disorders.  Chronic pain conditions, ischemic vascular 
disorders, gastrointestinal and cognitive disorders can be exacerbated by anxiety and/or 
depression (Sareen et al; 2003, Roy-Byrne 2008; Anxiety and Depression Association of 
America 2014). The inherited response to a variety of stressful stimuli affects human behavior in 
the form of the classic “fight or flight response”. This is a physiological neuroendocrine reaction 
134 
 
to environmental and social influence. It is exhibited in the nuanced involuntary behavior of 
“performance anxiety’ and ranges from the simple act of blushing to the perspiration, rapidity of 
heart rate, and sense of fear and avoidance when exposed to threatening scenarios. The range of 
physiological reactions is certainly evident in disaster environments where individual and 
communal reactions may result in alterations and departures from rational thought.  The 
biological imperative of “fight or flight” is an inherited characteristic shared by all vertebrate 
species including humans. It is an innate involuntary response to a potential threatening stimulus.   
 Ehrlich and Ornstein (1989) hypothesize that humans are affected by a lack of natural 
selection for response to slowly developing threats. Our physiological response capacity to threat 
is based on the “fight or flight” response to immediate challenge. We are not selectively 
conditioned to adequately tolerate prolonged stress. Lumsden (1983) indicates that culturally 
complex societies with high degrees of social stratification are behaviorally constrained and less 
capable of adaptive cognitive development than less developed cultures. The inheritance of a 
physiological stress response from our vertebrate ancestors was designed to deal with the short 
term immediacy of physical danger. The repetitive prolonged insidious stressors associated with 
poverty, poor health, lack of access to social support, and limited education can exceed the 
inherited capacity of this physiological mechanism and result in pathological behavioral effects 
that are exacerbated in the presence of a natural or technological disaster.  
 Psychological stress is a well-recognized correlate of exposure to a variety of hazardous 
environments (Bland et al. 2005; Reacher et al. 2004). Prolonged psychological stress has been 
associated with physiological changes in endocrine function resulting in memory deficit and 
structural change in the brain’s limbic system and the function of the hypothalamic-pituitary axis 
(Vanitallie, 2002. Dawood, 2004). The evidence strongly suggests a positive correlation between 
135 
 
exposure to negative social environments and the potential for biochemical induced cognitive 
dysfunction. This conclusion is based on a physiologic mechanism for irrational behavior during 
prolonged stress scenarios. The physiological response to stress is varied and our particular 
concern is directed to the role and effects of the hypothalamus, pituitary, and adrenal glands  in 
the innate response to the challenge of a perceived or actual stressor. The adrenal glands control 
the release of several hormones including dehydroepiandosterone (DHEA), epinephrine, and 
cortisol. The innate response of “fight or flight” is a result of the body’s release of adrenal 
hormones in response to stimulus from the hypothalamus and pituitary gland in the brain when 
triggered by a stressful event. Epinephrine and cortisol are secreted with a resultant increase in 
heart rate, blood pressure and the mobilization of stored energy. A concomitant increased sense 
of awareness and altered inflammatory response is experienced in the normal response to acute 
stress. This allows the body to deal with the immediate threat before it. However, extreme 
prolonged exposure to stress events may have a deleterious effect on the body due to continued 
demand for secretion of adrenal hormones and the effects of those same hormones on normal 
physiology.  Excessive release of adrenal hormones is associated with cognitive mental 
dysfunction and a host of metabolic abnormalities including diabetes, thyroid disorders, and 
gastrointestinal distress. McEwen (2000) describes these chemical imbalances as an “allostatic 
load” that can accelerate a variety of disease processes. 
 The initial response to acute or intermittent stress results in an increased release of 
cortisol. Prolonged stress leads to the detrimental effects of excess cortisol secretion. In severe 
cases, such as those seen in post-traumatic stress disorder, the hypothalamic-pituitary stimulus 
mechanism exhausts adrenal capacity and results in a decrease in cortisol level and an increase in 
the pituitary secretion of adrenocorticotropic (ACTH) hormone which has been correlated with 
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exacerbation of auto-immune disease and increased fear avoidance response in susceptible 
individuals (Kenyon, 2000). Kenyon has indicated that it has been suspected for some time that 
cortisol released from the adrenal cortex during stress has adverse effects on cognitive functions 
such as learning and memory (2000). Selye’s (1946) work on General Adaptation Syndrome 
supported a neuroendocrine role for dysfunctional behavior in response to stress. Further 
analysis by Kristenson (2004) and McEwen (2008) suggest a cycle of negative outcomes, loss of 
coping ability, and chronic stress secondary to psychobiological mechanisms associated with the 
challenges of the socioeconomically impaired.  The aberrant response to prolonged or extreme 
stressful stimuli leads to abnormalities in circulating levels of biochemical inflammatory 
mediators and contributes to the development of anxiety and depressive disorders and a variety 
of comorbid somatic, gastrointestinal, immunological, vascular, and cognitive maladies 
(Grachev, Fredickson, and Apkarian. 2001; Davidson et al. 2004; O’Keefe et al. 2004; Reacher 
et al. 2004; Foa, Stein, and McFarlane 2006). 
 An estimated 25 percent of individuals, 65 and older, are estimated to suffer from mental 
health disorders and the prevalence of depressive symptoms is greater amongst low income, 
extreme elderly (>75) and rural populations (Gamm, Stone and Pittman 2003; Pleis, Lucas and 
Ward 2009). However, concerns regarding anonymity and the social stigma that is associated 
with mental illness in rural areas may prevent elderly individuals from acknowledging the need 
for formal behavioral health services for anxiety or depressive disorders (Fox et al. 1999; Letvak 
2001). These findings support the dissertation emphasis on the physiological and psychological 
outcomes of disaster affected individuals in socioeconomically and culturally marginalized rural 
communities that may have differential access to federal resources. The subjective and objective 
determinants of the Stafford Act related to the demographics of age, income, health status, 
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insurance status, and prior exposure to damages indicate that this policy was formulated with an 
awareness of the uneven recovery outcomes that may be experienced by individuals who are 
already burdened by varied socioeconomic stressors. This dissertation considers the presence of 
multiple stress-related physiological disorders that have well-established comorbid presentations 
with anxiety and depression as a marker of equitable recovery in presidential disaster declared 
and denied areas of Illinois after the 2008 flood events. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CASE STUDY: 2008 ILLINOIS STORM AND FLOOD DISASTERS 
  
3.1 Introduction 
 In 2008, several rural counties in Illinois experienced three separate storm/flood disaster 
events that were each of sufficient magnitude to warrant a gubernatorial disaster declaration and 
a subsequent gubernatorial request for a presidential disaster declaration (PDD) for Stafford Act 
Public Assistance and/or Individual Assistance (See Figure 2). The PDD denied counties of 
Southern Illinois are the focus of this case study. This region is selected due to the 
socioeconomic disparities that exist compared to areas in Illinois that received disaster 
declarations in 2008 and the physical, cultural, and social characteristics that have contributed to 
local concerns regarding perceived inequities in the distribution of state and federal resources 
after disasters.  
 The case study area of rural southern Illinois is considered from a historical perspective 
to provide a foundational understanding of the factors that have contributed to the social, 
economic, and cultural characteristics of this region. The 2008 pre- and post-disaster setting in 
the study area is described to provide the reader with a thorough understanding of the disparate 
federal and state response efforts in counties that were granted gubernatorial disaster 
declarations and were subsequently declared or denied presidential disaster declarations under 
the provisions of the Stafford Act. This review will set the stage for determining if the noted 
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socio-demographic disparities contributed to inequities in the well-being of individuals and 
communities that had differential access to the benefits and provisions of the Stafford Act. 
  
 
Figure 2: Case study area-2008 Illinois storm/flood disasters  
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3.2 Rural Disasters in Illinois-2008   
 One of the presidential disaster declaration requests for Individual Assistance, which 
involved 15 rural counties in Southern Illinois that were affected by storms and flooding in 
March 2008, was initially denied by the president on April 28, 2008 and subsequently denied on 
appeal on August 20, 2008.  The loss of individual and community resources associated with the 
denied counties was highlighted by Ryan Buckingham, Franklin County Emergency 
Management Agency director, who stated, “there are people in our region that were affected all 
the way to the point where they have lost their homes… at this point in time, they have very few 
options to begin to rebuild their lives" (Fasol 2008). Illinois Emergency Management Agency 
Director Andrew Velasquez III expressed his concern regarding the denial by stating, “It’s very 
disappointing that FEMA failed to recognize the devastating impact this flood had on so many 
lives in Southern Illinois” (McCoy 2008). The 15 denied counties in Southern Illinois had 
experienced approximately $5,000,000 in FEMA estimated individual and household damages 
affecting 659 homes (See Appendix 1) (FEMA 2008c). The number of homes with major 
damage or destroyed status (228) was greater than, or consistent with, disasters in other areas of 
Illinois that had been granted PDD’s in 2007 (DR-1722, DR-1729) and 2008 (DR-1747). 
Regardless, the 2008 denial of the gubernatorial request for a Major disaster declaration for 
Individual and Public Assistance in Southern Illinois by the President of the U.S. was issued 
based on an insufficient “concentration of damages” for Individual Assistance (Personal 
communication, anonymous Illinois Emergency Management Official 2011).  
 In contrast, only one request involving rural areas that were affected by storms and 
flooding in June and July 2008 received an expedited Major presidential disaster declaration 
(DR-1771) on June 24, 2008 which was amended in July 2008 to include 15 counties in the case 
141 
 
study area for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance under the provisions of the Stafford 
Act. The 15 declared counties were awarded $8,979,826 in housing assistance to cover 
temporary rental assistance, home repairs, and replacement, and $1,044,316 in Other Needs 
Assistance to cover essential personal property losses, medical, dental, funeral, transportation or 
other serious disaster-related expenses not covered by insurance" (FEMA 2014c) (See Figure 2). 
These funds were distributed to 1,752 applicants.  The U.S. Small Business Administration 
approved $7,835,800 in disaster loans for 153 disaster assistance applicants in the disaster 
declared counties (FEMA 2014c). This included coverage for two non-rural counties that were 
excluded from the study area due to demographic inconsistencies.  
 Iroquois and Livingston counties in rural Illinois were affected by floods in January 2008 
(see Figure 2) and granted a presidential disaster declaration (DR-1747) on March 3, 2008, for 
Individual Assistance, on appeal of an initial denial. A total of 917 applicants received 
$3,951,573 in housing assistance to cover temporary rental assistance, home repairs, and 
replacement, and $849,087 in Other Needs Assistance (FEMA 2014d). The U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) approved $13,592,800 in disaster loans for 240 applicants in Iroquois and 
Livingston Counties (Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity 2009). The 
citizens of Iroquois and Livingston counties were eligible for Crisis Counseling Services through 
a $33,800 grant to the Illinois Department of Human Services which was included as portion of 
the presidential disaster declaration for Individual Assistance. Illinois Governor Blagojevich 
acknowledged the value of the grant in stating, "Dealing with the aftermath of a natural disaster 
and losing personal belongings causes a lot of stress for people. It is important that crisis 
counseling is available as flood victims try to recover and get their lives back to normal” (Illinois 
Department of Health Services 2008) .  
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 As many as 13 of the 15 PDD denied counties in rural Southern Illinois were federally 
designated Delta Regional Authority counties in 2008.  As previously described, portions of 
these counties have “the highest concentration of disadvantaged populations in the country” and 
face “profound concerns related to health, out-migration, and persistent poverty. Education and 
income levels are well below the U.S. average, and are lower than other rural areas” (Delta 
Regional Authority 2013). Table 9 supports these observations, as 14 of 15 Southern Illinois 
county in the case study area have higher rates of poverty, unemployment, and outmigration and 
13 of 15 have lower rates of high school graduation than the Illinois average. Compounding 
these concerns is the significantly higher percentage (p < 0.01) of adults self-reporting seven or 
more days of poor mental health per month in the PDD denied counties from 2007-2009 (18.6 
percent) in comparison to the PDD declared counties (12.4 percent) and the control counties 
(14.6 percent) in the dissertation case study area (Illinois Department of Public Health 2013). In 
2009, the year after the 2008 PDD denial in Southern Illinois, the Chicago-based Heartland 
Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights, issued a telling report pertaining to escalating 
poverty in the region. The report revealed that: four Southern Illinois counties top the state's list 
of bankruptcies per 1,000 residents,10 Southern Illinois counties are among the top 20 for 
teenage pregnancy in Illinois,12 Southern Illinois counties place in the top 20 for highest 
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunches; and three Southern Illinois counties 
are among the top 10 worst high school graduation rates in the state (Testa 2009). Nicholette 
Dolin, community development specialist for the Illinois Coalition for Community Services, 
indicated that the dwindling number of employment opportunities, state budget cuts, and service 
eliminations contributed to the impacts of poverty in the region (Testa 2009). 
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Table 9: Socio-demographic profile - 2008 Southern Illinois PDD denied counties  
Southern Illinois 
County 
% Pop Change 
2000‐2007 
% Unemployed 
2008 
% Poverty 
2006-2010 
High School Grad 
Rate 2006-2010 
Race % White 
Non-hispanic 
Illinois 3.5 6.4 12.2 87.0 63.7 
Alexander ‐11.8 9.8 20.1 76.0 60.5 
Franklin 1.2 9.5 19.8 83.8 96.9 
Gallatin ‐6.5 8.3 18.0 77.7 97.1 
Jackson ‐1.3 5.8 28.5 89.5 76.0 
Jefferson 0.3 6.4 17.1 83.7 87.4 
Johnson 1.5 8.2 13.6 78.0 87.9 
Marion -5.0 8.5 16.5 84.1 92.4 
Massac ‐0.3 7.2 13.7 85.0 89.8 
Perry ‐2.2 9.8 14.0 81.5 87.1 
Pulaski ‐11.7 9.4 22.7 78.9 63.9 
Randolph ‐3.3 6.7 10.4 78.5 86.4 
Saline ‐2.4 8.3 18.4 82.1 92.4 
Union ‐0.2 8.8 21.1 79.1 92.4 
White ‐4.6 6.5 14.8 84.5 97.6 
Williamson 5.3 7.1 16.7 88.2 91.5 
  (U.S. Census Bureau 2009a; U.S. Census Bureau 2011; U.S. Census Bureau 2011a;  
   U.S. Census Bureau 2011b; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014) 
  
 In 2008, PDD denied Saline County, Illinois, the capital city of Harrisburg, reported total 
business and personal property damage of $16.8 million and 44 businesses affected by flooding 
(Fodor 2009). Flooding in the city was being called the worst in 71 years (City of Harrisburg 
Illinois 2011).  Harrisburg, Illinois, had declined participation in the federal National Flood 
Insurance Program prior to the 2008 disaster and allowed development in the floodplain (Office 
of Sustainability 2009). This prevented homeowners and businesses from obtaining federally 
subsidized flood insurance to offset the risk of disaster related damages. Alan Niness, Saline 
County Emergency Services Disaster Agency Director, addressed the lack of flood insurance 
protection by stating, “Every flood is different and this one was the result of record 
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rainfall…The challenge now for this council is to make the move that will best protect its 
citizens and businesses. I'm not going to point fingers and comment on what should have been 
done. It's not my place to say if a mistake was made or not" (Homan 2008). Saline County Public 
Safety Commissioner Bill Rice Stated, "Knowing what we know now, yeah, one of the former 
city councils probably should have participated in the insurance program"(Homan 2008). 
   The 2008 denial of a presidential disaster declaration remains a point of concern in this 
region, where the local contention is that “They don’t care as much about Southern Illinois” 
(personal communication anonymous Illinois Emergency Management officials 2011). In 2014, 
six years after the PDD denial of 2008, the City of Harrisburg website still highlights the “Flood 
of 2008” and reminds us that, “The Federal Emergency Management Agency denied flood 
recovery grants and loans to Illinois” (City of Harrisburg 2014). The fact that SBA disaster 
loans, identical to FEMA SBA disaster loans, were available for eligible businesses and residents 
after the 2008 event is not addressed on the website, nor is the failure for the city to participate in 
the NFIP. A PDD denial in 2012 after a tornado event in Harrisburg, Illinois, led to similar 
concerns: “Illinois sought federal disaster aid for the Harrisburg tornado but the aid request was 
denied. The subsequent appeal of that decision was rejected. Specialized assistance from federal 
agencies will not be forthcoming” (Rozdilsky 2012). This perspective was, in part, inconsistent 
with the coordinated state-federal response to the 2102 tornado event. Reprioritized existing state 
and federal programs and block-grants totaling $13 million were designated to support recovery 
needs in the impacted communities, independent of the need for a Stafford Act presidential 
disaster declaration. Support from federal agencies including the USDA, HUD, U.S. Department 
of Transportation and the U.S. General Services Administration was provided to the Harrisburg 
community. In fact, FEMA’s Non-Stafford Act Recovery Guide (2013) uses the 2012 Harrisburg 
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tornado event as an example of an event that “supports unified recovery-focused coordination 
between local, Tribal, State, and Federal agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the 
private sector” (FEMA 2013f).    
 Local emergency management officials expressed concern that the long term recovery 
needs of the community were not adequately addressed after the 2008 or 2012 events and the 
well-being of the community was compromised by the lack of a presidential disaster declaration 
and the associated Stafford Act provisions for Individual Assistance (personal communication 
anonymous Illinois Emergency Management official 2013). One official, in reference to the 
ongoing post-disaster psychological concerns of people in his county indicated that, “rural areas 
are spread out and people’s needs don’t go away when the state and federal folk go home” 
(personal communication anonymous Illinois Emergency Management official 2013). 
 There is a complex social and cultural dynamic in this region of Illinois where 
community leaders sometimes describe the locals as “a stubborn Southern people” (personal 
communication anonymous official 2011) and suggest that the “Mason-Dixon Line took a loop 
around Southern Illinois” (personal communication anonymous official 2011). There is a stark 
dichotomy to the sentiment of the people who inhabit the region as the frustration with the 
failure for the federal government to issue a disaster declaration is countered by the notion that: 
 
Local folks don’t want Easterners or Californian FEMA reps or volunteers 
bothering them cause they feel like they look down on them. They’re comfortable 
with Southerners. Some of them would just as well not evacuate. They’d stand on 
a pile of their own rubble with a shotgun before they’d let some fed move them off 
their land. (personal communication anonymous official 2011) 
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 The recovery of rural communities that are denied presidential requests for federal 
disaster relief is often dependent on the spirit of volunteerism, mutuality, and neighborliness that 
has been a hallmark of the rural social ethic in the U.S. for over 200 years (Danbom 2006). In a 
recent reference to the recurrent disasters that have affected rural southern Illinois, Mayor Eric 
Gregg of Harrisburg stated, “We have faith, a strong work ethic and we are really resilient. We 
are good people, we care about others” (Kane 2013).  This strong network of faith-based 
community support in Southern Illinois may have alleviated some of the emotional stress 
associated with the loss of personal and community resources in 2008, despite the denial of the 
request for a presidential disaster declaration. In reference to the 2008 event, church leaders in 
Southern Illinois indicated that “there were no requests for assistance to repair damaged homes 
that went unanswered. In fact, the bigger problem was getting people to ask for the help that was 
needed” (personal communication, anonymous 2011).The consideration of the social, cultural, 
and economic factors that have contributed to the perspectives of the residents of Southern 
Illinois will provide contextual understanding for the analysis of spatial equity in the distribution 
of federal disaster declarations and the post disaster health and well-being of the region after the 
2008 storm/flood PDD denial.   
 
3.3 Southern Illinois: A Historical Perspective 
 The physical characteristics of Southern Illinois were etched into the landscape by the 
geologic forces of tectonic shift, subsidence, water intrusion, and glacial erosion over the course 
of 500 million years (Russell 2012). The salt springs that were the original namesake and 
industrial foundation of early 19
th
 century Saline County, Illinois, were formed by the remains of 
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ancient seas that repetitively inundated the region. These saline waters interacted with the 
compressive forces of silt and sediment on decaying plant matter and created the high sulfur coal 
which has been the boon and bane of the region for the past century. Shifting of the tectonic 
plate along the New Madrid Fault led to subsidence and an extension of the Gulf of Mexico as 
far north as Southern Illinois, resulting in the northernmost present day Cypress swamps in the 
U.S. The New Madrid Fault remains an active seismic zone and hazard risk in Southern Illinois 
(Oskin 2014).  
 Glacial erosive forces shaped much of the Illinois land surface and created the flat fertile 
plains that form the foundation for the agricultural bounty that is a significant factor in the 
present day rural economy of the region. Glacial till and wind-blown loess formed the thick dark 
soils of the central portion of the state and  provide the basis for Illinois ranking as the #2 state in 
the U.S. in soybean and corn production in 2011 (USDA 2011). Glacial melt scoured the land 
and created the major transport and shipping rivers that surround Southern Illinois and the 
bottomlands that are subject to recurrent flooding. However, the forces of recurrent glacial 
erosion did not extend, as often, into the southern part of Illinois and the deposition of nutrient 
rich glacial till was not as prevalent in this region (Russell 2012). Although the hilly landscape 
of Southern Illinois provides a uniquely scenic contrast to the topography of the central portion 
of the state, the thin acidic soils of this region are less productive than the fertile plains and crop 
yields for corn and soybeans in Southern Illinois are comparatively lower (USDA 2014).  The 
sloping nature of the land and the soil type in parts of Southern Illinois contribute to present day 
problems with soil erosion (Qin and Flint 2008). In 1912, it was observed that Southern Illinois 
lands were, “the cheapest in price and the poorest in quality” (Smith 1912). However, portions of 
Southern Illinois do benefit from productive loess and alluvial soils. This was acknowledged as 
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far back as 1887 when a description of Saline County crop potential indicated that, “there is a 
good strong soil that occupies the greater portion of the county” (The Good Speed Publishing 
Co. 1887, 152). 
 Human inhabitation of Southern Illinois began in 12,000 B.C. to 9500 B.C. and by A.D. 
1000, Native Americans had established an extensive and productive civilization in this region 
which is recognized, today, as the Cahokia Mounds UNESCO World Heritage Site (UNESCO 
2014). Early European settlements were established in Southern Illinois throughout the 18
th
 
century and the final forced exodus of Native Americans from the region in the 1830’s remains 
marked, to this day, by the “Cherokee Trail of Tears”. The Shawnee National Forest and cities 
such as Shawneetown provide remembrance to the indigenous peoples of the region.  
 Most of Illinois early settlers came from southern states. Russell (2012, 46) indicates 
that, “Many of them were “upland” southerners, poor whites from the rural backcountry and hill 
or mountainous areas where small farmers eked out a living.” They were attracted to the hilly 
forested land of the region based on the assumption that land without trees would not provide 
soil that was suitable for farming. The plains of central Illinois were mosquito-infested and the 
flat lands drained poorly and were not as conducive to agricultural development until drainage 
systems and mechanized tractors became available. The settlers in Southern Illinois planted 
crops and cleared trees, unaware of the soil erosion problem that they were potentiating by 
removing trees from the sloped hillsides. It is important to reiterate that although Southern 
Illinois farmland does not match the yield per acre of the fertile plains, the land is productive and 
agricultural remains a significant economic driver and primary land use in the region. The area is 
often referred to as “Little Egypt”, a given name based, in part, on a 19th century visiting Baptist 
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missionary’s vision of fertile land and a vast river system that was reminiscent of the Nile 
(Musgrave 1996). 
 The settlements of Southern Illinois gradually became small towns as river traffic 
necessitated stopping points for refueling and supplies. However, by 1825, when the Erie Canal 
was created, an alternative route from east to west was available for travelers. This led to 
northern and eastern migrant settlement patterns in upstate Illinois that contributed to the 
persistent cultural clashes that exist between the historic southern roots of Little Egypt residents 
and the previously established northern roots of new inhabitants in cities like Chicago (Russell 
2012).  Although slavery was not prevalent in Southern Illinois, it was present in the early 19
th
 
century and in some demand due to manpower needs for the economically productive salt 
springs. The only location where slave trading was deemed legal in Illinois in the early 1800’s 
was in Little Egypt outside of the town of Equality along the Saline River (Cline 2012). The 
racial profile of the region is of interest due to the predominantly white-only percentage of 
inhabitants in most of Southern Illinois, with the notable exception of Alexander County. Cairo, 
Illinois the county seat of Alexander County was the southernmost point of “free soil” for 
African-Americans fleeing the South and the present day disproportionate percentage of Black 
inhabitants in the county is attributable to the post- Civil War emigration of freed slaves.  The 
remaining counties in Southern Illinois have a predominantly White racial profile. This may be 
associated with established cultural preferences of the African-American population, but the 
history of “Sundown Towns” in parts of Southern Illinois has been recognized as a potential 
contributing factor (Loewen 2005). Sundown towns were associated with exclusionary practices 
that included denying property rental and ownership to individuals based on race or requiring 
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African-Americans to leave the area after dark. Although the practice is no longer evident in the 
region, the precedent may have contributed to the racial disparity that persists.  
 By the late 19
th
 century, the railroad industry had made a lasting impact on Illinois. The 
railroads led to the growth of saw mill communities and rock and quarry operations in Southern 
Illinois.  Produce from Southern Illinois was shipped in refrigerated railroad cars to northern 
cities. Bituminous coal, rail transported from Southern Illinois, supplied homes with a high-
energy heating source and the trains with necessary fuel.  Chicago had established itself as a 
railroad hub for the shipment of beef and grain to eastern cities but the resultant prosperity of 
immigrants in Chicago was viewed unfavorably by Southern Illinoisans who realized that the 
raw goods they shipped to northern cities were inequitably valued compared to the price of the 
finished product.  Russell (2012, 66) notes that newly arrived “Yankees” in northern Illinois 
portrayed white southerners as lazy, uneducated, dirty, poor, ragged, and hopeless. The 
“Southern Illinoisans were regarded as a “coon and catfish” society that wanted to be left alone, 
a stereotype that had some truth to it” and, in turn, the residents of Southern Illinois assumed that 
the Northerners were money-grubbing opportunists (Russell 2012, 67).  
  The 20
th
 century created many challenges for the Southern Illinois economy. Agricultural 
commodities were often subject to unpredictable natural forces and the pressures of market 
based demand. The region has seen a gradual decrease in the number of farms but the amount of 
farm land has remained stable. The automobile and the Interstate Highway System provided 
alternatives to passenger rail service, which eventually led to the demise of the Southern Illinois 
Railway and Power Company. Small towns suffered from the loss of revenue that rail terminals 
had brought to their communities. The 1976 Clean Air Act mandated strict limitations on the use 
of the high sulfur coal that had become a primary source of employment and revenue for 
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Southern Illinois. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 created additional 
financial obligations for mining concerns in the region.  Out migration of youth who were 
seeking better employment opportunities decreased the available job force. Coal mine shut 
downs, prison and factory closures, and the recent reversal of the state government plan to locate 
an Illinois Department of Transportation facility in Harrisburg, Illinois have contributed  to the 
local sense of disenfranchisement with the state and federal government system. High business 
costs and taxes have led to Illinois ranking as one of the 3 worst states to do business in the U.S. 
(Sachdev 2011). The remote location of Southern Illinois and the potential for Indiana to 
establish itself as Right to Work state compound the economic challenges for the region.  
 The Stafford Act has established criteria for the consideration of “special populations” in 
the Individual Assistance disaster declaration determination process. Special populations include  
low-income, elderly, and unemployed individuals. The degree to which these segments of the 
population are affected and have a greater need for assistance is factored into the decision for a 
disaster declaration or denial. The historical and present day socio-demographic profile of 
Southern Illinois, described in this chapter, is clearly consistent with this “special population” 
classification. The following chapter presents the research methodology designed to determine if 
Southern Illinois was adversely affected by the denial of a presidential disaster declaration 
request, and if this region had a greater need for assistance under the provisions of the Stafford 
Act. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 This dissertation research is designed to provide a comprehensive approach to the 
analysis of spatial equity in the implementation of the Stafford Act. Multivariate generalized 
regression modeling of data obtained from FEMA through the Freedom of Information Act and 
from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was augmented by key stakeholder 
interviews to address the previously described research questions. This chapter provides a 
detailed description of the study areas, data collection techniques, and methodological 
approaches utilized in the analysis. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The research questions were addressed by means of a two phase study, as depicted in 
Figure 3. Phase I (national level) of the investigation addresses the first three research questions 
by analyzing political, economic, social, and spatial factors related to all presidential disaster 
declaration requests in the U.S. since the initiation of the Stafford Act. Phase II (state/county 
Level) of the investigation addresses the fourth research question by providing a more focused 
and detailed examination of Disaster Recovery and Individual/Community Health and Well-
Being in select counties of a single state (Illinois) that experienced storm/flood events in 2008. 
The research utilized qualitative and quantitative convergent validation methodologies to 
evaluate perceived inequities in the implementation of the Stafford Act. 
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Figure 3: Research design overview 
 
4.2 Phase I (National Level) 
 Phase I of the investigation addresses the questions pertaining to political partisanship 
and biased vote seeking behavior, “overwhelming” need, and geographic inequity associated 
with gubernatorial requests for presidential disaster declarations under the provisions of the 
Stafford Act in the U.S. The key components and steps of this phase of the proposed project are 
summarized below: 
 
4.2.1 Phase I Study Area 
Phase I of the analysis of disaster declaration and turndowns is confined to the 50 states 
of the U.S. The District of Columbia, U.S. territories, and U.S. possessions that are eligible for 
disaster declarations and turndowns under the provisions of the Stafford Act are excluded due to 
Phase I  
National  
Level Analysis 
 
Phase II  
State/County  
Level Analysis 
Research Questions: 
1. Political favoritism? 
2. Overwhelming need? 
3. Geographic inequity? 
Methodology: 
Archival data collection 
Quantitative analysis 
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Research Questions: 
4. Disaster recovery, 
 health and well-being? 
Federal Disaster Declarations and Denials: 
Analyzing Spatial Equities in the 
Implementation of the Stafford Act  
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the absence of gubernatorial party, voting congressional membership and/or the absence of an 
electorate that votes in presidential elections.  
 
4.2.2 Phase I Archival Data Collection 
 Data sets for this phase of the investigation were obtained from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA 2013a), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This 
information contains records of all presidential emergency and major disaster declarations and 
denials since May 2, 1953. It also includes the itemized Disaster Financial Status Report for all 
FEMA expenditures associated with declared disasters from 1989 through 2012. Congressional 
oversight committee membership and the party affiliations of governors by state were obtained 
from the Almanac of American Politics (Barone and Ujifusa 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000; Barone and Cohen 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010; Barone and Mccutcheon 2012) 
consistent with the research of Garrett and Sobel (2003). This data was utilized to assess 
indicators of political partisanship including same party affiliation between the president and the 
governor, senators, house representatives, and congressional oversight committee members of 
the disaster declaration requesting state. The consideration of FEMA oversight committees was 
consistent with the prior published research of Garrett and Sobel (2003) and Sobel, Coyne and 
Leeson (2004). There were six House subcommittees and six Senate subcommittees included in 
the analysis from 1989-2003. The Economic Development, Public Buildings & Emergency 
Management Subcommittee was added in 2000. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
was created in 2002 and FEMA was assimilated into DHS as part of the restructuring process. 
This led to extensive changes in oversight committee roles. Based on prior research (Foley and 
Rudman 2004; Sobel, Coyne and Leeson 2007), the dissertation limits the consideration of 
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oversight committees for all disaster declarations and denials since 2003 to the House 
Appropriations on Homeland Security Subcommittee, the Senate Appropriations on Homeland 
Security Subcommittee, the House Select Homeland Security Committee, and the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The FEMA oversight committees 
/subcommittees are listed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: FEMA oversight committees 
House of Representatives subcommittees/committees 
1. Economic Development, Public Buildings & Emergency Management subcommittee  
2. Water Resources and Environment subcommittee of the Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee  
3. V.A., Housing, and Urban Development, and Independent Agency subcommittee of the                                           
House  Appropriations Committee 
4. Basic Research subcommittee of the Science Committee 
5. Housing and Community subcommittee of the Banking and Financial Services Committee  
6. Select Homeland Security Committee 
7. House Appropriations on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
Senate subcommittees/committees 
1. Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety subcommittee of the Environmental and 
Public Works Committee 
2. Veteran’s  Administration,  Housing  and  Urban  Development  subcommittee  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations Committee 
3. Oversight   of   Government   Management   and   District   of   Columbia   subcommittee   of    the 
Government Affairs Committee 
4. Housing Opportunity and Community Development subcommittee of the Banking, Housing  and 
Urban Affairs Committee 
5. Science, Technology and Space subcommittee of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee 
6. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committee 
7. Senate Appropriations on Homeland Security Subcommittee 
  
 State level data pertaining to estimated Total Taxable Resources was obtained from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012), the National Center for Higher Education Management 
Systems Information Center for State Higher Education Policymaking and Analysis (2007), and 
Compson (2003). Poverty data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. FEMA has 10 
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regional office locations that provide disaster related services, including Preliminary Damage 
Assessments and Summary Analyses for the FEMA Director. The FEMA regional offices will 
be considered in the analysis of the research question pertaining to geographic inequity based on 
the potential for regional operatives to have different assessment standards or different levels of 
influence with the federal director and/or president.   
 
The resulting breakdown of states included in the respective FEMA regions is as follows: 
 
FEMA Region I-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont  
FEMA Region II-New Jersey, New York 
FEMA Region III-Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia 
FEMA Region IV-Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South  Carolina, 
Tennessee 
FEMA Region V-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin  
FEMA Region VI-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas  
FEMA Region VII- Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska 
FEMA Region VIII-Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming  
FEMA Region IX-Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada 
FEMA Region X-Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Phase I Quantitative Methodology  
 The names and definitions of all variables considered in the analysis are summarized in 
Table 11. Binary logistic regression was utilized to analyze the dichotomous dependent variable 
― federal disaster declaration requests. For each Presidential disaster request, declarations were 
coded as 1 and denials (turndowns) were coded as 0. The reference level for all dichotomous and 
variables in the Phase I analysis is 0. Separate regression models were implemented to examine 
emergency disaster declaration requests and major disaster declaration requests. Each model 
contained a sequential stepwise analysis of the influence of the predictor variables on the 
dependent variable and of interaction effects for pertinent variables. Separate regression analyses 
were performed for all disaster declaration requests from 1989-2012 and for “marginal” disaster 
157 
 
declarations that received less than $24 million in FEMA funding (2012 inflation adjusted). 
 The objective of the regression analyses was to determine if: (a) variables pertaining to 
political, partisanship, politically biased vote-seeking, “overwhelming” need, and geographic 
location are influential with respect to disaster declarations and denials; (b) variables influencing 
emergency declarations are similar or different from those influencing major disaster 
declarations; (c) the interaction of pertinent variables is influential with respect to disaster 
declarations and denials; and if “marginal” disasters are influential with respect to disaster 
declarations and denials . The different categories of explanatory variables are described in detail 
below. 
 
Table 11: Variable names and definitions- federal disaster declaration requests 
 
Variable Definition and measurement 
Federal Disaster Declaration Request 1=declaration, 0=denial (turndown) 
Partisanship:  
Governor 1=same party, 0=not same 
U.S. senator 1=both same party, 0=not same 
U.S. house representative 1=majority same party, 0=not same 
FEMA oversight committee senate 1=membership  on  committee,  0=no  membership 
FEMA oversight committee house 1=membership  on  committee,  0=no  membership 
Biased Vote-Seeking:  
Electoral votes weighted 
#  of  electoral  votes  weighted  by  prior  election 
outcomes (see formula in text) 
Reelection year 1=reelection year, 0=other yr 
Overwhelming Need:  
Recent multiple disasters 
1=state or federal declaration in prior 12 months, 
0=none in prior 12 months 
State poverty rate 
Percent   of   state   population   below   the   annual 
poverty level 
Total taxable resources Annual TTR per capita indexed to the U.S. 
Geographic Inequity:  
     FEMA region 1=region specified, 0=other regions 
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Partisanship: This category consists of distinct dichotomous variables that are indicative of 
party favoritism between the president and governors, U.S. senators, or U.S. house 
representatives who shared political party affiliation and U.S. senators or U.S house 
representatives who served on FEMA oversight committees. Additionally, FEMA regions are 
utilized as an independent categorical variable in this analysis to determine if political influences 
are pertinent to the disaster declaration recommendations that are generated in each respective 
FEMA region. Gubernatorial, senatorial, and house party similarity with the president is 
considered a partisan variable due to the electoral benefits that a sitting president may receive 
from a governor/senator/house member with similar political perspectives who is more likely to 
support a “same party” president’s initiatives and reelection efforts. For each declaration request, 
governors of the same party as the president were coded 1 and opposing party governors were 
coded as 0. States with both senators representing the same party as the president were coded as 
1 and states with a single senator or no senator of the same party as the president were coded as 
0. States with a majority of house representatives who were of the same party as the president 
were coded as 1 and states with equal party representation or a majority of house representatives 
of the opposing party were coded as 0, for each declaration request. 
 Prior consideration of the influential role of congressional membership on FEMA 
oversight committees with respect to disaster declarations resulted in the estimation that 44.5 
percent of FEMA disaster payments are due to representation on FEMA oversight committees 
and “that for each House member on an oversight subcommittee (which directly oversees 
disaster expenditures), states receive an average of $31 million in excess disaster expenditures” 
(Garrett and Sobel 2003, 508). However, Garrett and Sobel (2003) indicated that they were 
unable to obtain information on the total number of disaster requests and their analysis was, 
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therefore, limited to disaster declarations. Fiscal determinants are not relevant in the 
consideration of disaster declaration turndowns and oversight committee membership since no 
financial support is generated for turndowns. However, it is assumed that if the presence of 
single representative on an oversight committee generates an average of 31 million dollars in 
additional relief (Garrett and Sobel 2003), the presence of a single representative will also be 
correlated with a higher success rate in acquiring disaster declarations. The following analysis 
considers the relationship between membership on congressional FEMA oversight committees 
and all post-Stafford Act disaster declaration requests (both declarations and turndowns) from 
1989-2012. States with at least one senator and/or states with at least one house representative on 
a FEMA oversight committee were coded 1 and states without a representative were coded as 0.  
 
Biased Vote-Seeking:  This category was utilized to indicate a tendency for the president to 
seek voter favor in states with a significant electoral vote (weighted) and/or during reelection 
years. The weighting for electoral votes was consistent with prior methodology (Garrett and 
Sobel 2003) and was employed for consistency in comparative analysis. This weighting 
acknowledged “battleground” states as those states that often switched party allegiance in 
presidential elections by considering the percentage of presidential elections won by each 
respective party from 1956-2012 and factoring the percent by the following formula: “Y= 1-
4
.
(X-0.5)
2
, where X is the percent of presidential elections between 1956 and 2012 won by a 
Democrat and Y is the weighting factor having a maximum value of one at X= 50% and a 
minimum value of zero at X= 0% or X= 100%. Y is multiplied by the number of electoral votes 
in a state to arrive at the measure of electoral importance. Because Y has an inverted U shape, 
the value of Y is the same if we used the percent of presidential elections that were won by a 
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Republican” (Garrett and Sobel 2003, 500). For each disaster declaration request, the reelection 
year variable was coded as 1 for reelection year and 0 for other years. Disaster request 
declarations and turndowns were considered from November 1
st 
of the year prior to reelection 
through October 31
st 
of the reelection year for the analysis of the relevant presidential reelection 
years (1992, 1996, and 2004). 
 The consideration of electoral votes as a causal factor in the inequitable distribution of 
presidential disaster declarations has been highlighted in previously referenced research (Sylves 
and Waugh 1996; Tarcey 2004; Miskel 2006; Sylves 2008, Reeves 2011). This has led to the 
conclusion that “political discretion exercised by the president is likely to be evident when the 
president approves governor requests regarding low damage, marginal incidents that often 
involve relatively low federal payouts” (Miskel 2006, 134-135). Tarcey (2004, 1) reports that “in 
marginal cases, small, noncompetitive states receive less help because they are just not that 
important in terms of an election.” The influence of electoral votes as an effect modifier (Horney 
MacDonald, Van Willigen, et al. 2011) in presidential disaster declaration decision-making is 
recognized in this dissertation research. The explanatory variables pertaining to “same party” 
status between the president and governors/senators/house members and the reelection year 
variable are considered by the use of statistical interactions with the electoral vote weighted 
variable in a separate multivariate model for Emergency and Major disaster declaration requests 
(Model 2). This will address the conclusions of prior researchers regarding the primacy of 
electoral votes as a motivation to award presidential disaster declarations. It is assumed that the 
purported preferential distribution of a disaster declaration will be greatest in a state that has the 
combined benefit of “same party” legislator status and higher weighted electoral votes or during 
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a reelection year in those states with a greater number of weighted electoral votes. These 
explanatory interaction variables are predicted to have a statistically significant positive 
relationship with disaster declarations if biased vote-seeking is occurring in the presidential 
designation of disaster declarations. 
 
Overwhelming Need: The Stafford Act specifically provides for discretionary decision making 
by the president and allows for selective declarations in areas of recurrent disaster exposure and 
in areas where there is a low income population (Bazan 2005). States with a recent recurrence of 
a federal disaster declaration within a 12-month time frame and those states with a higher 
poverty level are less likely to have the financial resources that may be necessary to manage a 
disaster event without federal support due to the state’s fiscal obligations that are associated with 
these characteristics. Recent multiple disasters was coded as a dichotomous variable with 
declaration requests  for events that occurred within 12 months of a prior declaration coded as 1 
and all other requests as 0. Poverty levels associated with each request were categorized by the 
annual percentage of individuals in poverty for each respective state that was requesting disaster 
relief. The potential for a state to be “overwhelmed” by a disaster event is evaluated in this study 
based on the General Accounting Office’s recommendation for the use of state “Total Taxable 
Resources” (TTR) as a guideline for the assessment of state fiscal capacity in the determination 
of eligibility for federal aid, with specific reference to disaster declarations under the provisions 
of the Stafford Act (Wrightson 1996; GAO 1998; GAO 2001). TTR, as developed by the 
Treasury Department, averages per capita income and all income produced within in a state by 
residents, nonresidents, and businesses. The General Accounting Office (GAO 2001, 12) 
indicates that “TTR provides a more sensitive adjustment for growth over time in a state’s fiscal 
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capacity than does adjustment for inflation based on personal income”. TTR were reported and 
categorized as total taxable resources per capita indexed to the U.S. and applied to each state for 
the respective disaster event. Poverty rate, recent multiple disasters and total taxable resources 
are predicted to have no statistical relationship with disaster declarations if the decision making 
process is assumed to be primarily dependent on political partisanship or biased vote-seeking 
behavior. 
 Prior research has utilized various insurance and property loss databases to address the 
question of “overwhelming” need (Schmidtlein, Finch and Cutter 2008, Reeves 2011). The 
concerns related to the use of these sources based on incomplete data and the failure for insured 
losses to adequately represent the eligibility criteria for Stafford Act PDDs has been previously 
noted in this dissertation. The distribution of a PDD in large scale events has not been contested 
in prior research. Events ranging from the California Northridge Earthquake (DR-1008) to 
Louisiana Hurricane Katrina (DR-1603) do not evoke questions of indiscretion in the declaration 
decision-making process. Although claims of political inefficiency exist in large and small scale 
disaster events, the research focus on inequity in the award of a PDD is based on the assumption 
of presidential partisanship and preference for politically important states and actors in 
“marginal” disaster events that do not exceed the “overwhelming” needs of a state.  
 Determining a level of fiscal loss that merits the definition of “marginal” is challenging 
as the Stafford Act provides for the consideration of a PDD based on eligibility criteria, 
including “special populations” that may not incur a large economic loss but are in need of 
federal disaster assistance. However, a valid economic proxy indicator of a “marginal” event is 
provided by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). The ISO defines a “catastrophe” as an event 
that causes $24 million or more in insured property losses and affects a significant number of 
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property/casualty policyholders and insurers (McGlown and Robinson 2011). This is an 
economic loss value that represents a viable “cutoff” level based on the data available in the 
Disaster Financial Status Report (FEMA 2013a), obtained through the Freedom of Information 
Act. The mean total (2012 inflation adjusted) FEMA expenditures for all Major disaster 
declarations (N=1199) from 1989-2012 was $141,314,721 and the range of expenditures per 
declaration was $408,250 to $37,203,720,564. Utilizing a threshold of $24 million for a 
“marginal” declaration definition provides a fiscal loss indicator which removes the 389 Major 
presidential disaster declarations that resulted in the highest FEMA expenditure while retaining 
810 Major disaster declaration events. This limiting threshold also removes 30 high economic 
cost Emergency declarations while retaining 222 of these events in the analysis. By removing 
these “catastrophic” events from the analysis, we are able to focus on the potential inequity that 
may exist in the distribution of disaster declarations for the comparatively minor events that do 
not meet insurance industry standards for “catastrophic” events. Although the ISO catastrophe 
value is for insured losses, it is a valid and parsimonious proxy indicator for the uninsured losses 
that are covered under a presidential disaster declaration. A separate binary logistic regression 
model, utilizing the same variables, will be analyzed for the “marginal” events (N=1356). 
 
Geographic Inequity: FEMA regions were utilized in this category to determine if there was 
any evidence of partisanship in the intergovernmental and bureaucratic relationships that exist 
between this agency and elected officials, based on geographic location. FEMA regions were 
included as dichotomous variables for the analysis of Major disaster declarations. For each 
disaster declaration request, the region under evaluation was coded as 1 and the remaining 
FEMA regions were coded as 0. FEMA Region VII (IA, KS, MO, NE) represented the required 
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baseline comparison variable in the analysis because it represented a recommended midpoint 
(Starkweather 2010) in the range of regional requests during the time frame analyzed. The 
potential for disparity in the distribution of disaster  declarations based on differential degrees of  
political influence across the various FEMA regions has been addressed in prior research 
(Stephens and Wikstrom 2007; Schmidtlein, Finch, and Cutter 2008). Schmidtlein, Finch, and 
Cutter (2008, 13) recommended that further research in this arena should “incorporate measures 
of state political importance... to identify if those political influences help to explain the 
differential spatial pattern of PDDs” (presidential disaster declarations). It is assumed that if 
there are geographic inequities that exist in presidential decision making, certain FEMA regions 
will reveal a statistically significant relationship with disaster declarations when controlling for 
the other predictor variables. 
 
 
4.3 Phase II (State/County Level) 
Phase II of the investigation will address the final research question that pertains to 
disaster recovery and community well-being. The key components and steps of this phase of the 
proposed project are summarized below. A mixed methods analysis consisting of informal 
interviews with key stakeholders in disaster affected regions of southern Illinois and a 
retrospective multilevel longitudinal analysis of post-disaster stress-related disease was 
performed to determine the factors associated with the consequences of presidential disaster 
declaration decisions after the Illinois floods of 2008. 
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4.3.1 Phase II Study Area 
 This phase of the proposed research will provide a focused and detailed comparison of 
socio-demographically similar counties in Illinois that received individual and household 
assistance via presidential Stafford Act disaster declarations with counties in Illinois that were 
denied requests for individual and household assistance under the Stafford Act for similar storm 
and flood related disaster events during the 2008 disaster year. Illinois was selected for this 
investigation because this state provides a unique setting for a comparative assessment of 
presidential disaster declarations and denials. A comparative examination of counties that 
received presidential disaster declarations and counties that were denied requests for presidential 
disaster declarations is best performed if confounding variables can be eliminated. Variations in 
a state's capacity to respond to disasters based on established emergency protocols, mutual aid 
compacts, mitigation strategies, public resources, and available revenues creates the potential for 
unreliable results in a comparative assessment. Additionally, a comparative consideration of 
disaster events that are dissimilar in type and place provides for potentially misleading results.  
All Illinois counties in the study area met U.S. Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA), Office of Rural Health Policy, criteria for rural designation. None of 
the involved counties had a request issued by the governor of Illinois for individual and family 
assistance under the provisions of the Stafford Act in the prior four years and none of the 
counties received a gubernatorial or presidential disaster declaration in the year subsequent to the 
respective declaration/denial.  The counties that were denied a presidential disaster declaration 
were also denied Stafford Act relief on a follow-up formal appeal to the president through 
established protocols. The majority of counties (14) that received disaster declarations from the 
president were authorized by the federal coordinating office for the disaster event to receive long 
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term recovery assistance. All of the disaster exposed counties have had prior exposure to events 
ranging from the 1937 Ohio River floods to the 1993 Mississippi River flood.  
This scenario provides a study area that was subject to similar types of disaster events 
during the same calendar year, under the same response and recovery measures provided by the 
state government of Illinois. If the distribution of presidential disaster declarations is equitable, 
the denied counties are not expected to have experienced an “overwhelming" need for individual 
and household assistance under the guidelines of the Stafford Act and they should be able to 
recover from the event without federal assistance. The disaster declared counties, in contrast, are 
expected to have exhibited “overwhelming” need and their recovery was dependent on federal 
relief.  A comparative analysis of  disaster recovery and community well-being from  2008 
events in declared and denied counties of Illinois should reveal similar findings if the Stafford 
Act was equitably implemented. 
 
4.3.2 Phase II Archival Data Collection 
 This research utilizes encrypted individual-identifier level empirical data, obtained from 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which has not been considered in prior 
published studies pertaining to the differential recovery of individuals in disaster affected rural 
communities. Access to this information was approved by the U.S. Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) after peer-review of a request for data for all Medicare recipients in 
the 17 declared rural counties, the 15 denied rural counties, and 12 control rural counties that did 
not request an Individual Assistance Stafford Act disaster declaration in any year from 2004-
2009 (See Table 12).  
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Table 12: 2008 Illinois case study counties 
DENIED COUNTIES DECLARED COUNTIES CONTROL COUNTIES 
Alexander Adams Bond 
Franklin Calhoun Cass 
Gallatin Clark Christian 
Jackson Coles Dewitt 
Jefferson Crawford Fulton 
Johnson Cumberland Marshall 
Marion Douglas Mason 
Massac Edgar Montgomery 
Perry Hancock Morgan 
Pulaski Henderson Putnam 
Randolph Iroquois Scott 
Saline Jasper Stark 
Union Jersey  
White Lawrence  
Williamson Livingston  
 Mercer  
 Whiteside  
 
 
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requirements have been 
met by utilizing encrypted identifiers and protected data bases. A stratified random sample of 
12,000 individual Medicare recipients who maintained community-based residence in the same 
county of the study area from 2007-2009 are included in the CMS datasets. Diagnostic groupings 
of 78 stress-related disease and control indicators were considered in a manner consistent with 
prior studies (Burton et al. 2009; Holman and Silver 2011) (See Table 13) and with the extensive 
list of references to psychological and physiological stress-related disorders that are provided in 
Chapter 1: Introduction and in Chapter 2.7 Health, Well-being, and the Mechanism for Post 
Disaster Stress- Related Illness. The diagnostic grouping scheme and the selection of comorbid 
disorders in the research design is consistent with the peer-reviewed literature pertaining to 
stress-related disease, the peer-reviewed federally approved research study protocols from the 
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services that were, as previously stated, required to obtain 
the encrypted individually identified files used in the analysis, and the peer-reviewed National 
Science Foundation SBE Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (SBE DDRIG 
#1233352) approved research study protocols. Each of the ICD-9CM codes selected is 
associated with a stress-related disorder that is recognized in the medical literature as a 
component of the diagnostic grouping category to which it is assigned (Costa et al. 1982; Cohen 
and Ginsburg 1990; Colantonio et al. 1992; Sartorius et al. 1996; Korszun et al. 1998; Kroenke 
et al. 1998; Beekman et al. 2000; Mayer 2000; Linton 2000; Noyes 2001; Cenac et al. 2002; Gur 
2004; Neugebauer 2004; Furman et al. 2005; Schoevers 2005; Bruce et al. 2005; Suls and Bunde 
2005; Best et al. 2006; Nicholson et al. 2007; Seignourel 2008; Mizyed, Fass and Fass 2009; 
Saczynski 2010; Byers and Yaffe 2011; Wilson et al. 2011; Lambiase, Kubzansky and Thurston 
2014). The use of diagnostic grouping methods for disease specific studies and categorization 
schemes is well-established in the medical literature (Robinson 2007). Variations of this 
approach have been applied by private and federal entities  and include the methodology of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP)-Clinical 
Classifications Software (CCS) for ICD-9-CM (HCUP CCS 2014), the Johns Hopkins University 
Health Services Research and Development Center -Adjusted Clinical Groups (ACGs) (Health 
Services Research and Development Center  2011) , the Diagnostic Cost Groups/Hierarchical 
Condition Categories (DCG/HCCs) (Ash et al. 2000), and the 3M-Clinical Risk Groups (CRGs) 
(Hughes et al. 2004). These grouping mechanisms can be utilized to analyze the influence of a 
variety of environmental and societal factors on categories of disease with similar characteristics, 
comorbidities, and precipitating factors. These techniques obviate the problems associated with 
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fragmented analyses of individual ICD-9-CM codes that may suppress significant findings when 
the individual codes are infrequently observed and/or not appropriately grouped. Additionally, 
studies of physiological aspects of stress related disease may be subject to ill-defined clinical 
conditions that may be associated with zealous use of ICD-9CM codes by practitioners, pending 
a more conclusive diagnosis (i.e. fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome). The problems 
associated with overlap of clinical conditions/presentations (Aaron and Buchwald 2001) is 
addressed in this analysis by utilizing a single count of visits within diagnostic grouping, 
regardless of the number of ICD-9-CM codes that were assigned to a patient for that visit. It is 
acknowledged that alternative approaches to the analysis of frequency of service for disease exist 
but the use of diagnostic groupings with the assignment of one visit or equivalent, independent 
of the number of symptom/diagnosis/medication findings in each group at the time of visit, is 
well-established in the peer reviewed medical literature (Herrmann et al. 1998; Maynard and 
Cox 1998; Mechanic, McAlpine and Olfson 1998; Bao and Sturm 2001; Pottick, McAlpine and 
Andelman 2000;  Duffy 2004; Helgason, Tomasson. and Zoega 2004; Lau et al. 2005; Sayers et 
al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2010). Additionally, none of the aforementioned references provide 
itemized frequency counts for the subordinate level diagnosis/symptom/medication in the 
respective diagnostic grouping but this information is defined in Table 14 to support the analysis.  
The study is restricted to Medicare recipients who were 65 years old or greater at the time of the 
disaster event. The Medicare eligible age group was selected due to the specified emphasis on 
elderly populations in the Stafford Act determination criteria and prior research findings 
associated with stress-related vulnerabilities and resiliencies in this age strata (Kilijanek and 
Drabek 1979; Krause 1987; Ticehurst et al. 1996). This data includes all individual 
outpatient/office visits, as listed in the Medicare Carrier, Beneficiary Summary, and Outpatient 
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files, for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM) anxiety and depressive 
disorders that are related to psychological stressors such as disasters and the associated 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD 9 CM) 
diagnostic codes for these disorders and stress-related physiological conditions.  
 The names and definitions of all disorders considered in the analysis and their respective 
grouping categories are summarized in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Stress-related disorders and control indicators by grouping variable 
Anxiety 
Depression 
Acute 
Vascular 
Dementia Gastrointestinal Somatic Control 
Anxiety 
Acute 
Cerebrovascular 
Disease 
Alzheimer’s 
 
Gastroesophageal 
Reflux Disease 
Back/Neck/Chronic 
Pain 
Cholecystitis 
Depression 
Acute 
Myocardial 
Infarction 
Senile 
Dementia 
Gastritis 
Chronic Fatigue 
Syndrome/Fatigue 
Otitis 
externa 
Generalized 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
Cerebral 
Infarction 
Senility w/o 
Psychosis 
Irritable  Bowel 
Syndrome 
Fibromyalgia Otitis media 
Panic 
Disorder 
Angina  Ulcer Generalized pain  
PTSD    
Headache-
Migraine/Tension 
 
    
Irritable Bowel 
Syndrome 
 
    
Polymyalgia  
rheumatica 
 
    Sleep Disorder  
    
Temporomandibular 
Joint Syndrome 
 
    Vertigo Unspecified  
 
 
Individual level socio-demographic information pertaining to each Medicare 
beneficiary’s race, gender, date of birth, and dual-eligible Medicaid status (Low Income, < 135 
percent of federal poverty level) was also obtained from the encrypted CMS database. This 
information will be utilized to control for socio-demographic variations in utilization of 
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Medicare services and to assess the relationships between these characteristics and the incidence 
of stress-related disease visits in the study area. Prior research has documented differences in the 
incidence of stress-related disorders associated with the demographic variables under analysis 
(Boman 1979; Norris, Friedman, and Watson 2002; Cutter, Boruff and Shirley; Cutter 2006; 
Barr 2008; Burton, Skinner, Uscher-Pines, et al.  2009; Holman and Silver 2011).  The 
consideration of the potential for the combined effects of poverty, age, race, gender, and health 
service access to exacerbate post disaster stress-related illness is critical to an evaluation of 
equity in the distribution of federal disaster relief.   
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) (2013) has developed a reverse coded Z - 
scoring system to rank counties based on access to health care. The Lack of Access metric 
considers several factors including “the percentage of the population that could (or could not) get 
medical care when needed; the number of patients served by a federally qualified health center 
(FQHC); and the availability of primary care providers in a community.” Lack of access to 
health care is a valid consideration in the determination of different patterns of utilization for 
medical services and the RWJF scoring system will be applied in this analysis. County level data 
pertaining to all federal grant dollars distributed for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 was obtained 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2009a, 2010). This information will be utilized as a control 
variable for the consideration of Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act related county-level federal 
financial support in the study area for FY 2008 and 2009.   
The consideration of social capital as a measure of community resilience and as a valued 
asset in disaster recovery has been acknowledged in the academic literature (Nakagawa and 
Shaw 2004; Norris et al. 2008). This is of particular importance in communities where denials 
have been issued for disaster declaration requests. The Stafford Act acknowledges the 
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importance of social capital by indicating that Individual Assistance declarations may not be 
issued in communities where adequate volunteer support is available to address the needs of 
disaster survivors. The Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NERCRD) has 
created a Social Capital Index from 14 county level demographic variables, utilizing Principal 
Component Analysis (Rupasingha and Goetz 2008). The scored variables included in the 
NERCRD Social Capital Index are based on the following county level attributes: number of 
religious organizations, civic and social associations, business associations, political 
organizations, professional organizations, labor organizations, bowling centers, physical fitness 
facilities, public golf courses, sport clubs, managers, and promoters, population, voter turnout, 
survey response rate, and number of non-profit organizations without including those with an 
international approach. This index will be applied in the analysis of disaster recovery. 
 Estimated Individual Assistance related property damages for the respective disaster 
declared and denied counties were obtained from the Illinois Emergency Management 
Association, the FEMA Preliminary Damage Analysis, and the U.S. Small Business Association. 
This information is considered to control for the relative effect of property losses on emotional 
stress and the potential need for health services associated with office/outpatient visits. 
 
4.3.3 Phase II Quantitative Methodology  
 The names and definitions of all variables considered in the analysis are summarized in 
Table 14. A hierarchical longitudinal generalized linear mixed regression model was utilized to 
analyze the natural logarithm of the counts of office/outpatient visits as a function of the 
predictor variables. The observed overdispersion of zeroes in patient visit counts was 
accommodated with the addition of a dispersion parameter in a negative binomial regression to 
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avoid underestimation of standard errors and overestimation of test statistics with a resultant 
increase in Type 1 error rates. Empirical standard error estimates are reported as they provide 
more conservative indicators of statistical significance when the covariance structure is not 
consistent across models. The logarithm of the expected count is assumed to be a linear function 
of the relevant independent variables and a maximum likelihood method was used to estimate 
the model. Nonlinear ridging was utilized to accommodate any violations of the assumption of 
linearity in the time related measurements.  
Omitted reference variables for the comparisons of denied-declared-control counties 
were applied in separate models in order to provide independent comparisons of each group. An 
individual-level random effects model was created for each dependent variable utilizing a first-
order autoregressive covariance structure to account for the within subject time-related 
correlations in the generalized linear models. Separate regression models were designed for 
counts of patient visits for stress-related or non-stress-related control diseases in 6 diagnostic 
grouping categories. Office/outpatient visits that contained more than one diagnosis from the 
same category were counted as a single visit to avoid over counting for comorbid illnesses that 
existed in the same diagnostic grouping dependent variable (Aaron and Buchwald 2001). If a 
Medicare beneficiary in the study area went to the doctor with a headache, backache, fatigue, 
and dizziness, that patient was counted as having one visit in the somatic category, not four visits 
in the somatic category. This avoids biased over counting of visits for comorbid diagnoses 
within the same outcome grouping variable for the individual random effects component of the 
model.  If the same patient also had a diagnosis of depression during the same visit then he/she 
had 1 visit in the somatic category and one visit in the anxiety/depression category. The somatic 
category and the anxiety/depression category are evaluated independently of each other in this 
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analysis. The comorbidity of the somatic group and the anxiety/depression group is 
acknowledged.  However, the acute vascular, dementia, GI, and somatic diagnostic grouping 
categories are specifically utilized in the analysis as separate alternative indicators of stress-
related disease to accommodate populations that may have lower utilization rates for 
anxiety/depression due to lack of access to mental health providers and/or stigmatization 
regarding mental health concerns but retain more normal utilization rates for comorbid stress-
related physiological conditions.  This approach provides a sophisticated research design that 
addresses gaps in analytical models that combine comorbid diagnoses from multiple categories 
of psychological and physiological illness. Comorbidity indices that combine physiological and 
psychological disorders into one category of stress-related disease lose the refined analysis that 
is provided by the above approach and increase the potential for Type I or Type II statistical 
errors due to aberrant over/under counting of patient visits for subcategories of stress-related 
illness in certain subsets of the population. Each of the categories contained established 
diagnostic indicators of  stress-related diseases that may be exacerbated by disaster exposure 
including; anxiety/depression (13- ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes); acute vascular conditions (14- 
ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes); dementia (3- ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes); gastrointestinal 
disorders(10- ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes); somatic disorders (33- ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes); 
and a non-stress-related control (4- ICD-9-CM diagnostic codes).  The specific diagnosis codes 
and visit frequencies are listed in Table 14. The ICD-9-CM codes were grouped as described and 
compared for each portion of the case study area (denied, declared, control). Table 20 provides 
descriptive statistics for the range and number of visits in each diagnostic grouping category for 
each area (denied, declared, control) and each time frame under analysis. 
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Table 14: ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Codes and Frequency of Visits in Study Area (N=12,000) 
Anxiety/Depression Acute Vascular Dementia 
ICD Freq Dx ICD Freq Dx ICD Freq Dx 
311 3768 Depression 436 1647 Acute Cerebrovasc. Dis. 797 53 Senility w/oPsych 
296.20 181 Depression 411.1 1305 Angina 290.0 844 Senile dementia 
296.22 82 Depression 413.9 2428 Angina 331.0 2654 Alzheimer's 
296.23 33 Depression 410.11 65 Acute MI    
296.30 327 Depression 410.41 138 Acute MI    
296.31 52 Depression 410.70 95 Acute MI    
296.32 157 Depression 410.71 451 Acute MI    
296.33 182 Depression 410.90 357 Acute MI    
296.34 72 Depression 410.91 215 Acute MI    
296.35 33 Depression 410.92 101 Acute MI    
300.00 2781 Anxiety 433.11 85 Cerebral Infarction    
300.01 95 Panic Disorder 434.01 94 Cerebral Infarction    
300.02 568 Gen. Anx. Disord. 434.11 60 Cerebral Infarction    
309.81 14 PTSD 434.91 1719 Cerebral Infarction    
G.I. Somatic Control 
ICD Freq Dx ICD Freq Dx ICD Freq Dx 
787.1 136 Heartburn 725 620 Polymyalgia  382.9 359 Otitis media 
530.81 7601 GERD 564.1 640 IBS 575.0 103 Cholecystitis 
531.90 203 Ulcer/gastritis 338.4 112 Chronic pain syndrome 380.10 341 Otitis externa 
532.90 83 Ulcer/gastritis 723.1 5451 Neck pain 381.10 0 Otitis media 
533.90 232 Ulcer/gastritis 724.1 2830 Back pain    
535.00 325 Ulcer/gastritis 724.2 11909 Back pain    
535.10 418 Ulcer/gastritis 724.3 3908 Back pain    
535.40 491 Ulcer/gastritis 724.4 4518 Back pain    
535.50 1016 Ulcer/gastritis 724.5 3856 Back pain    
564.1 640 IBS 729.1 3843 Fibromyalgia    
   338.29 412 Chronic pain    
   346.00 32 Migraine    
   346.10 38 Migraine    
   346.90 157 Migraine    
   386.10 110 Vertigo unspec.    
   524.60 51 TMJ    
   524.62 0 TMJ    
   524.63 0 TMJ    
   524.69 0 TMJ    
   780.50 184 Sleep disorder    
   780.51 17 Sleep disorder    
   780.52 975 Sleep disorder    
   780.53 307 Sleep disorder    
   780.54 58 Sleep disorder    
   780.56 41 Sleep disorder    
   780.57 806 Sleep disorder    
   780.58 0 Sleep disorder    
   780.59 0 Sleep disorder    
   780.71 219 Chronic fatigue syn.    
   780.79 11679 Fatigue    
   780.96 123 Generalized pain    
   307.42 46 Sleep disorder    
   307.81 112 Headache tension    
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The objective of the regression analyses was to determine if a presidential disaster declaration or 
denial for a gubernatorial Individual Assistance request influenced the incidence of stress-related 
diseases, while controlling for the effects of the aforementioned demographic variables.  
 Data was analyzed for the time frame consisting of six months pre-event, and 18 months 
post-event, in six month increments (2007-2009). This time frame is consistent with the peer-
reviewed literature pertaining to the variations in the documented phases of disaster recovery and 
the potential for delayed onset of post-disaster psychological symptoms (Phifer, Kaniasty and 
Norris 1988, Phifer and Norris 1989; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000). 
Lorrie Rickman Jones of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Division of Mental Health, 
acknowledged an awareness of the delayed onset of post disaster stress-related symptoms after 
the 2008 flood in presidential disaster declared Iroquois and Livingston counties in stating,  
“Psychological effects of a natural disaster of this type often don't show up until months after the 
event. We want people to know crisis counseling is there for them now and in the future"  
(Illinois Department of Human Services 2008). The 18 month post-event time frame also 
represents a cumulative period in which a significant amount of Stafford Act benefits had been 
distributed to individuals and households in the declared counties under investigation. The date 
of disaster event occurrence for the declared and denied counties was the first date listed in the 
gubernatorial disaster declaration request and for control counties the date of disaster event 
occurrence was established as the midpoint of the dates of the disaster denied and declared 
events. 
Counties that received Individual Assistance disaster declarations and also shared 
contiguous borders with counties which were denied Individual Assistance declarations will be 
excluded due to potential overlap in resource utilization variables included in the analysis. 
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Counties that were not categorized as rural by the HRSA- Office of Rural Health Policy were 
excluded from the analysis to maintain consistency between declared and denied areas with 
respect to DHS grants for metropolitan areas. Control counties were selected based on mean 
weighted consistencies with disaster affected counties (p > 0.05), utilizing the 2010 County 
Health Rankings & Roadmaps Social and Economic Factors index (2013).  
 There are three distinct controls utilized in this study: 1) a pre-event baseline count of 
office/out-patient visits for each disease category; 2) an independent variable control grouping 
that is used as a comparison of counties that were not affected by a disaster with disaster 
declared/denied counties; and  3) a control diagnosis group category of non-stress-related disease 
that is used as a comparison indicator of time-dependent utilization trends for non-stress-related 
patient visits in the respective declared/denied/control regions of the Illinois study area. The 
selection of the disorders for the control diagnosis group category, otitis media and otitis externa 
(ear inflammation/infection) and cholecystitis (gall bladder inflammation), were based on the 
lack of evidence of a prominent stress correlate with these conditions and a severity of 
presentation that would not lead to overcounting as an innocent diagnosis in the consideration of 
office/outpatient visits in the respective time frames. Controlling for pre-disaster symptoms by 
the use of a comprehensive Medicare database that provides established indicators of pre-event 
stress-related well-being addresses methodological problems that have been noted in prior 
hazards research associated with a lack of knowledge of individual physical and psychological 
status prior to the disaster event (Norris, Phifer, and Kaniasty 2001; Soeteman 2008). The 
different categories of explanatory variables and the coding criteria are described in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Variable names and definitions  
Variable  Definition and measurement 
Time 1-4 0-6 m pre, 0-6 m post, 6-12 m post, 12-18 m post  
Disaster Request  FEMA 0=denial,1=declaration, 2=control   
Anxiety/Depression CMS Count # of visits per individual 
Acute Vascular CMS Count # of visits per individual 
  Dementia CMS Count # of visits per individual 
Gastrointestinal CMS Count # of visits per individual 
  Somatic  CMS Count # of visits per individual 
Control CMS Count # of visits per individual 
Gender Individual level CMS 1=Male, 2=Female  
Lack of Access to Health Services County level RWJF Z-score (higher value = lower access) 
Federal Grants County level Dept. of Commerce county $ per cap 2008-2009  
Extreme Elderly >80 years Individual level CMS 0= < or = 80 at  event, 1=>80 at event  
Social Capital County level NERCRD social capital index score  
Race Individual level 0=Non-white, 1=White  
Medicaid (Low Income) Individual level CMS 0=No Medicaid 1= Medicaid  
Property Damage-Homes County level IEMA/FEMA/SBA per capita damage estimate 
 CMS=Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
 IEMA=Illinois Emergency Management Association 
NCCS=National Center for Charitable Statistics 
NERCRD= Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development 
RWJF=Robert Woods Johnson Foundation 
  
 The selection of diseases for the diagnostic grouping categories (anxiety/depression, 
acute vascular, dementia, gastrointestinal (G.I.), somatic, control) was designed to highlight 
psychological and physiological disorders that have well established correlations with stressful 
events such as disasters. These groupings were utilized as the dependent variables in separate 
models to evaluate the influence of the predictor variables on the count of number of 
office/outpatient visits in the previously described time frames. The longitudinal analysis 
considers the incidence of cumulative visits for each respective diagnostic stress-related disease 
grouping in the pre event time frame (0-6 months pre-event) as a baseline for comparison to the 
incidence of cumulative visits that occurred in each of the three post-event time frames (0-6 
months post-event; 6-12 months post-event; 12-18 months post event), while controlling for the 
effects of the predictor variables. The categorical variable, Disaster Request (denial, declaration, 
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control), was applied as a statistical interaction with the variable, Time 1-4, for each time frame 
comparison to the baseline (0-6 pre-event time).  The resultant regression coefficients report the 
comparative change in the incidence of office/outpatient visits for the disaster request denied, 
declared, and control regions in the 0-6 month post-event, 6-12 month post-event, and 12-18 
month versus the 0-6 month pre-event time frame. The individual level socio-demographic 
characteristics (gender; extreme elderly status (age: 80 years or older); race; and Medicaid-low 
income) were coded as dichotomous variables in the manner defined in Table 15. These values 
are arranged in ascending alphanumeric order which results in the highest number representing 
the reference level. The extreme elderly or “oldest old” have been alternately defined in the peer 
reviewed literature as individuals that were 75, 80, or 85 years of age or older (Camacho et al. 
1993).  This study utilizes the midpoint of that range (age: 80 years or older) for the 
categorization of extreme elderly based on extensive justification in the peer reviewed medical 
literature regarding the unique characteristics of health and well-being in this age group (Ishii, 
Hosoda and Maeda 1980; Harris et al. 1989; Suzman et al. 1992; Camacho et al. 1993; Desbiens 
et al. 2001; Haynie et al. 2001; Liang et al. 2001; Xavier et al. 2002; Zeng and Vaupel 2002; 
Human Rights Education Associates 2003; Yi, Yuzhi and George 2003; Andersen-Ranberg et al. 
2005; Nilsson 2010; Bansal et al. 2011; Panagiotakos et al. 2011; Shapiro et al. 2011; Johnson 
2012). County level demographic per capita variables were based on 2008 population estimates 
and the NECRCRD social capital index score and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Z-scoring 
measurement criteria have been previously described. 
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4.3.4 Phase II Qualitative Methodology 
 Informal conversational interviews with 27 key stakeholders in Southern Illinois were 
performed between October 2011 and April 2013. Each interviewee was provided with an 
Institutional Review Board approved summary of the research intent and the option to be an 
anonymous participant. It became evident, early in the interview process, that the participants 
were most comfortable with an informal process. My status as a medical officer with state and 
federal disaster response teams provided me with an opportunity to interact with key 
stakeholders in Illinois in an ethnographic context, as a member of the extended team of first 
responders. On two separate occasions at local and regional meetings, I was asked to provide an 
impromptu summary of my experiences related to special needs sheltering and patient care. In 
regard to the privileged information that was provided to me by varied members of the disaster 
management network, I elected to recommend that all of the participants remain anonymous 
with the exception of those that are listed, by name in the text. Additionally, I have generalized 
the dates of the interviews and the title of the interviewee. Many of the individuals who were 
generous with their time, candor, and perspectives worked as the sole emergency response or 
preparedness representative in their county and their anonymity would be violated by any 
specific geographic identifier. The interviews focused on the 2008 storm/flood disaster events, 
but often evolved into personal narratives related to rural life and individual hopes and 
aspirations. Several of the interviews yielded contextual background that led to further archival 
investigation and the names of interviewees are included when their perspectives were 
substantiated by published reports in local newspapers. The interviews ranged from 20 minutes 
to several hours and took place in several locations that will remain privileged to protect the 
sources.  
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 The comments from the interviewees were not recorded and I put my pen down on more 
than one occasion when it became evident that copious note-taking was perceived as a sign of 
disrespect and that my eye contact and sincere interest were the most valued signs of trust. The 
20 anonymous quotes that are contained in the dissertation were read back to the participants at 
the conclusion of the interview for their approval. Each of these quotes is referenced in the text 
at points where it is pertinent to an understanding of the subject matter. This approach to the 
investigation of post-disaster stress-related disease provided rich insights into the Southern 
Illinois community and I am indebted to each of the participants for sharing their perceptions of 
the 2008 flood disaster and of rural life in Southern Illinois.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
RESULTS OF SPATIAL EQUITY ANALYSIS 
 
 The results of the quantitative analysis of data pertaining to the dissertation research 
questions are provided in this chapter. Descriptive statistics, logit coefficients, odds ratios and 
summary findings are produced for the analysis of explanatory factors related to political 
partisanship/biased vote seeking, overwhelming need, and geographic inequity in a full and 
marginal regression model. Relevant interaction effects are considered in the analysis of 
electoral votes weighted.  Graphic representations of the mean number of visits for each time-
frame in the disaster denied, declared, and control areas are provided in conjunction with 
negative binomial individual level random coefficents for the analysis of explanatory factors 
related to disaster recovery and individual/community health and well-being. 
 
5.1 Results Research Question 1, 2, 3 
5.1.1 All Disaster Declaration Requests 
 The results for the analysis of all disaster declaration requests from 1989-2012 (N=1775) 
pertaining to the research questions associated with political partisanship/biased vote seeking; 
overwhelming need, and geographic inequity, are provided in Tables 16 and 17. Table 16 
provides summary statistics for emergency and major disaster declaration requests and includes 
each of the variables used in the analysis. There were a total of 1,775 total disaster declaration 
requests analyzed during the 1989-2012 time frame. This included 283 (15.9 percent) requests 
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for emergency declarations and 1,492 (84.1 percent) requests for major disaster declarations. The 
incidence of presidential approval for all Emergency and Major disaster declaration requests 
under evaluation from 1989-2012 was 81.8 percent (1451/1775). The presidential approval rate 
was 89 percent (252/283) for Emergency declaration requests and 80.4 percent (1199/1492) for 
Major disaster declaration requests. 
 Multivariate logistic regression was utilized to investigate the statistical effect of the 
aforementioned partisanship, biased vote-seeking and “overwhelming” need characteristics, after 
including the variables in separate models for emergency and major disaster declaration requests. 
The categorical variable for FEMA Regions was not included in the models for emergency 
declarations because of the absence of a single turndown for any request in this category in 
FEMA Regions III, V, VII, and X. This created unreliable statistical estimates in the categorical 
comparison. The Logit models were estimated for the designation of a disaster declaration by the 
president as a function of the explanatory variables previously described. For each logit model, 
the natural logarithm of the odds of acquiring a presidential disaster declaration is assumed to be 
a linear function of the relevant independent variables and the maximum likelihood method was 
used to estimate the model. Model 1 includes all variables with the exclusion of the, previously 
mentioned, FEMA Region variable for the Emergency declaration request analysis.  
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Table 16: Descriptive statistics for variables analyzed: all disaster declaration requests (N 1775) 
 Emergency Disaster Declaration 
Request (N=283) 
Major  Disaster  Declaration 
Request (N=1492) 
Variable: Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
Declaration 0 1 0.89 0.31 0 1 0.80 0.40 
Governor 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 
Senate 0 1 0.34 0.48 0 1 0.34 0.47 
House 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.47 0.50 
Senate FEMA Oversight 0 1 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.65 0.48 
House FEMA Oversight 0 1 0.66 0.48 0 1 0.62 0.49 
Electoral Vote weighted 0.85 52.07 11.14 10.25 0.85 52.34 10.36 10.52 
Reelection Year 0 1 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.17 0.38 
Recent Declaration 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.76 0.43 
State Poverty Rate 6 26 13.07 3.46 6 26 13.51 3.50 
TTR Index 0.67 1.6 1.00 0.18 0.67 1.73 0.97 0.16 
FEMA Region I 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.09 0.29 
FEMA Region II 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.05 0.23 
FEMA Region III 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.09 0.29 
FEMA Region IV 0 1 0.17 0.38 0 1 0.21 0.40 
FEMA Region V 0 1 0.10 0.29 0 1 0.13 0.33 
FEMA Region VI 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.14 0.35 
FEMA Region VII 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.10 0.30 
FEMA Region VIII 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.07 0.25 
FEMA Region IX 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.05 0.23 
FEMA Region X 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1 0.06 0.25 
 
 A simultaneous examination of all explanatory variables in a single model allows for 
consideration of the effects of each variable while controlling for the effects of the remaining 
variables. Model 2 provides for the sequential addition of interaction terms between the electoral 
votes weighted variable and the Governor, Senate, House, and reelection year variables.  
 The logit coefficients and odds ratios from the multivariate logistic regression models are 
presented in Table 17. The log likelihood (chi- square) test indicated overall significance for 
both the emergency disaster declaration request model (p < 0.001) and for the major disaster 
declaration request model (p < 0.001).  
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Table 17: Logit coefficients and odds ratios: multivariate analysis of “all” disaster   
     declaration requests (1989-2012) 
 
 Emergency Disaster 
Declaration Request 
Major Disaster 
Declaration Request 
 Model 1 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds Ratio 
Governor  0.62  1.86  0.06 1.06  0.28*  1.33  0.35  1.43 
Senate  2.05**  7.78  1.20 3.32 -0.27  0.76 -0.24  0.79 
House -0.89*  0.418 -0.61 0.54  0.03  1.03  0.12  1.13 
Senate FEMA Oversight  0.20  1.23  0.25 1.29 -0.05  0.95 -0.07  0.94 
House FEMA Oversight  0.31  1.36  0.32 1.37 -0.29  0.75 -0.29  0.75 
Electoral Vote wtd -0.04  0.97 -0.06  0.944 -0.02*  0.98 -0.01  0.99 
Reelection Year  0.75  2.12 -0.45  0.64  0.30  1.35  0.05  1.05 
Recent Declaration  1.09*  2.96  1.13*  3.10 -0.02  0.98 -0.02  0.98 
State Poverty Rate -0.07  0.94 -0.07  0.93 -0.01  0.99 -0.01  0.99 
TTR Indexed to US  4.84*  126.07  4.56*  95.52 -1.50*  0.22 -1.53  0.22 
  Gov* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.05  1.05 - - -0.01  0.99 
  Sen* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.10  1.10 - -  0.00  1.00 
  House* Elec Vote wtd - - -0.02  0.98 - - -0.01  0.99 
  Reelect* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.16  1.18 - -  0.02  1.02 
FEMA Region I - - - -  0.26  1.30  0.27  1.32 
FEMA Region II - - - -  0.66  1.93  0.65  1.91 
FEMA Region III - - - -  0.52  1.68  0.52  1.68 
FEMA Region IV - - - - -0.21  0.81 -0.22  0.81 
FEMA Region V - - - -  0.09  1.09  0.07  1.07 
FEMA Region VI - - - - -0.37  0.69 -0.36  0.70 
FEMA Region VIII - - - -  0.46  1.59  0.45  1.57 
FEMA Region IX - - - -  0.42  1.53  0.44  1.55 
FEMA Region X - - - -  0.33  1.39  0.32  1.38 
* p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01 
  
About 89 percent of the observed declarations and denials (turndowns) were correctly 
 predicted or classified as declarations or denials (turndowns) by the multivariate logit model for 
emergency requests and 80 percent were correctly classified by the model for major requests. 
Collinearity diagnostics, including variance inflation factor (VIF), tolerance, and condition 
indices, indicated no significant evidence of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables 
in either model. 
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 For Emergency declaration requests in Model 1, the success in acquiring declarations is 
significantly influenced by senate and presidential party similarity, after controlling for the other 
explanatory variables. The odds of acquiring an Emergency declaration increase for each 
emergency request in states where both U.S. senators were from the same party as the president. 
The odds of receiving an Emergency declaration also increase significantly in states that had a 
prior presidential disaster declaration within the past 12 months and in states with higher levels 
of Total Taxable Resources. The odds of receiving an Emergency declaration increase by a 
multiple of approximately 126 for each one unit increase in Total Taxable Resources. States with 
a majority of House representatives who were of the same party as the president have a 
statistically significant decrease in the odds of receiving an Emergency declaration. In Model 2, 
higher state levels of Total Taxable Resources and a presidential disaster declaration within the 
previous 12 months increased the odds of receiving an Emergency declaration in the requesting 
state. The electoral vote weighted interaction effect failed to elicit any statistical significance for 
same party governors, senators, house of representative members, or reelection years. 
 For Major declaration requests in Model 1, a higher amount of Total Taxable Resources 
(TTR) and a larger number of electoral votes weighted were associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in the odds of receiving a Major disaster declaration, after controlling for the 
other explanatory variables. The odds of receiving a disaster declaration decrease by almost 10 
percent for each one unit increase in the electoral votes weighted. Gubernatorial and presidential 
party similarity is another statistically significant factor influencing major disaster declaration 
success. The odds of receiving a disaster declaration increase by almost 33 percent for each 
request in a state with a governor of the same party as the president. In Model 2, the electoral 
vote weighted interaction effect failed to reveal any statistical significance for same party 
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governors, senators, house of representative members, or reelection years. There was no 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between success in acquiring major disaster 
declarations and any of the remaining partisanship, biased vote-seeking, overwhelming need or 
FEMA region comparison predictor variables. 
 
5.1.2 Marginal Disaster Declaration Requests  
 The results for the restricted analysis of “marginal” disaster declaration requests from 
1989-2012, which were limited to declarations resulting in less than $24 million in total FEMA 
awards, are provided in Tables 18 and 19. This analysis also addresses the research questions: 
Political Partisanship/Biased Vote Seeking, Overwhelming Need, and Geographic Inequity 
Table 17 provides summary statistics for emergency and major disaster declaration requests and 
includes each of the variables used in the analysis. There were a total of 1,356 total disaster 
declaration requests in the restricted data set during the 1989-2012 time frame. This included 
253 (18.7 percent) requests for emergency declarations and 1,103 (81.3 percent) requests for 
major disaster declarations. The incidence of presidential approval for all emergency and major 
disaster declaration requests under evaluation from 1989-2012, in the restricted dataset, was 76.1 
percent (1,032/1,356). The presidential approval rate was 87.8 percent (222/253) for emergency 
declaration requests and 73.4 percent (810/1,103) for major disaster declaration requests. 
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Table 18: Descriptive statistics for variables analyzed: marginal model (N 1356) 
 Emergency Disaster Declaration Request 
(N=253) 
Major  Disaster  Declaration 
Request (N=1103) 
Variable: Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
Declaration 0 1 0.88 0.33 0 1 0.73 0.44 
Governor 0 1 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 
Senate 0 1 0.34 0.48 0 1 0.33 0.47 
House 0 1 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.46 0.50 
Senate FEMA Oversight 0 1 0.70 0.46 0 1 0.66 0.47 
House FEMA Oversight 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.60 0.49 
Electoral Vote weighted 0.85 52.07 10.05 9.42 0.85 52.34 9.09 9.34 
Reelection Year 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.17 0.38 
Recent Declaration 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1 0.74 0.44 
State Poverty Rate 6 26 13.03 3.48 6 26 13.37 3.61 
TTR Index 0.67 1.6 0.99 0.18 0.67 1.73 0.96 0.17 
FEMA I 0 1 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.11 0.31 
FEMA II 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.04 0.20 
FEMA III 0 1 0.09 0.28 0 1 0.09 0.29 
FEMA IV 0 1 0.18 0.39 0 1 0.19 0.40 
FEMA V 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.12 0.33 
FEMA VI 0 1 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.15 0.35 
FEMA VII 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.10 0.30 
FEMA VIII 0 1 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.07 0.26 
FEMA IX 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.05 0.21 
FEMA X 0 1 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.07 0.26 
 
 Multivariate logistic regression was utilized to investigate the statistical effect of the 
aforementioned partisanship, biased vote-seeking and “overwhelming” need characteristics, after 
including the variables in separate models for emergency and major disaster declaration requests 
resulting in FEMA awards for less than $24 million. The same criteria were applied for the 
“marginal” model analysis as were utilized in the full analysis of “all disaster declarations.” The 
logit coefficients and odds ratios from the multivariate logistic regression models are presented 
in Table 19. The log likelihood (chi- square) test indicated overall significance for both the 
emergency disaster declaration request model (p < 0.001) and for the major disaster declaration 
request model (p < 0.001). About 90 percent of the observed declarations and denials 
(turndowns) were correctly predicted or classified as declarations or denials (turndowns) by the 
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multivariate logit model for emergency requests and 75 percent were correctly classified by the 
model for major requests. Collinearity diagnostics, including variance inflation factor (VIF), 
tolerance, and condition indices, indicated no significant evidence of multicollinearity between 
the explanatory variables in either model.  
 
Table 19: Logit coefficients & odds ratios: multivariate analysis of “marginal” disaster 
          declaration requests  
 
 Emergency Disaster 
Declaration Request 
Major Disaster 
Declaration Request 
 Model 1 
Model 1 
Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds 
Ratio 
Coef Odds Ratio Coef Odds Ratio 
Governor  0.53  1.69  0.03  1.03  0.34*  1.41  0.36  1.43 
Senate  2.01**  7.49  1.29  3.64 -0.36*  0.70 -0.29  0.75 
House -0.84  0.43 -0.49  0.61 -0.01  0.99  0.09  1.09 
Senate FEMA Oversight  0.07  1.07  0.11  1.11  .03  1.03  0.01  1.01 
House FEMA Oversight  0.26  1.29  0.26  1.30 -0.29  0.75 -0.29  0.75 
Electoral Vote wtd -0.04  0.96 -0.06  0.94 -0.04**  0.96 -0.04  0.96 
Reelection Year  0.89  2.44 -0.44  0.64  0.38  1.46  0.05  1.05 
Recent Declaration  1.20**  3.32  1.26**  3.52 -0.10  0.91 -0.11  0.90 
State Poverty Rate -0.08  0.92 -0.08  0.92 -0.02  0.98 -0.03  0.98 
TTR Indexed to US  4.45*  85.83  4.12  61.50 -1.69**  0.19 -1.74**  0.18 
  Gov* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.17  1.19 - -  0.03  1.03 
  Sen* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.04  1.05 - -  0.00  1.00 
  House* Elec Vote wtd - -  0.09  1.09 - - -0.01  0.99 
  Reelect* Elec Vote wtd - - -0.03  0.97 - - -0.01  0.99 
FEMA Region 1 - - - -  0.43  1.54  0.44  1.56 
FEMA Region 2 - - - -  0.70  2.02  0.68  1.98 
FEMA Region 3 - - - -  0.66  1.93  0.66  1.93 
FEMA Region 4 - - - - -0.12  0.89 -0.12  0.89 
FEMA Region 5 - - - -  0.25  1.28  0.23  1.26 
FEMA Region 6 - - - - -0.13  0.88 -0.11  0.89 
FEMA Region 8 - - - -  0.56  1.74  0.54  1.71 
FEMA Region 9 - - - -  0.50  1.64  0.46  1.58 
FEMA Region 10 - - - -  0.57  1.77  0.55  1.73 
 * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01 
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  For Emergency declaration requests in Model 1, the success in acquiring declarations is 
significantly influenced by senate and presidential party similarity, after controlling for the other 
explanatory variables. The odds of acquiring an Emergency declaration increase for each 
emergency request in states where both U.S. senators were from the same party as the president. 
The odds of receiving an Emergency declaration also increase significantly in states that had a 
prior presidential disaster declaration within the past 12 months and in states with higher levels 
of Total Taxable Resources. The odds of receiving an Emergency declaration increase by a 
multiple of approximately 86 for each one unit increase in Total Taxable Resources. In Model 2, 
a presidential disaster declaration within the previous 12 months increased the odds of receiving 
an Emergency declaration in the requesting state. The electoral vote weighted interaction effect 
failed to elicit any statistical significance for same party governors, senators, house of 
representative members, or reelection years.   
 For major declaration requests in Model 1 of the “marginal” declaration analysis, 
increases in Total Taxable Resources (TTR), increases in a state’s weighted electoral votes, or 
the presence of both U.S senators from the same party as the president in the requesting state 
was associated with a statistically significant decrease in acquiring a Major disaster declaration. 
There was a significant increase in the odds of acquiring a Major declaration in states where the 
governor and president represented the same political party. The odds of receiving a Major 
declaration increased by 41 percent in states where governors were of the same political party as 
the president in the year of the request for a PDD. In Model 2 of the “marginal analysis, the 
decreased odds of receiving a major disaster declaration were statistically significant for states 
with a larger TTR index. There was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
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between success in acquiring major disaster declarations and any of the remaining partisanship, 
biased vote-seeking, overwhelming need or FEMA region comparison variables. 
 
5.2 Results: Research Question 4  
The results of the analysis of the incidence of post-disaster stress-related disease 
incidence pertaining to the research question, Disaster Recovery and Individual/Community 
Health and Well-Being, are provided in Tables 20 and 21. Table 20 provides summary 
statistics for the counts of office/outpatient visits for each grouping category and each time 
frame used in the analysis. This table indicates that the mean number of office/outpatient 
visits for stress-related illness in the respective areas under analysis (Denial, Declared, 
Control) were highest for somatic conditions and lowest for diagnoses associated with 
dementia. The socio-demographic profile of the study area is evidenced by the higher mean 
observations for females, Medicare recipients < 80 years, self-identified White individuals, 
and residents who were not low income dual-eligible for Medicaid. The PDD denied area 
received an average $4.61 per capita in 2008-2009 federal grant dollars compared to $2.80 
for the PDD declared area and $3.01 for the control region. 
Negative binomial regression was utilized to investigate the statistical effect of the 
aforementioned characteristics related to individual/county level demographics and disaster 
declaration request status (denial, declaration, control), after including the variables in separate 
models for emergency for each disease grouping category. Collinearity diagnostics, including 
variance inflation factor (VIF), tolerance, and condition indices, indicated no significant 
evidence of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables in either model. Graphic 
representations of the mean number of visits for each diagnostic grouping and time frame are 
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provided in Figure 4. The mean number of visits per capita for each area (denied, declared, and 
control) and each time frame (0-6 month pre-event, 0-6 month post-event, 6-12 month post-
event, and 12-18 month post-event) are provided for each stress-related diagnostic grouping. The 
overdispersion of zero visit counts is evident in the small values for the means in several of the 
diagnostic categories. This overdispersion is associated with the fact that the majority of 
individuals in the study area did not utilize health services for the stress-related and non-stress- 
related disease diagnoses that were included in the analysis. As previously noted, most disaster 
survivors do not suffer long term health related impacts or require professional consultation. The 
National Comorbidity Survey Replication reports a 6 month prevalence rate of 13.9 percent for 
anxiety disorders in the general elderly population aged 65–74 and 10.4 percent for those aged 
75-85 (Gum, King-Kallimanis, and Kohn 2009). Wang et al. (2005) report a combined 12.5 
percent 12-month prevalence rate for health care provider visits related to DSM IV anxiety and 
depression diagnoses in the general population. The rural Illinois combined study area exhibited 
an 8.3 percent 24-month prevalence rate for all anxiety and depression diagnoses included in the 
study as reported in the CMS data files for individuals who were 65 years of age or older. This 
finding is consistent with the observation of a high count of zero visits in the six month time 
frames under analysis in the dissertation study area and is indicative of the previously recognized 
lower utilization rate for mental health services by the rural elderly (Wang et al. 2005). 
The negative binomial distribution requires a log link function to allow the response 
variables to vary linearly with the predicted values. This approach produces estimates of the 
means and not the probability of the relationship between the predictor and response variables 
and odds ratios are not created. The coefficients and standard error estimates from the 
multivariate regression models are presented in Table 21. The simultaneous examination of all 
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explanatory variables in a single model allows for consideration of the effects of each variable 
while controlling for the effects of the remaining variables.  
 
Table 20:  Descriptive statistics stress-related disease 
 
Denial (N=4715) Declaration (N=4665) Control (N=2620) 
Variable: Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD 
Anxiety/Depression pre 0-6m 0 41 0.14 0.91 0 25 0.16 0.81 0 14 0.16 0.75 
Anxiety/Depression post 0-6m 0 17 0.15 0.74 0 22 0.17 0.79 0 12 0.18 0.76 
Anxiety/Depression post 6-12m 0 18 0.18 0.90 0 33 0.17 0.87 0 11 0.17 0.74 
Anxiety/Depression post 12-18m 0 51 0.20 1.09 0 19 0.20 0.89 0 25 0.24 1.11 
Acute Vascular pre 0-6m 0 32 0.17 1.11 0 36 0.20 1.21 0 34 0.17 1.20 
Acute Vascular post 0-6m 0 55 0.24 1.50 0 41 0.19 1.36 0 20 0.22 1.27 
Acute Vascular post 6-12m 0 28 0.21 1.26 0 16 0.16 0.90 0 17 0.16 0.99 
Acute Vascular post 12-18m 0 24 0.20 1.12 0 19 0.19 1.01 0 16 0.16 0.94 
Dementia pre 0-6m 0 13 0.06 0.52 0 11 0.06 0.49 0 11 0.05 0.42 
Dementia post 0-6m 0 11 0.08 0.59 0 29 0.08 0.72 0 12 0.05 0.45 
Dementia post 6-12m 0 13 0.09 0.61 0 21 0.09 0.61 0 9 0.06 0.47 
Dementia post 12-18m 0 13 0.10 0.66 0 13 0.09 0.60 0 13 0.07 0.55 
Gastrointestinal pre 0-6m 0 12 0.23 0.81 0 14 0.22 0.84 0 9 0.18 0.66 
Gastrointestinal post 0-6m 0 15 0.25 0.84 0 11 0.27 0.93 0 8 0.18 0.72 
Gastrointestinal post 6-12m 0 10 0.24 0.84 0 13 0.24 0.86 0 8 0.21 0.75 
Gastrointestinal post 12-18m 0 15 0.24 0.83 0 17 0.25 0.93 0 7 0.20 0.74 
Somatic pre 0-6m 0 38 0.88 2.44 0 49 1.06 2.67 0 31 0.99 2.66 
Somatic post 0-6m 0 32 1.06 2.65 0 35 1.15 2.82 0 29 1.03 2.46 
Somatic post 6-12m 0 43 1.03 2.70 0 34 1.07 2.62 0 28 0.92 2.49 
Somatic post 12-18m 0 54 1.09 2.90 0 34 1.15 2.63 0 33 1.05 2.73 
Control pre 0-6m 0 9 0.02 0.25 0 8 0.02 0.20 0 6 0.02 0.23 
Control post 0-6m 0 4 0.02 0.18 0 10 0.02 0.22 0 3 0.01 0.15 
Control post 6-12m 0 9 0.02 0.22 0 8 0.02 0.21 0 6 0.02 0.23 
Control post 12-18m 0 11 0.02 0.26 0 6 0.02 0.23 0 7 0.02 0.22 
Gender 1 2 1.60 0.49 1 2 1.60 0.49 1 2 1.59 0.49 
Lack of Access -0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.06 -0.10 0.16 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.18 -0.01 0.07 
Federal Grants per capita 2.24 15.48 4.61 2.24 1.32 5.01 2.80 0.98 1.80 5.09 3.01 1.01 
Extreme Elderly >80 0 1 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.31 0.46 
Social capital -0.46 2.09 0.87 0.56 -1.16 1.96 0.93 0.65 -0.43 1.83 1.06 0.60 
Race 0 1 0.97 0.16 0 1 0.99 0.11 0 1 0.99 0.09 
Low Income 0 1 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.18 0.38 
IA Damages 0.01 60.68 3.39 8.75 0 317 31.43 51.81 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.00 
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The relationship between the observed means for the denied, declared, and control 
categorical variable that are visualized in the graphs (Figure 4) are bivariate representations. The 
beta coefficients in the negative binomial random effects model are calculated based on the 
influence of the explanatory variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Study area graphs: mean number of visits for stress-related illness 
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Table 21: Negative binomial random coefficient model: pre-disaster comparison 2007-2009  
 
 
Anx/Dep 
 
 
Acute Vasc 
 
 
Dementia 
 
G.I. 
 
Somatic 
 
 
Control 
 
Variable Coef S.E Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E Coef S.E. Coef S.E. 
Denied to Control 
Time 1 
-0.01  0.12 -0.12 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.37 
Time 2 0.22* 0.12 -0.02 0.20 0.32* 0.19 -0.15 0.12 0.20*** 0.07 -0.61* 0.35 
Time 3 -0.03 0.12 0.04 0.21 0.28 0.19 -0.06 0.12 0.18** 0.07 0.13 0.35 
Declared to Control  
Time 1 
-0.12 0.12 -0.6*** 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.24* 0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.41 0.38 
Time 2 0.03 0.12 -0.34* 0.20 0.29 0.19 -0.02 0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.13 0.36 
Time 3 -0.13 0.12 -0.10 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.30 0.37 
Declared to Denied  
Time 1 
-0.04 0.10 -0.47*** 0.17 -0.12 0.15 0.11 0.10 -0.13** 0.06 0.30 0.31 
Time 2 -0.19* 0.10 -0.33*** 0.17 -0.04 0.15 0.13 0.10 -0.15** 0.06 0.48 0.31 
Time 3 -0.10 0.10 -0.14 0.17 -0.10 0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.15** 0.06 0.17 0.30 
Gender -0.95*** 0.08 0.46*** 0.90 -0.24 0.16 -0.4*** 0.05 -0.45*** 0.03 0.13 0.11 
Lack of Access -2.07*** 0.62 -0.01 0.73 0.66 1.28 -0.56 0.44 0.09 0.30 -0.17 0.95 
Federal Grants  
per cap 
  0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Extreme Elderly  
>80 
-0.16** 0.07 0.60*** 0.09 -3.09*** 0.17 -0.01 0.06 -0.08* 0.04 0.27** 0.13 
Social capital -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.02 0.10 
Race -1.46*** 0.35 -0.10 0.33 0.42 0.56 0.04 0.20 -0.33** 0.14 -1.56** 0.66 
Low Income -0.70*** 0.19 -0.68*** 0.11 -1.04*** 0.19 -0.35*** 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.13 0.15 
IA Damages   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
*p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
 
The negative binomial random coefficient model revealed a statistically significant 
increase in the count of visits for diagnoses related to anxiety and depression, dementia, and 
somatic disorders and a statistically significant decrease in the visit count for the control group 
of non-stress-related disorders in the disaster request denied area compared to the control area, 
during the 6-12 month post-event time frame. The statistically significant increase persisted for 
somatic disorders in the denied versus control area for the 12-18 month post event time frame. 
The findings associated with the comparison of the disaster request declared to denied group 
revealed a significantly lower count of visits for anxiety and depressive disorders in the declared 
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group during the 6-12 month time frame; for acute vascular disorders in the 0-6 month post 
event and 6-12 month post event time frames; and in the 0-6 month, 6-12 month, and 12-18 
month post event time frames for somatic disorders. The disaster request declared group 
compared to the control group exhibited a significantly lower count of visits for acute vascular 
conditions in the 0-6 post event and 6-12 month post event time frames and a higher visit count 
for gastrointestinal disorders in the 0-6 month post event period. 
The evaluation of gender as a predictor for office/outpatient visits revealed a statistically 
significant lower number of visits for men in the anxiety/depression, gastrointestinal, and 
somatic diagnostic groups and higher visit count in the acute vascular grouping. A higher Z 
score for lack of access, which was equivalent to poorer levels of access to health services, was 
statistically significant for a lower visit count in the anxiety/depression grouping. Individuals 
who were less than 80 years old had a significantly lower count of office/outpatient visits in the 
anxiety/depression, dementia, and somatic diagnostic groupings and a higher visit count for 
acute vascular and control diagnostic groupings in comparison to individuals who were 80 years 
of age or older. Study participants who were self-categorized as non-white exhibited a 
significantly lower count of visits than their white counterparts for anxiety/depression, somatic, 
and control diagnoses. Individuals who were not low income and Medicaid eligible had a 
statistically significant lower count of visits for the anxiety/depression, acute vascular, dementia, 
and gastrointestinal (GI) diagnostic groupings than their low income, Medicaid eligible, 
counterparts. Increased per capita property damages were a significant predictor of a higher visit 
count in the dementia grouping. There was no evidence of a statistically significant relationship 
in any of the other diagnostic groupings or individual/county level demographic comparisons. 
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5.3 Discussion 
The consideration of explanatory variables associated with political partisanship in the 
analysis of all disaster declarations from 1989-2012 provided some evidence of a significant 
relationship between same party status and a state’s success in obtaining a disaster declaration. 
This may be indicative of partisan decision making and biased political motivation by the 
president in the distribution of federal relief under the provisions of the Stafford Act. However, 
there was offsetting evidence of a decreased success rate regarding same party legislators in the 
House of Representatives. This is contrary to any premise of partisan behavior that is consistent 
with public choice, distributive, or legislative models. The restricted “marginal” model provides 
additional conflicting findings with respect to evidence of political partisanship in the 
distribution of presidential disaster declarations. The significant relationship between 
senatorial/presidential party similarity and success in acquiring Emergency declarations and 
between governor/presidential party similarity and success in acquiring Major declarations 
persists, but the relationship between senators and presidents of the same party becomes 
significantly associated with a failure to obtain a Major disaster declaration. These contrasting 
findings with respect to the political partisanship variables suggest a relationship that may not 
have any causal role with respect to presidential decision making. The absence of significant 
statistical associations for the partisan and geographic inequity predictor variables including 
FEMA senate and house oversight committee membership, FEMA regions, and any of the 
interactions between weighted electoral votes and same party status of the president and 
governors, senators, or house members suggests a limited role for partisan bias in presidential 
disaster declaration decision making. There is no statistically significant evidence that the 
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president showed preference to governors, senators, or house members of the same party based 
on weighted electoral votes.  
It is important to acknowledge the ecological fallacy associated with the limited findings 
of success in acquiring a PDD and same party status between the aforementioned elected 
officials. Every president who held office during the study period (1989-2012) issued disaster 
request denials to states where governors, both senators, and/or the majority of house members 
were from the same political party as the president. Statistical significance must be differentiated 
from statistical unanimity and any conclusion of partisanship based on same party status is 
muted by the empirical observations of denials for disaster requests in same party states in every 
year of the analysis. It is also worth noting that in an era of exposes, when former government 
employees and employees of government contractors are revealing a plethora of previously 
privileged information relating to the inner workings of the federal government, there is no 
evidence of documented political partisanship, biased-vote seeking, or geographic inequity by 
any former FEMA or DHS operative with respect to presidential disaster declaration decision 
making. Former FEMA director, Michael Brown (2011), whose name has been indelibly 
imprinted in our minds as a symbol of the flawed federal response to Hurricane Katrina, 
published an insightful self-explanatory of the event titled Deadly Indifference-The Perfect 
(Political) Storm-Hurricane Katrina, The Bush White House, and Beyond. Brown makes no 
attempt to hide his contempt for people at the highest levels of the federal government and 
dedicates a chapter of his book to “Disaster Politics”. However, there is not a single reference in 
the book to any recollection of privilege or political impropriety in the distribution of disaster 
declarations from a man who served as the final conduit for disaster declaration 
recommendations to the president from 2003-2005. 
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 Contrary to the findings of prior research, the consideration of predictor variables 
associated with biased vote-seeking failed to reveal significant evidence that Emergency or 
Major disaster declarations are more likely to be issued during presidential reelection years in 
the analysis of all disaster declaration requests as well as in the analysis of “marginal” requests.   
Although emergency declarations may represent a potentially marginal type of presidential 
declaration based on comparative total federal fiscal obligation and it has been noted that 
emergency declarations offer governors a more “flexible path for securing federal help” (Sylves 
2008, 96), there is no evidence of preferential designation of emergency declarations during 
reelection years in the post-Stafford Act time frame (1989-2012) for the analysis of all disaster 
declarations or in the analysis of “marginal” declarations. The absence of a significant 
relationship between electoral votes weighted in Emergency declarations and the statistically 
significant decrease in the success rate for acquiring a Major disaster declaration in states with a 
higher level of electoral votes weighted is contrary to the prior published conclusions of biased 
vote-seeking behavior in this aspect of presidential disaster declaration decision making. 
 Regarding “overwhelming need” variables, the Stafford Act makes specific provisions 
for presidential discretion in the consideration of requests from areas that have been impacted by 
recent disasters. The increase in emergency declarations in areas that have had prior declarations 
within the past 12 months supports the consideration of this extenuating circumstance by FEMA 
and/or the president in the decision making process in both the marginal analysis and the 
analysis of al declaration requests. The state poverty level was not significantly associated with 
presidential disaster declaration success for emergency or major disaster declaration requests in 
any model. The evidence of a negative relationship between Total Taxable Resources (TTR) and 
the success rate in acquiring Major declarations in the full and marginal analysis provides 
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evidence that the previously noted recommendations of the GAO are empirically evident in the 
review of major disaster requests from 1989-2012. The distribution of a higher percentage of 
declarations to states with a lower level of TTR may be indicative of a needs-based application 
of discretionary decision making by the president. However, with regard to Emergency 
declarations, states with higher levels of TTR are significantly more likely to achieve success. 
This is a contrary indicator that may be associated with the specific provisions of the Stafford 
Act that have provided categorical Emergency declarations for record snowfall events in states 
such as New York and Massachusetts that, coincidentally, have relatively higher levels of per 
capita Total Taxable Resources.  
The concept of coincidental declarations requires further discussion. Geographic location 
is an important consideration in the debate pertaining to political impropriety in the presidential 
decision making process. However, some states are simply more prone to disaster events than 
others. It is a consequence of physical location and it occurs independent of the state’s status 
with respect to electoral votes or elected officials. Coastal states are more prone to hurricanes 
than inland states. Many states in the Mississippi River basin are subject to a higher incidence of 
tornadoes and flooding.  Florida has a recent history of closely contested presidential elections, 
but the severe losses from the 2004 hurricane season led to multiple disaster declarations that 
were not a result of President Bush’s quest for reelection or the calculated machinations of 
patronage in a “battleground” state. The use of a marginal declaration model in this dissertation 
has provided a method for filtering the large scale events that occur based on geographic 
predisposition and offers a perspective on the smaller events that have been the focus of 
speculation related to political partisanship and biased vote-seeking by the president. 
201 
 
The consideration of explanatory variables associated with disaster recovery and 
individual/community health and well-being provide unique insights into the progression of 
stress-related disease in the disaster declared and denied areas of Illinois after the 2008 storm 
and flood events. The statistically significant comparative increase in the incidence of 
office/outpatient visits for anxiety/depression, dementia, and somatic complaints in the denied 
area reveals a progression of stress-related disease at a point in time (6-12 months post-event) 
that is consistent with the “disillusionment” phase of disaster recovery (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2000) 
(See Figure 5). Community cohesion and the altruistic efforts of others may mitigate the onset of 
stress- related disorders during the early weeks or months after a disaster, but as individuals 
begin to fully assess the loss of resources that has occurred as a result of the disaster, 
psychological and physiological symptoms may become more prominent. This delayed onset of 
stress-related symptomatology has been noted in prior studies (Phifer, Kaniasty and Norris 1988; 
Phifer and Norris 1989; Tang 2007).  
 
 
Figure 5: Phases of disaster recovery (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000) 
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The statistically significant decrease in visits for the non-stress-related disorder control 
group in the denied area versus the control area of counties that did not experience a 2008 
disaster is an important consideration. This finding indicates that the individuals who resided in 
the denied counties were not seeking medical services for this representative group of non-stress-
conditions at a higher level than their counterparts in control counties. A potential causal link for 
the observed increase in stress-related visits in the disaster declaration denied area is supported 
by this contrasting finding. It is statistically evident that the increase in stress-related visits was 
not attributable to any general trend in the disaster denied area to seek medical services at an 
increased rate compared to the control or denied areas. The statistically significant increase in 
visits for somatic conditions persist in the denied to control 12-18 month post event time frame 
and a significant decrease in visits for somatic conditions exists in all post-event time frames for 
the comparison of the disaster declared to disaster denied areas. This statistically significant 
decrease is evident for acute vascular condition visits in both the declared to denied areas and the 
declared to control areas for the 0-6 month and 6-12 month post-event time frames. There were 
no stress-related disease categories or time frames in which the control or declared areas had a 
statistically significant higher count of visits than the disaster declaration denied area of 
Southern Illinois. The only stress-related disease category and time frame in which the disaster 
declared area had a significantly higher visit count than the control area was from 0-6 months 
post-event for gastrointestinal disorders. The abundant evidence of statistically significant higher 
counts of visits for stress-related disorders in multiple categories in the denied area compared to 
the control and declared areas is supported by the noted decrease in non-stress-related visits and 
the onset of the increase in stress- related visits in a time frame that is consistent with the 
“disillusionment” phase of recovery.  
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Prior research has acknowledged the potential for prior experience to mitigate the 
adverse psychological effects of disasters (Norris and Murrell 2008). This concept of 
“inoculation” serving as an adaptation mechanism provides valuable insight into human 
capacities to manage stressful experiences. All counties in the study area had received a 
presidential flood declaration at least once since 1981, but no county had been issued a 
gubernatorial or presidential disaster declaration for Individual Assistance at any point within the 
prior 46 months. The disaster declared and denied counties were each well-versed in flood 
events ranging from the 1000 year Ohio River flood of 1937 to the 1993 Mississippi River 
floods. The common exposure to prior disasters in all study area counties provided a means of 
controlling for the “inoculation” effect in the sampled population. 
Individual level socio-demographic characteristics were considered for each stress-
related grouping and combined to produce a cumulative assessment of all time frames in the 
analysis. There was a statistically significant lower count of visits for men than women for 
anxiety/depression, gastrointestinal, and somatic disorders. This is not necessarily indicative of a 
gender based lower level of stress-related illness in elderly men. Prior studies have revealed that 
men are less likely than women to seek help for a variety of medical conditions and the social 
stigma related to mental health services in rural areas has been observed as an area of particular 
concern for men who historically place high value on “self-reliance and rugged individualism” 
(Hoyt,  et al. 1997, 466). The higher incidence of acute cardiovascular disorders in men versus 
women may be consistent with the acuity of ischemic conditions and the resultant prioritized 
help-seeking and the observed higher incidence of angina in males (Go, et al. 2013).  
The lack of access to health services was statistically significant for a lower count of 
visits for anxiety/depression and this may be indicative of the reluctance to acknowledge a need 
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for professional intervention for these psychological disorders combined with the previously 
noted rural stigma associated with mental illness (Fox, Blank, Berman et al. 1999; Letvak 2001). 
Federal grant dollars and social capital were not associated with any statistically significant 
difference in visits for any grouping. The extreme elderly (> 80 years) in the study had a 
statistically significant higher count of visits for anxiety/depression, dementia, and somatic 
illnesses and a lower count for the control category. The findings in the dementia and somatic 
categories are consistent with age related prevalence of related conditions. The higher incidence 
of visits for anxiety/depression in the extreme elderly in this study is supported by prior research 
noting an increased alteration in normal routine, a higher level of personal resource loss, and a 
greater tendency to live in damaged dwellings in the elderly age group after disasters (Kilijanek 
and Drabek 1979; Phifer and Norris 1989).  
Non-white racial individual self-identification was associated with a significantly lower 
count of visits for anxiety/depression, somatic, and control grouping disorders. Individuals who 
were not dual eligible for Medicaid, based on low income status, exhibited a statistically 
significant lower count of visits in the anxiety depression, acute vascular, dementia, and 
gastrointestinal groupings. A lower utilization rate for medical services by non-white individuals 
has been previously documented in the peer-reviewed literature (Gornick et al. 1996; Kaiser 
Family Foundation 1999). Cultural preferences and precedents, and a lack of providers who are 
familiar with the needs and personal characteristics of the non-white community, contribute to 
this lower utilization rate (Wang 2005; Salkowe 2010). Lower income status has been associated 
with less access to health services due to a lack of adequate health insurance, but the sample 
population was dual eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare office/outpatient services. Given 
the availability of insured medical services, the higher count of visits for individuals based on 
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socio-demographic characteristics associated with gender, income, and age supports the findings 
of prior researchers regarding the long term consequences of poverty and sociocultural 
marginalization on psychological and physiological well-being (Barr 2008; Shonkoff, Boyce and 
McEwen 2009; McEwen and Gianaros 2011). 
 
5.4 Summary 
 The findings of this chapter provide contrasting evidence of a statistically significant 
relationship between predictor variables related to partisanship, biased vote seeking, and 
overwhelming need in the full and marginal analyses of disaster declarations. There is no 
evidence of any significant relationship between house/president same party status, FEMA house 
or senate oversight committees, FEMA regions, reelection year, electoral votes weighted, or any 
of the interaction terms and increased success in acquiring a disaster declaration.   Several stress-
related disease categories are associated with an increased count of office/outpatient visits for the 
disaster request denied category compared to the declared or control categories. Individual level 
socio-demographic variables such as gender, income, and age are significantly associated with a 
higher incidence of visits for stress-related disease. These findings provide sufficient evidence to 
support the reconsideration of prior research findings related to political impropriety in the 
distribution of disaster declarations and emphasize a focus on the reformulation of federal 
disaster policy to provide a more equitable consideration of high stress-related disease risk 
populations in rural areas of the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 An Assessment of the Research Findings 
 This dissertation has expanded upon the body of research pertaining to political influence 
and presidential disaster declarations by the independent and comparative assessment of spatial 
equity in the implementation of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-707) and by the consideration of a wide variety of explanatory 
factors that are indicative of political partisanship, biased vote-seeking, overwhelming need, 
geographic preference, and disaster recovery. A case study of counties in Illinois that were 
affected by storm and flood events in 2008 was performed to assess health-related disaster 
recovery in areas that had received differential access to the federal resources that are available 
under the provisions of the Stafford Act. The following hypotheses were considered in the 
dissertation:  
1. Presidential Stafford Act disaster declarations and denials in the U.S. are not influenced 
by political partisanship or biased vote seeking behavior  
2. Presidential Stafford Act disaster declarations and denials in the U.S. are influenced by 
the "overwhelming" need of a state/county. 
3. There is no evidence of geographic inequities in the distribution of presidential disaster 
declarations and denials under the provisions of the Stafford Act in the U.S. Geographic 
disparities in the distribution of presidential disaster declarations and denials under the 
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provisions of the Stafford Act are based on the differential prevalence of natural hazards 
in certain regions of the U.S.  
4. The recovery from similar types and scales of disaster events is the same in presidential 
declared and presidential denied counties of Illinois in 2008 under the provisions of the 
Stafford Act. 
 
  Prior published research has indicated the need for incorporating several of the variables 
employed in this analysis to address an important gap in the literature pertaining to presidential 
disaster declaration decision making. Some of the findings differ substantially from the 
conclusions of related previous studies. The complexities of intergovernmental relations between 
state and federal legislative and executive branches and bureaucracies is associated with an 
environment that produced statistical evidence of some degree of partisanship and biased vote-
seeking in this analysis. However, these findings are limited to the statistically significant 
relationships between governor/ presidential party similarity and Major disaster declaration 
success and the conflicting findings associated with U.S. senate/presidential party similarity and 
Emergency and Major disaster declaration success rates. Conflicting findings were also present 
in the house/presidential party similarity and U.S. senate/presidential party similarity variables 
for Emergency declarations. The evidence of a significant relationship between states with a 
lower Total Taxable Resource index and success in acquiring Major disaster declarations and 
states with recent multiple disasters and success in acquiring Emergency disaster declarations 
support the concept of presidential discretionary disaster declaration decision making that is 
attentive to need and public interest.  
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 The post-Stafford Act time frame has been associated with a marked increase in the 
incidence and frequency of disaster declarations in the U.S. Multivariate logistic regression 
analysis of every gubernatorial request for a presidential disaster declaration and of gubernatorial 
requests for “marginal” events from 1989-2012 failed to reveal any evidence of a statistically 
significant association between an increased likelihood of success in acquiring presidential 
disaster declarations and U.S. House of Representatives/presidential party similarity, Senate 
FEMA oversight committee membership, House FEMA oversight committee membership, 
FEMA region location, reelection year, or weighted electoral votes.  In fact, an increase in 
weighted electoral votes was significantly associated with less success in acquiring a Major 
disaster declaration in the full and marginal analysis of disaster declarations. This observation is 
antithetical to the claims of prior researchers pertaining to the political motivations of the 
president in the disaster declaration decision making process. There is insufficient evidence to 
support broad claims of spatial inequity in the distribution of federal disaster declarations based 
on political patronage or preference. The research hypotheses pertaining to partisanship, biased-
vote seeking, overwhelming need, and geographic inequity are supported by the findings of this 
research. 
 Partisanship and biased vote-seeking behavior are inherent aspects of our political system 
with a longstanding history that has often raised concerns regarding effective governance 
(Apperson 2006). The risks and rewards associated with incentive based partisan behavior have 
been noted in prior studies (Kingdon 2003, Muirhead 2003). Excessive allegiance to members of 
similar parties creates the danger of inequitable distribution of public services and a biased 
enactment and implementation of legislation. Indiscriminate and biased vote-seeking behavior 
creates similar vulnerabilities and engenders a concept of a government that is subservient to a 
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public choice model that places personal gain over public good. The consideration of 
partisanship and biased vote-seeking as being forces of primacy in time of disaster provides a 
particularly egregious scenario. It is evident that both rational choice and reasonable decision 
making are utilized in the recommendations of the president. Presidential disaster declaration 
decision making does not appear to be primarily motivated by the political influences associated 
with public choice, distributive, or legislative theory in this analysis based on the absence of 
significant positive findings for the majority of predictor variables, including several variables 
that were determined to be indicators of political influence in prior studies such as reelection and 
weighted electoral votes.  
 The increase in the incidence of presidential disaster declarations and disaster relief 
funding since the onset of the Stafford Act is associated with changes in intergovernmental 
relations and policy implementation that are independent of political partisanship and biased 
vote-seeking. Rubin (2007) and Birkland (1996) have acknowledged the role of media coverage 
and large scale disasters as focusing events that may have influenced the declaration process 
after the initiation of the Stafford Act. The devolution of federal oversight and funding for a vast 
array of state initiatives and the discontinuation of federal general revenue sharing grants during 
the 1980s may have encouraged a subsequent increase in gubernatorial disaster declaration 
requests due to diminished state resources. State and federal fiscal constraints combined with the 
established trend of continued increases in federal fiscal support during and after disaster events 
will necessitate changes in the Stafford Act and in the methods utilized to determine eligibility 
for federal assistance. It is essential that legislators and bureaucrats are informed regarding all of 
the variables that appear to influence the decision making process. Effective action is contingent 
on establishing a disaster policy agenda that is attentive to the causal aspects of any apparent 
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disparity in the distribution of federal disaster relief. Based on the findings of this study, it is 
advisable that we reassess the research emphasis on broad claims of political partisanship and 
biased vote-seeking in presidential disaster declaration decision making and focus on the post 
event evaluation of community recovery in disaster declared areas. This will provide an 
evidence-based approach to analyzing the effectiveness of the Stafford Act and allow for policy 
revisions to be applied that will provide for the effective and efficient use of federal dollars for 
disaster stricken regions of the U.S.  
 In that regard, the 2008 Illinois case study was undertaken to obtain new insights on 
disaster recovery in communities that received differential access to federal resources under the 
provisions of the Stafford Act. The case study revealed a statistically significant higher incidence 
of stress- related office/outpatient visits for individuals based on the demographic characteristics 
of gender, income, and age. This provides stark evidence of the disproportionate burden of 
disease in subsets of the elderly population in the study area. The previously established 
correlates between poor health outcomes and low socioeconomic status are exemplified in this 
analysis.  
 The increased prevalence of stress- related disease visits in the disaster declaration 
request denied area of Southern Illinois compared to the control area and/or the declared area is a 
critical indicator that demands further analysis of the Stafford Act disaster declaration 
determination criteria. The Stafford Act provides for the consideration of special populations 
such as the elderly and the impoverished in the determination of need for an Individual 
Assistance declaration. However, the metric for determining an eligibility threshold for a disaster 
declaration based on “special population” status is not available. Southern Illinois has been 
designated as part of the Mississippi River Delta region, an area that has “the highest 
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concentration of disadvantaged populations in the country and faces profound concerns related 
to health, out-migration, and persistent poverty” (Delta Regional Authority 2013). It is difficult 
to define a more “special population” in a time of disaster when comparatively meager resources 
are further compromised and Individual Assistance is denied.  
 Small Business Administration loans have limited value to individuals in Southern 
Illinois who were literally and figuratively under water with respect to structural damages and 
mortgage obligations after the 2008 flood event. SBA loans require a verification of credit 
worthiness, which may be limited in low income areas, and without flood insurance or equity in 
a home, the additional burden of a loan may be untenable. An unrepaired flood-damaged vehicle 
may compromise the capacity for a sole-wage earner to work or for an elderly person living 
alone to attend to the daily routine that is essential to their sense of well-being. Supplemental 
grants from the federal government provided some respite to the disaster request denied 
communities, months to years after the disaster, but the restoration of material and emotional 
resources that is available through Individual Assistance grants for repairs of damaged property 
and immediate crisis counseling was denied.    
 The fact that the denial was issued to those communities and individuals who were at the 
greatest risk of suffering from the burden of stress-related diseases that may surface in the wake 
of disasters was not factored into the decision-making process. The empirical evidence from this 
analysis is a harsh testament to the potential consequences of the denial of the gubernatorial 
request for an Individual Assistance disaster declaration. The disproportionate progression of 
stress-related illness in Southern Illinois may have occurred regardless of the disaster, but the 
empirical evidence suggests a need to address what is an obvious spatial inequity, regardless of 
the causal origin. The increased prevalence of disease was concurrent with the disillusionment 
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phase of disaster recovery and the denial of a request for federal assistance under the provisions 
of the Stafford Act may have been the tipping point for those individuals who were already 
psychologically and physiologically compromised by a long-standing socioeconomic burden. 
Disaster recovery did not proceed in an equitable manner in the denied area of Southern Illinois. 
 The denial in this region after the 2008 disaster was based on a low “concentration of 
damages” (Illinois Emergency Management Agency Official 2012). However, rural areas are 
inherently prone to a lower concentration of damages based on population density and agrarian 
land use patterns. Illinois Governor Pat Quinn addressed the procedural inequity associated with 
concentration of damages in stating, “The federal law that FEMA follows is fundamentally 
unfair and needs reform…rural areas can get ignored” (Berg 2014). Charity was available after 
the 2008 event in Southern Illinois, but the reluctance to accept it was noted by several members 
of the emergency response community (anonymous personal communication 2011, 2012). 
Preliminary Damage Assessments from Southern Illinois would not have referenced an 
overwhelming need for federal support in an area where self-reliance and privacy are highly 
valued, but the consequences are empirically evident in the disproportionate disease burden of 
the disaster request denied region. Survivors of disasters may initially deny assistance but their 
needs may change over time (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004).The process 
of providing federal assistance to individuals who are culturally acclimated to an independent 
lifestyle and who may have a distrust of government intervention based on generations of real 
and perceived inequities is challenging. However, the denial of a request for federal assistance 
after the 2008 storm and flood event did not improve the undercurrent of social anomie (Barr 
2008)  that exists in portions of Southern Illinois.  
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 This dissertation has attempted to adhere to Robert Sack’s (1997, 248) challenge to 
“pursue investigations that increase our moral awareness of the differences that exist between 
and within our socially created spaces.” The findings of stress-related disease prevalence in the 
elderly population of Southern Illinois serve not only as an insidious indicator of the inequitable 
distribution of federal disaster assistance, but as a reminder of our obligations as social scientists 
to share our knowledge in a manner that will influence disaster policy (Knowles 2012). The 
eligibility criteria for Individual Assistance require reconsideration so that the unique needs of 
rural communities are factored into the determination process. Illinois Senator Dick Durbin has 
recently sponsored the Fairness in Federal Disaster Declarations Act of 2014. This proposed 
legislation, in conjunction with the recently enacted Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 
(P.L. 113-2), is designed to allow additional consideration for rural communities that have been 
affected by disasters. The findings of this dissertation will be provided to Senator Durbin and to 
FEMA for consideration in the policy making process. The observations will also be 
disseminated at academic and public policy meetings to researchers, planners, emergency 
management officials, health care affiliates, and other stakeholders who serve as stewards of 
community well-being during and after disaster events. In this regard, the research will assist in 
placing a focus on Stafford Act policy reformulation that is attentive to the risks and potential 
inequities that exist in the implementation of this critical disaster legislation with respect to 
disaster recovery. 
  
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
 This dissertation has systematically investigated perceived inequities in the 
implementation and effectiveness of federal disaster policy in the U.S. under the provisions of 
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the Stafford Act and the consequences of those inequities with respect to health-related recovery 
in communities that had differential access to the array of federal resources that are available 
after a disaster. The consideration of explanatory variables that have not been utilized in prior 
studies and the modeling of “marginal” events have provided further clarity with respect to the 
question of inequity in the distribution of presidential disaster declarations. However, the details 
of presidential disaster declaration decision making are protected by executive privilege. This 
requires careful consideration of the factors that contribute to the declaration or denial of a 
request from the president. It is possible that some aspect of the determination process has not 
been fully considered in this analysis. Additionally, the limitations in access to FEMA identifiers 
for Public Assistance declarations and Individual Assistance declarations, prior to 1996, 
necessitated combining these categories in the analysis. The research observations would be 
refined if this information were available.  
 The longitudinal analysis of stress-related disease prevalence in the 2008 Illinois case 
study benefitted from a large patient sample utilizing multiple controls and the refinements of 
random coefficient modeling. However, the etiology of stress-related psychological disorders 
and their comorbid physiological maladies are varied and often not fully understood by either the 
patient or the practitioner. There is no mechanism in this study to control for the individual 
characterizations of illness by patients or the diagnostic coding practices of health care 
providers. It is assumed that consistencies exist across the time frames, areas under analysis, and 
standards of the service providers, but it is important to note the subjectivity associated with the 
utilization of ICD 9 CM codes for illnesses that are often not defined by an x-ray, laboratory test, 
or objective parameter. Correlation is not causality. The statistically significant increase in 
stress-related disease in the disaster denied area may have no causal link with the failure to 
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receive Stafford Act Individual Assistance benefits and, without obtaining the perspectives of the 
afflicted individuals, this conclusion will remain limited. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) protects the privacy rights of patients and the encrypted 
identifiers in this study, while allowing for individual level longitudinal analysis, prevent the 
pursuit of qualitative substantiation of the statistical observations.  
  
6.3 Significance of the Investigation 
 The contributions of prior research pertaining to political improprieties in the 
implementation of the Stafford Act have provided insight into potential causes of inequities in 
the response to and recovery from disasters. However, this dissertation has reframed the 
investigation by the inclusion of previously unconsidered explanatory variables, including 
updated itemized FEMA expenditure data, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act 
request, and encrypted individual level data obtained through a CMS peer review process. The 
resultant analysis considered the political, economic, geographic, and health related aspects of 
disaster declaration decision-making and in so doing, provided findings that redirect our 
attention away from claims of political bias and towards the particular needs of disadvantaged 
“special populations.”  This study has provided substantive evidence that there are portions of 
the elderly demographic, residing within rural America,  who are not benefitting equitably  from 
the consideration of need by the federal government with respect to the implementation of the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. This is not an 
inequity grounded in the ill-found motives of miscreant politicians. Nonetheless, it is, both, an 
inequity and an abrogation of the “social contract” which defines “the duties of care that public 
officials owe to the people of a democratic society” (Ignatieff  2005). The Conservation of 
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Resources theory informs us that individuals maximize the obtainment, retainment, and 
protection of those things that they value in order to avoid psychological stress and establish a 
sense of well-being. (Hobfoll 1988; Hobfoll, 2001, 341). However, those same individuals, when 
chronically and generationally culturally alienated and disenfranchised by poverty, infirmity, 
lower education levels, and lack of social support, may be the least able to obtain, retain, and 
protect the material and emotional resources that are essential to our sense of well-being 
(Klinenberg 2002, 47; Barr 2008). The assets of power, prestige, hope, and privilege may be 
foreign to those who are burdened by the inordinate sense of despair that develops from a 
dependency on simply maintaining the object resources of a meager existence.  These are the 
“hand-to-mouth” Americans. Their salvation is not readily found and it does not lie in charity.  
However, there are grassroots and federal government initiatives that recognize the potential of 
community action to foster a sense of self-efficacy amongst the rural elderly. This is engendered 
by empowering trusted partners and members of the local community to work together and serve 
as paraprofessional and non-professional health care workers, Red Hat Society members, 
nutrition advisors, agricultural educators, government liaisons, crisis counselors, and emergency 
response volunteers. This is a bottom-up approach that incorporates a culturally sensitive 
interaction between locals and “outsiders” and it may represent our best opportunity to address 
the social roots of inequality amongst the elderly in rural America and foster the creation of a 
voice of power amongst the disadvantaged people of areas such as Southern Illinois. This will 
enable communities to better prepare for and respond to disasters, to access the post-disaster 
resources that are available from the federal government, and to establish a better understanding 
of the mechanisms that are available to assist in the long-term recovery from these events. 
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 The investigation was undertaken with a reverence for the unity of knowledge that 
embodies a geographic approach to disaster research. Andrew Sayer (1982, 69) informs us that, 
“we need to … avoid dividing the indivisible in our research”. Marx (1857) warns us of the risks 
of incomplete and inappropriate methodological analysis that leads to an endpoint of ―chaotic 
conceptions. The difference between an endpoint of innocent and misleading correlations and an 
endpoint that yields a degree of realism by means of causal inference lies in a disciplined and 
rigorous application of appropriate methodologies and in an interpretation of those findings that 
is grounded in sound theory and a firm understanding of the subject matter under investigation. 
It has been the intent of this dissertation to heed the warnings of Sayer and Marx, and, in so 
doing, contribute to some degree of consilience in the complex analysis of spatial equity in the 
implementation of the Stafford Act and the political ecology of post-disaster stress-related 
disease. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 2008 Illinois Disaster Declaration Request Correspondence 
Appendix 1.1 Southern Illinois Gubernatorial Request April 8, 2008 
 
April 8, 2008 
 
 
The Honorable George W. Bush 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 
 
Through: 
 
Edward Buikema 
Regional Administrator 
FEMA Region V 
536 South Clark, 6th Floor 
Chicago, IL  60605 
 
Dear Mr. President: 
 
Under the provisions of Section 401 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (Stafford Act), and implemented by 44 CFR 
§ 206.36, I request that you declare a major disaster for the State of Illinois as a result of severe 
storms that produced extremely heavy rain causing flooding in Southern Illinois beginning on 
March 17, 2008, and continuing. The most severe impact as a result of the storms and heavy rain 
is damage to residences and businesses in 15 counties. The impact to public infrastructure is 
significant, but cannot be fully assessed at this time due to standing water making areas 
inaccessible. Residences, businesses, roads, bridges, water control facilities and other public 
infrastructure have been damaged and/or destroyed. This flood is the fourth flood event in the past 
twelve months in Illinois that is of the magnitude to warrant Federal disaster assistance. 
In response to the situation, and in accordance with Section 401 of the Stafford Act, I have 
taken appropriate action under State law and directed the execution of the Illinois Emergency 
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Operations Plan by proclaiming that a disaster exists in the State of Illinois on March 20, 2008. I 
specifically declared the following 19 counties as State disaster areas: Alexander, Fayette, 
Franklin, Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Marion, Massac, Perry,  Pope, 
Pulaski, Randolph, Saline, Union, White and Williamson. My proclamation  of a State disaster 
aids the Illinois Emergency Management  Agency (IEMA) in coordinating the State agency 
response to assist and support the local governments in the disaster area. The proclamation of 
disaster also authorizes the reassessment of real property damaged by the disaster and enables 
a request for Federal disaster assistance if it is determined necessary to effectively recover 
from the disaster. 
The State of Illinois has developed a hazard mitigation plan that was approved by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in November of 2004. That plan has been 
updated and continues to be approved by FEMA. The State of Illinois continues to work with 
local governments in the affected area to promote participation in flood mitigation programs. 
As the floodwaters receded, local emergency managers and county highway engineers 
provided IEMA with damage estimates. Based on the damage estimates, IEMA requested a 
Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) to determine the extent of damage to residences and 
businesses on March 31, 2008. This joint Federal, State and local assessment began on April 2 
and continued through April 5. Attachment # 1 documents the number of residences impacted 
and the level of damage observed by the PDA teams. 
 
The damage to public property cannot be fully assessed until the floodwaters have 
receded and the local public works and county highway departments can conduct an initial 
assessment. IEMA staff is advising the local officials on the process for assessing flood 
damaged publicly owned property and costs incurred for  emergency response and debris 
removal. A PDA to assess public damage may be requested within the next two weeks. 
 
I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that effective 
response and recovery is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local 
governments and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary. I am specifically 
requesting Individual Assistance to include the Individuals & Households Program and Small 
Business Administration disaster loans for the following 15 counties: Alexander, Franklin, 
Gallatin, Jackson, Jefferson, Johnson, Marion, Massac, Perry, Pulaski, Randolph, Saline, 
Union, White and Williamson. I am also requesting Hazard Mitigation Assistance for all 
counties statewide. I reserve the right to request additional counties if residential and/or 
business damage is identified in counties not included in this request and if a PDA indicates 
the need for Federal assistance. I also reserve the right to request additional programs such as 
Public Assistance (PA) if it is determined necessary after completing additional damage 
assessments. Pending further assessments, Disaster Unemployment Assistance and Crisis 
Counseling may be identified as necessary. 
 
Preliminary estimates of the types and amount of assistance needed under the Stafford 
Act are provided in Attachment # 2. Estimated requirements for assistance from certain 
Federal agencies under other statutory authorities are included as Attachment # 3. 
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IEMA opened the State of Illinois Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) to 
coordinate the response of State agencies to assist local governments in the response and 
recovery effort. Following is a brief description of the nature and type of assistance provided: 
* Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) - Provided staff to coordinate 
activities at a Unified Area Command (UAC) established in the disaster area. All State 
emergency response field activity was coordinated from the UAC. IEMA Regional 
Office personnel worked directly with local emergency managers in the flooded 
counties. 
IEMA also provided communication equipment to enhance communication within the 
disaster area and with the SEOC. 
* Illinois State Police (ISP) - Mobilized additional officers to provide law 
enforcement support throughout the affected area. Tactical officers were staged in the 
area with boats and equipment to assist in rescue operations. 
* Illinois Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) - Deployed ten Conservation 
Police Officers with five jon boats to assist in evacuations in Alexander, Pulaski and 
Saline counties. IDNR professional engineers conducted an assessment of the levee 
systems. 
* Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) - Transported sandbags, pumps and 
other equipment to the disaster area. 
 
* Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) - Provided inmates from 
correctional facilities to fill sandbags. 
* Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) - Provided bottled water and portable 
toilets. IDPH staff monitored the long-term care facilities affected by flooding to 
ensure the safety of the residents. Coordination with water departments continues to 
ensure public awareness of water quality issues. 
* Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) - Assessed the impact of the 
flood on water and wastewater treatment plants. IEPA emergency personnel responded 
to a flood- related train derailment in Johnson County to assess the potential 
environmental impact. 
* Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS) - Opened a shelter at the Choate 
Mental Health Center in Anna to care for people displaced by the flood. 
 
* American Red Cross (ARC) - Partnered with the State to open nine shelters to 
provide mass care, food and shelter. 
 
State assistance to help the people and the local governments impacted by this disaster 
continues in the impacted counties. Currently, the focus is on removing debris from the 
flooded areas. As the recovery effort continues, State agency assistance will be coordinated by 
IEMA through the SEOC. 
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I certify that for this major disaster, the State and local governments will assume all 
applicable non-Federal shares of the costs required by the Stafford Act. Total State and local 
expenditures are currently expected to exceed $62,077 for the Other Needs Assistance grants 
in accordance with the estimates of needed Federal assistance. This estimate, shown on 
Attachment #4, will greatly increase once the assessment of public damage and costs incurred 
by the State and local governments has been completed. 
 
I anticipate the need for debris removal, which poses an immediate threat to lives, 
public health, and safety and therefore: 
 
Pursuant to Sections 403 and 407 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170b & 5173, the 
State agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the United States of America for any 
claims arising from the removal of debris or wreckage for this disaster. The State agrees 
that debris removal from public and private property will not occur until the landowner 
signs an unconditional authorization for the removal of debris. 
 
I have designated Andrew Velasquez III, Director of the Illinois Emergency 
Management Agency, as the State Coordinating Officer for this request. Director Velasquez 
will work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in damage assessments and may 
provide further information or justification on my behalf. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Rod R. 
Blagojevich 
Governor 
 
Attachments:  1, 2, 3 & 4 
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Appendix 1.2 Southern Illinois Gubernatorial Appeal of Denial May 23, 2008 
 
 
May 23, 2008 
 
The Honorable George W. Bush 
The President 
The White House 
Washington, D. C. 
 
 Through: 
 
Edward Buikema 
Regional Administrator 
FEMA Region V 
536 South Clark Street, 6
th
 Floor 
Chicago, IL 60605 
 
Dear Mr. President: 
 
 Pursuant to 44 CFR 206.46, I am appealing the April 28, 2008, denial of my April 8, 
2008, request for a major disaster declaration for the State of Illinois.  This appeal is based on 
additional damage to residences in four of the 15 counties that were included in my original 
request for Federal assistance through the Individual Assistance and Hazard Mitigation 
Assistance programs.  This flood, which has resulted in homes in Gallatin County being 
inundated with water and mud for over 30 days, continues to present a disaster recovery situation 
that is beyond the capability of the State and affected local governments. 
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 My original request for Federal disaster assistance was based on flood damages to 
residences in 15 counties.  A joint Federal/State Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) was 
conducted April 2 – 5, 2008.  During that PDA, it was noted by the assessment teams that some 
flooded residences in three counties were inaccessible due to standing flood water.  
Consequently, the extent of damage to those homes was impossible to determine at that time.  
Subsequent to the completion of the PDA conducted in April, the water slowly receded and local 
officials were able to identify additional residences that were destroyed or sustained major 
damage.  The extent of damage to homes that remained flooded for weeks has increased. 
 
 As a result of the denial of Federal assistance to aid the people most severely impacted 
by the flooding in Southern Illinois, it was necessary for the Illinois Emergency Management 
Agency (IEMA) to request Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance in 
conducting a second PDA to verify the extent of damage to those homes that were inaccessible 
in April and to the damaged homes that were identified since the initial PDA.  A PDA to 
accomplish this was conducted and the results are attached.  The attachment details the number 
of residences and extent of damage identified for this disaster as of the conclusion of the PDA on 
May 21, 2008. 
 
 This flood, which began on March 17, 2008, is the fourth flood in Illinois since August 
2007 that requires Federal assistance for an effective recovery.  In August of last year, two 
separate flood events in northern and northeastern Illinois resulted in major disaster declarations 
for the purpose of providing assistance to people with flood damaged homes.  In January 2008, 
two counties in north central Illinois flooded resulting in a major disaster declaration.  This 
Southern Illinois flood is similar to those three federally declared floods in terms of the number 
of residences identified during the respective PDAs that sustained major damage or were 
destroyed.  Following is a comparison of residential damage identified during PDAs in the three 
floods previously declared as major disasters and the two PDAs conducted for this current flood 
where the same type of Federal assistance has been requested: 
 
 August 2007 (Stephenson & Winnebago County) – 128 homes with major damage or 
destroyed 
 
 August 2007 (DeKalb, Grundy, Kane, Lake, LaSalle & Will counties) – 230 homes with 
major damage or destroyed  
 
 January 2008 (Iroquois & Livingston counties) – 238 homes with major damage or 
destroyed 
 
 Current flood (15 Southern Illinois counties) – 228 homes with major damage or 
destroyed 
 
It is vitally important that the same type of Federal disaster assistance be made available to the 
people in all parts of Illinois who were severely impacted as a result of flooding last August, this 
past January and this spring.  Federal assistance was requested and received in the previous three 
floods and it is needed now for the current flood. 
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 It is the Federal assistance through the programs administered by FEMA that will help 
the people in Southern Illinois to recover from this devastating flood.  The flooded area in the 15 
counties has a population that is 48% low income.  The most severely impacted areas have a 
population that is over 70% low income.  Based on the information collected during the PDA for 
this appeal, the estimated cost to the State for the Other Needs Assistance Program will exceed 
$70,699.          
 
      Andrew Velasquez III, Director of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, will 
work with FEMA to provide additional information concerning this appeal if necessary. 
 
       Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Rod R. Blagojevich 
Governor 
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Appendix 1.3 Southern Illinois Presidential Denial of Appeal August 20, 2008 
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Appendix 1.4 Southern Illinois SBA Declaration September 2, 2008 
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Appendix 1.5 Gubernatorial Request (DR-1747) January 18, 2008 
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Appendix 1.6 Gubernatorial Appeal (DR-1747) of Denial February 21, 2008 
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Appendix 1.7 Presidential Disaster Declaration (DR-1747) March 7, 2008 
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Appendix 1.8 Gubernatorial Request (DR-1771) June 13, 2008  
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Appendix 1.8.1 Gubernatorial Request (DR-1771) Addendum June 20, 2008 
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Appendix 1.9 Presidential Disaster Declaration (DR-1771) June 24, 2008 
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Appendix 2: IRB Approval 
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Appendix 3: Publication Permission Documents 
 
 
Copyright Agreement 
1. The following agreement is effective if and when the Article submitted to be published by 
Walter de Gruyter GmbH/ Walter de Gruyter, Inc. (the "Publisher") is accepted. 
2.1 The Author/Editor grants (for U.S. or U.K. government employees: to the extent transferable 
according to applicable law or regulations) to the Publisher the following rights to the Article, 
including any supplemental material, and any parts, extracts or elements thereof: 
 the right to reproduce and distribute the Article in printed form, including print-on-
demand; 
 the right to produce prepublications, reprints, and special editions of the Article; 
 the right to translate the Article into other languages; 
 the right to reproduce the Article using photomechanical or similar means including, but 
not limited to photocopy, and the right to distribute these reproductions; 
 the right to reproduce and distribute the Article electronically or optically on any and all 
data carriers or storage media – especially in machine readable/digitalized form on data 
carriers such as hard drive, CD-Rom, DVD, Blu-ray Disc (BD), Mini-Disk, data tape – 
and the right to reproduce and distribute the Article via these data carriers; the right to 
store the Article in databases, including online databases, and the right of transmission of 
the Article in all technical systems and modes; the right to make the Article available to 
the public or to closed user groups on individual demand, for use on monitors or other 
readers (including e-books), and in printable form for the user, either via the internet, 
other online services, or via internal or external networks. 
2.2. The rights pursuant to clause 2.1 shall be granted as exclusive rights for the duration of the 
copyright, each unlimited in geographic scope. Should the Author wish to reproduce and 
distribute the Article elsewhere after one year following publication, the Author must obtain the 
written consent of the Publisher. Taking into account the interests on both sides, the Publisher 
shall not unreasonably withhold its consent. If the Article is submitted by the Editor, the Editor 
shall inform the Author(s) of this provision. 
2.3. The Publisher may transfer the rights granted to it pursuant to clauses 2.1 and 2.2 in whole 
or in part to third parties, or may grant licenses to third parties to use rights to which it is 
entitled. Any claims from agreements between the Author and reprographic rights societies, in 
particular the German VG Wort, to which the Author is entitled shall remain unaffected. 
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2.4. The Author/Editor furthermore grants the Publisher the exclusive and permanent rights 
without any restriction as to content and territory for all forms of media of expression now 
known or that will be developed in the future. The grant of rights shall also extend to the 
exploitation of rights of use both in the Publisher's own publishing company and through the 
grant (including a partial grant) of rights to third parties in exchange for remuneration or free of 
charge. 
3. Obligations of the Author/Editor  
The Author/Editor warrants that a) Author is the Author of the Article or, if Editor, Editor has 
properly and irrevocably acquired without restriction any and all rights in and to the Article to 
the extent as stated in clause 2.1.; b) Author/Editor is entitled without restriction to grant such 
rights to the Publisher; c) the Article is not libelous and does not infringe on any copyrights, 
performing rights, trademark rights, personal rights or any other third party rights or is otherwise 
unlawful; and d) the Article or substantial parts thereof have not been published elsewhere. 
4. Retention of Rights 
The Author/Editor may deposit an Author-created version of the Article on Author's/Editor's 
funder's or funder's designated repository at the funder's request or as a result of a legal 
obligation, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after official publication. 
Author/Editor may not use the Publisher's PDF version, which is posted on www.degruyter.com, 
for the purpose of that deposit. Additionally, the Author/Editor may deposit the Publisher's PDF 
version of the Article on Author's/Editor's own website or Author's/Editor's institute's designated 
repository, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after official publication. 
Furthermore, the Author/Editor may only post the Article provided acknowledgement is given to 
the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published Article on Publisher's 
website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available 
at www.degruyter.com". The Author/Editor is requested to use the appropriate DOI for the 
Article. 
5. Backup Copy 
The Author/Editor shall be obliged to retain a back-up copy of the manuscript (data file and print 
out or PDF, as well as copy for illustrations). 
6. Reversion of Rights 
All rights pursuant to clauses 2 to 4 shall revert to the Author should the Article be rejected 
during the publication process. 
7. Proofreading 
Upon receiving the proofs, the Author/Editor agrees to promptly check the proofs carefully,  
Copyright © 2011–2014 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH 
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